
Warfare, actively initiated or unwillingly endured, was central to the experience of Greek city-states in the Hellenistic period. The old picture of passive and emasculated poleis, helpless pawns in the geopolitical struggles of the major Hellenistic dynasties, did not survive John Ma’s seminal essay, ‘Fighting Poleis of the Hellenistic World’ (in: H. van Wees, *War and Violence in Ancient Greece*, London 2000, 337–376), which drew attention to the sheer volume of evidence that we possess for inter-polis warfare, civic military institutions, and militaristic ideology in city-states throughout the Hellenistic world. More recently, Angelos Chaniotis’ ‘War in the Hellenistic World’ (Malden, MA/Oxford 2005) provided a brilliant synthetic study of warfare as a cultural phenomenon in the Hellenistic era, and Andrzej Chankowski’s ‘L’Éphébie hellénistique’ (Paris 2010) drew together the abundant evidence for citizen military training in the Greek cities of Asia Minor and the Aegean. Thibaut Boulay’s ‘Arès dans la cité’ is a welcome addition to this scholarly lineage.

This mammoth work (491 pages of text, accompanied by 3,321 footnotes) is a revised version of B.’s 2007 doctoral thesis. The bibliography was closed in 2010, with a few exceptions «pour tenir compte des dernières découvertes épigraphiques». In fact, B.’s use of literature published between 2007 and 2010 is distinctly patchy: so for instance A. V. Walser’s important ‘Bauern und Zinsnehmer’ (München 2008) has left little impact on B.’s discussion of the Ephesian debtors’ law of 299/298 BC (446–52). The long delay in publication seems to have encouraged one member of B.’s thesis jury to publish one of his arguments without due acknowledgement (324 n. 127).

For all its formidable bulk, ‘Arès dans la cité’ is not a comprehensive history of warfare in Hellenistic Asia Minor. B.’s chief interest is in the impact of war on the institutions and civic ideology of Greek poleis, primarily the cities of the west and south coasts of the peninsula: Bithynia, the Troad, Aiolis, Ionia, Karia, Lykia, Pamphylia and Pisidia. (In fact, his focus is almost entirely on the negative impacts of warfare: see further below.) B. is less concerned to distinguish between the different kinds of agents who inflicted violence on Greek cities: maritime piracy, Galatian raiding, local inter-polis conflicts, and Seleukid and Roman ‘big war’ are largely bundled together into a single baggy category of «temps de guerre». One does wonder whether the impact of these various exter-
nal forces was quite as homogeneous as B. implies. So his chapter on the kinds of violence inflicted on defeated cities (255–272: mass enslavement, burning, massacres, rape) in practice draws almost entirely on narratives of victorious royal or Roman armies. Did Greek cities treat one another as viciously as they were handled by Antiochos III, Fimbria, or Mithradates?

Nonetheless, it is hard to over-emphasize the sheer usefulness of this book as a collection of evidence for military institutions and the practice of war in Hellenistic Greek cities. The book is divided into three parts. Part I, 'Prévenir et préparer la guerre' (25–155), focuses on the institutions which cities developed to ensure their successful defence against external enemies: the military training of young citizens, primarily through the ephebeia and the civic gymnasium (25–47); the various spheres in which citizens participated in civic defence (urban and rural garrisons, 49–73); the composition and command-structure of civic armies (75–115, a particularly original and useful chapter); war-fleets and their dockyards and harbours (117–129); urban fortifications, with a focus on their financing rather than their layout or function (131–148); and a few pages on the grain-supply (149–153).

Part II, 'La cité défaite' (159–384), covers a more miscellaneous selection of topics. B. deals first with the pillage and devastation of cities’ territory by invading armies (159–186), with an oddly-placed excursus on arbitration and mediation between warring cities (163–173). Similarly, in the long section on cities under siege (187–254), a crisp account of the practicalities of mobilizing urban defence (188–201) drifts off into an unfocused discussion of mutual defence treaties, alliances between cities, leagues and isopoliteiai (201–216, part of a motley sub-section on ‘Les mesures d’urgence’). Clarity resumes with two excellent chapters on the treatment of captured cities (255–272) and cantonment and the imposition of garrisons on defeated communities (273–307). The following chapter, on ‘Les marques de la sujétion’ (309–333), is by some distance the weakest in the book, consisting as it does of an attempt to summarise in twenty pages the complete range of possible relationships between cities and kings in the Hellenistic world (taxes and exemptions, ‘subject’ status, royal epistatai, royal mints and so forth). More helpful is B.’s discussion of the different kinds of public distress consequent on military defeat (335–384: famine, financial crisis, war-indemnities), though the actions of the publicani in the early Roman province of Asia (370–372, 376–378) are of marginal relevance at best.

Part III, ‘Recomposer la cité’ (387–484), begins with the material reconstruction of devastated cities and sanctuaries (387–397), to which is appended a short discussion of ways in which cities proclaimed and celebrated their independence (397–401: coinage, new civic eras). A chapter on the recomposition of the citizen body (403–421) discusses synoikisms, the return of prisoners of war, and mass citizenship-grants. B. then turns to the internal reconciliation of the citizen body, through the use of foreign judges, amnesties, laws on tyrants and the return of exiles, miscellaneous financial measures (some only very tangentially related to warfare, such as dikai telonikai), and the cult of homonoia (423–460). The final chapter is broadly concerned with the civic memory of war, through the creation of new cults and the celebration of military epiphanies, public commemoration
of specific wars, and monuments to the war-dead (461–484). A short conclusion (485–491), bibliography, and excellent indices follow.

As will be clear from this summary description of its contents, ‘Arès dans la cité’ falls firmly into the long Francophone tradition of histoire des institutions (Robert, Migeotte, Gauthier), both in its approach and in its selection of source material. Written documents, both epigraphic and literary, predominate. Visual evidence is almost completely absent, and the use of archaeology is restricted to some rather cursory generalities about city-walls (142–143, 197). Numismatic material appears only sporadically: Phaselitic coin-iconography (117, with outdated bibliography); emergency hoarding (182–184); civic minting of royal coins (331); coin-minting as a sign of financial distress (358–362); coining and civic freedom (397–398, rather unsatisfactory); the use of bronze coinage (454–455). It is widely acknowledged that intensive periods of minting by Hellenistic monarchs correlated to periods of high military expenditure (e.g. F. de Callataÿ, ‘Guerres et monnayages à l’époque hellénistique’, in: J. Andreau, P. Briant and R. Descat, ‘Économie antique: La guerre dans les économies antiques’, Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges 2000, 337–364), and it would have been nice to know if the same was true of Hellenistic Greek cities.

In the face of B.’s stupendous collection of evidence, it may seem churlish to quibble over absences: few would wish the book any longer. But there are, nonetheless, some rather striking omissions from ‘Arès dans la cité’. Here I shall focus on three: chronology, geography, and the causes of war.

First, chronology. B.’s «époque hellénistique» has little or no internal differentiation. Each chapter cherry-picks items of relevant evidence from the entire period between the death of Alexander and the battle of Actium, with little attempt to draw out trends specific to earlier or later periods. As a result, we are left with no sense of when and why the militaristic culture of the Greek cities of Asia Minor might have emerged, and when and why it disappeared.

B. repeatedly assumes that the militaristic culture of Hellenistic cities in Asia Minor was a direct inheritance from the Classical period. «À l’époque hellénistique, les hoplites ... formaient sans doute, comme à l’époque classique, un élément essentiel des armées civiques» (95); «Comme à l’époque classique, les cités assuraient elles-mêmes leur défense à l’époque hellénistique, et cette question demeurait une préoccupation essentielle» (155); «des l’époque classique, la plupart des cités possédaient une enceinte fortifiée» (173). But just how militarized were the Greek poleis of Asia Minor – as opposed to mainland Greece – during, say, the last seventy years of Achaemenid rule in Anatolia? The evidence for citizen armies in late Achaemenid Asia Minor is far from abundant (96); Persian satraps relied on Greek mercenaries, not civic militias (e.g. X. Hell. 3.1.13). The sources for Alexander’s invasion of western Asia Minor in 334 BC imply that a few Ionian and Karian cities had their own civic armies (Miletos, Myndos, Hali-karnassos: Arr. Anab. 1.18–23), but most of the opposition to the Macedonian conquest clearly came from Persian garrisons, not from citizen militias. We do not know how many of the cities of Asia Minor had a war-fleet at the time of the Macedonian conquest: there was a Kyzikene fleet of war-ships by 318 at the latest (122–123), but this is an isolated example (126). It is possible, as B. claims, that city-walls had been «une nécessité vitale depuis l’époque archaïque» (199),
but the explosion of wall-building in western Asia Minor in the late fourth century BC does rather imply that fortifications were not a major priority in Achaemenid Anatolia (cf. Thuc. 3.33.2).

Might, instead, the decades after the Macedonian conquest have seen a new ‘militarization’ of civic culture in western Asia Minor? After the abrupt collapse of the long *pax Persiana*, the cities of the region were subjected to half a century of near-continuous exogenous violence, first at the hands of a sequence of Macedonian dynasts, then from the Celtic bands that ravaged western Asia Minor from 277 BC onwards. It is easy to see how the twin shocks of Macedonian royal war and Galatian raiding could have fostered a highly militarized civic culture in western Asia Minor (new wall-circuits, adolescent military training, citizen armies), which was gradually extended ‘sideways’ into inter-communal violence between peer polities.

B. also has little to say on the decline of warfare in the late Hellenistic period. «Certes, après la création de la province d’Asie puis d’autres provinces romaines, les conflits entre cités semblent s’éteindre, mais les armées civiques demeurent et les efforts matériels et financiers consentis par les cités pour entretenir leur enceinte défensive furent constants» (487). Yet warfare *did* come to an end: inter-communal violence was not a feature of western Asia Minor in the Julio-Claudian period. In fact, there is strikingly little evidence for warfare of any kind within the Attalid kingdom after 188 BC (only the Galatian war of 168–166 BC and the revolt of Aristonikos after 133 BC). It is true that polis-warfare persisted elsewhere throughout the second century BC (particularly in Karia, Lykia and Pisidia), but after the defeat of Aristonikos, aside from a few low-level conflicts in Karia (B. 163–164, 170–171), inter-polis conflicts effectively ceased. Why? Was civic warfare simply not tolerated by Roman (and, earlier, Attalid) authorities?

The second major omission from B.’s book is geography. B. nowhere defends his choice of ‘Asia Minor’ as a meaningful or heuristically useful geographic unit: indeed, he brings in plenty of evidence from offshore islands such as Samos, Kos, and Rhodes. But was warfare in Hellenistic Asia Minor distinctively different from warfare on the Greek mainland or lands? And, more importantly, do we have any right to generalize about conditions in ‘Asia Minor’ as a whole, in all of its staggering geographic and cultural diversity? Is it really more helpful to compare conditions at (say) Erythrai with the situation at far-off Selge, rather than with nearby Chios or Mytilene?

Only at the very end of the book does B. obliquely address this question of regional variety and specificity. In an important 2004 article (‘Une culture militaire en Asie Mineure hellénistique?’, in: J.-C. Couvenhes and H.-L. Fernoux, ‘Les cités grecques et la guerre en Asie Mineure à l’époque hellénistique’, Tours 2004, 199–220), John Ma pointed out the great variety in the representation and commemoration of war in different parts of Asia Minor: some cities (such as Kibyra or the Hellenized towns of Pisidia) positively bristle with monuments «au décor militaire», while other places (such as Miletos) seem to have had a far less visible military culture (no military tombstones, triumphal monuments, etc.). B. is not convinced: «Je crois qu’il est délicat d’isoler ainsi le champ des représentations de la guerre forgées par les communautés civiques: l’idéal du citoyen-soldat me semble avoir été également partagé par les citoyens de Cyzique, Milet ou Tabai»
This is frankly feeble. Even the most casual reading of B.’s own collection of material reveals the uneven distribution of inter-communal warfare in different parts of Asia Minor. In Ionia, there is a startling concentration of evidence for inter-polis warfare in the Maeander delta region (Miletos, Herakleia, Priene, Magnesia): whatever reason, the cities of the Maeander delta really do seem to have been ‘fighting poleis’ in a way that was not true of, say, the cities of the Çeşme peninsula. The density of material from Karia (particularly coastal western Karia) in B.’s book is also telling: one recalls that Karia was one of the main zones of conflict between Hellenistic dynasts in the late fourth and early third centuries BC. The warlike Pisidians – already notorious for their militarism in pre-Hellenistic periods – continued to fight incessantly through the Hellenistic age; by contrast, we have virtually no evidence for inter-communal warfare in Phrygia at any point in the last three centuries BC. What determined these local variations? Was territory necessarily more contested in broad coastal alluvial valleys (the rivers Maeander, Hermos, or Xanthos) than in mountainous regions or on the high plateau? Did the degree of Hellenization matter? Or was it simply a matter of population density?

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, why did inter-state violence play such a large role in the life of Greek cities in Asia Minor in the last three and a half centuries before Christ? Throughout ‘Arès dans la cité’, B. is almost exclusively concerned with the debit side of the military balance-sheet: state expenditure on military infrastructure (walls, weapons, manpower), the economic and social impact of seeing one’s territory ravaged, and the various unpleasant consequenc-es of defeat and occupation. Symptomatically, almost half the book is dedicated to the experience of ‘La cité défaite’ (159–384), while scarcely a page is given over to la cité victorieuse. This selective emphasis is not unique to B.: Angelos Chaniotis, in his thoughtful paper on ‘The Impact of War on the Economy of Hellenistic Poleis’ (in: Z. H. Archibald, J. K. Davies and V. Gabrielsen, ‘The Economies of Hellenistic Societies, Third to First Centuries BC’, Oxford 2011, 122–141), likewise focuses solely on the economically negative impacts of warfare («the damage caused by war... loss of production... increased demands on manpower and commodities»). This approach has the effect of making warfare appear like a universal brake on economic growth, a mal nécessaire (or not so nécessaire) which cities simply had to knuckle down and endure.

But what about the credit side of the ledger? In inter-polis warfare, for every defeated city there was – to state the obvious – also a victorious city, whose economy would have been boosted by a sudden influx of booty, slave manpower, and new tracts of productive land (not to mention prestige). In extreme cases, when a city ceased to exist altogether (Myous, Kyrbissos, Rhoiteion and Gergis), other cities could reap a magnificent windfall of territory and resources (Miletos, Teos, Ilion). Material benefit of this kind was, after all, the whole point of warfare in the first place (Plato, Rep. 373d–374e). From the perspective of a habitual winner – say, Miletos or Kyzikos – warfare would surely have seemed a much more cheerful business than B.’s book might suggest. And it is not impossible that the fiercely militaristic climate of the early Hellenistic period brought more fundamental structural benefits to the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Thanks to the opening up of the Persian royal treasuries, Alexander’s successors had money to
burn; they spent it, for the most part, on salaried armies of tremendous size. As hoard-evidence vividly shows, the result was a colossal influx of large-denomination silver coinage into the local economies of Asia Minor, as a direct result of expenditure by demobbed mercenaries and veterans flush with cash. Many cities chose to plough this new wealth back into local military infrastructure, in the form of the vast new fortifications dotted across early Hellenistic western Asia Minor (131–143). No doubt both corvée and slave labour played a role in this orgy of construction-work, but as B. notes (132–133), an early Hellenistic subscription-list from Erythrai implies a waged labour-force (I. Erythrai 22), and there is some reason to think that the late third-century walls of Teos were built by labourers paid at a rate of a hemidrachm per day (P. Thonemann, ‘The Hellenistic World: Using Coins as Sources’, Cambridge 2015, 56). As a result, the incessant warfare of the early Hellenistic period could well have ended up as a driver of overall economic growth in western Asia Minor, through a kind of ‘military Keynesianism’, with royal military expenditure injecting new cash into the regional economy as a whole, and civic military expenditure accelerating the circulation of productive capital within particular cities.

This particular reconstruction of the ‘political economy of war’ in early Hellenistic Asia Minor may or may not be correct. But it is a trifle disappointing that B. does not even attempt to ask these kinds of big structural questions about warfare and the Hellenistic polis, in western Asia Minor and elsewhere. Thanks to B.’s heroic compilation of documentary and literary evidence, ‘Arsès dans la cité’ will be an indispensable tool for any future historian of Greek cities at war in the Hellenistic world. But the work of interpretation largely remains for others to pursue.

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Olivier Hekster untersucht, welche Bedeutung die Bezugnahme auf Vorfahren und Dynastien für die Repräsentation der römischen Kaiser hatte. Sein Begriff von Repräsentation ist dabei eng mit dem der Kommunikation verknüpft. Verschiedene soziale Gruppen des Reiches kommunizieren mittels verschiedener Medien auch über dynastische Repräsentationsformen der Kaiser. Ein Schwerpunkt des Buches liegt, was die Medien betrifft, auf den Münzen der Reichsprägung und, was die Kommunikationsgruppen anbelangt, auf Unterschieden und Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Rom und den Provinzen. Bei Heksters Untersuchung wird am Beispiel dynastischer Darstellungen des Kaisers deutlich, daß dessen Repräsentationsformen nicht einfach zentral und autonóm entworfen und dann in den Provinzen rezipiert worden sind, sondern daß sie in einem regional und medial wechselseitigen kommunikativen Austausch entwickelt wurden.

Dieser Ansatz, Repräsentation als Ergebnis reziproker Kommunikationsprozesse in mehreren Medien zu begreifen, hat sich bei der Untersuchung einzelner