rarische Funktion der verglichenen Stellen wird häufig nicht hinreichend berück-
sichtigt, und es fehlt allenalbben an Sinn für die historische Dimension des Tex-
tes; erwähnt seien lediglich der Abschnitt über das spätantike Frauenbild (31–32) 
und der 'Nachtrag: Aspekte des Dankens in einer Monarchie/Diktatur' (41–42). 
Die allhistorische Diskussion über die Handlungsspielräume von Kaiserinnen1 
ist an V. ebenso spurlos vorbeigegangen wie die kulturwissenschaftliche Debatte 
über die literarische Konstruktion von gender.

Marburg

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Andrew Laird: Powers of Expression, Expressions of Power. Speech Presentation and Latin 

Laird’s subject is attractive and important: in what ways do ancient and esp. 
Latin authors (whether of factual or fictional texts) present their characters’ 
words and thoughts? And what does this presentation tell us, e.g., about the 
author’s or characters’ claims to truth and accuracy, about the power relations 
between characters and between author and reader, etc.? Why, for example, does 
Livy render some speeches in direct but others in indirect discourse, while yet 
others are merely summarized? Why, in the ‘Aeneid’, are no responses made to 
most of the speeches that are presented in direct discourse? For approaching 
such questions, L. draws heavily on current literary theories, and one should in-
deed hope that only the most intransigent enemies of ‘theory’ will deny that 
theoretical and esp. narratological notions might well be helpful in this area.

L. does make some interesting points; the most notable will be mentioned be-
low. Nevertheless, this marriage of interpretation and theory is not a happy one 
for either of the partners. This is unfortunate, if only because it may suggest to 
some that any such alliance is bound to be unsuccessful. But ‘theory’ comes in 
many guises, and in fact the book merely shows that this particular specimen of 
theory is an unsuitable husband. L. is an unreliable guide through the labyrinth 
of recent theories, and his own theorizing is disappointing. His interpretations, 
moreover, are often actually independent of the theory, and too frequently im-
plausible in themselves.

The first three chapters, constituting about one third of the book, discuss theo-
retical matters of general import. Chapter 1, apart from exhibiting the problems 
just mentioned, includes extensive treatments of issues that are at best of tangen-
tial interest to L.’s subject, and barely re-appear elsewhere in the book; e.g., the 
(Bakhtinian) notion of the ‘superaddressee’ (18–23), and ‘indexicals’ (25–34). The 
most central subject discussed in chapter 1 is «speech as an index of power» (6–
18). As the example of Odysseus’ maltreatment of Thersites in Iliad 2 illustrates,

1 Dazu jetzt als repräsentative Gesamtdarstellung: H. Temporini (Hrsg.), Die Kaiserin-
nen Roms. Von Livia bis Theodora, München 2002. Speziell zu Eusebia vgl. auch A. Wies-
ber-Scariot, Im Zentrum der Macht. Zur Rolle der Kaiserin an spätantiken Kaiserhöfen am 
Beispiel der Eusebia in den Res gestae des Ammianus Marcellinus, in: A. Winterling 
(Hrsg.), Comitatus. Beiträge zur Erforschung des spätantiken Kaiserhofes, Berlin 1998, 
103–132.
18). As the example of Odysseus’ maltreatment of Thersites in Iliad 2 illustrates, the way that speakers use and are permitted to use their words reflects their authority and power. Speech presentation may thus give us clues to 'ideology'. To this rather unproblematic though important idea, L. adds a development of the notion that «the study of ideology is itself ideological» (12), but while this receives much emphasis, its impact in the remainder of the book is slight, with the exception of the chapter on Petronius (below). Much space is also given to intertextuality. L. rejects the familiar variety of this concept, which is akin to allusion. Instead, he declares his preference for the original, broad version of Kristeva, in which «intertextuality is an inevitable property of every text, because every text functions in terms of other texts» (35). But the integration of this notion into L.’s theme is again sketchy. Moreover, his stance does not stop him from using the narrower concept of intertextuality elsewhere, even if he then avoids the term: see his arguments for significant «resemblances» between texts and his mention of the «influence» of an author (e.g., 238–9, 277).

Further problems include the following. (a) Confusion of the 'standard' version of speech act theory, in which all utterances constitute speech acts, with J. L. Austin’s early ideas, which focused on 'performative utterances' such as promises (3–4; cf. 7, 316). (b) Misrepresentation of the development of the concept of intertextuality: L. (36, with n. 70) ascribes the narrow version (akin to allusion) to Conte (1986), thus implying that it is peculiar to classicists. Yet Van Erp Taalman Kip, in her brief overview in Modern Critical Theory and Classical Literature (ed. I. J. F. De Jong & J. P. Sullivan, Leiden 1994), reports that already in 1974, Kristeva herself dropped the term because it had begun to be used in «le sens banal de ‘critique des sources’ d’un texte». Since L. refers to Van Erp Taalman Kip’s account (35 n. 68), we must conclude that he does so without having read her article with proper attention.

In chapter 2, L. takes Plato as the basis for discussing problems of narratology; in particular, on the basis of Rep. 392–394, he offers an extensive 'critique' of the distinction between what Genette has called 'histoire' (the events in their chronological sequence) and 'récit' (these events as presented in the 'discourse', with all its partiality, chronological displacement, etc.). Speech presentation itself plays a central role here, because an important part of Plato’s discussion consists of a paraphrase by Socrates of Iliad 1,12–42, in which he substitutes indirect for direct discourse. But L.’s discussion of the actual issue is flawed on several counts.

Confusingly for the reader, L. is confused over Plato’s terminology (pace L. 52. 54. 60, mere διήγησις is never used to refer to διήγησις ἀπλῇ, narration without direct speech). More importantly, he claims that Plato’s distinction between λόγος and λέξις corresponds to that between ‘histoire’ and ‘récit’, but under λέξις, Plato discusses only Direct Discourse (μιμήσεις: the poet ‘imitates’ a character) vs. narrator-text (διήγησις ἀπλῇ: the poet speaks as poet); he does not, e.g., mention temporal dislocations or focalization through characters. Finally, L. assumes that all narratologists rigidly adhere to an absolute distinction between ‘histoire’ and ‘récit’: in fact, Rimmon-kenan (o.c. below n. 2, 6–8) needs only three pages for a clear and balanced account which incorporates something like L.’s «critique»; and Chatman’s reasonable stance, quoted by L. himself (47–8), is never actually considered.

In chapter 3, L. turns to the actual forms that speech presentation may take in texts. An interesting notion is that of Angled Narration of Dialogue (101), in
which the words of one speaker are given in direct discourse, those of the other in indirect discourse. This proves fruitful when applied to Petronius (below), but is, surprisingly, only sparingly used elsewhere in the book (and therefore hardly merits the distinction of its own acronym: 'AND'). The core of the chapter, however, is L.'s explanation of his main tools of analysis, the 'speech modes' (87–101). He distinguishes in total seven such modes: A) two direct modes, viz.: 1) Direct Discourse (DD; familiar) and 2) Free Direct Discourse (FDD; see below); B) three indirect modes, viz.: 3) Indirect Discourse (ID), 4) Free Indirect Discourse (FID: 'style indirect libre', 'erlebte Rede'), and 5) Mimetic Indirect Discourse (MID), in which mimetic elements (such as vocabulary typical of the speaking character) are added to standard ID; C) two versions of Record of Speech Act (RSA), in which no clue to the actual wording is given: 6) 'terse' RSA (Aen. 9.2rim de caelo misit Saturnia Iuno) and 7) 'expansive' RSA (in which more details are supplied). This is a good and workable set of categories. Unfortunately, L. fails to mention that, except for his introduction of a new version of FDD, his sevenfold categorization was already formulated in 1978 by McHale (quoted and mostly followed by Rimmon-Kenan and Genette in 1983). Now L. must perhaps be commended for finding Latin examples where his predecessors used modern ones; but he also writes, «My list of speech modes has obviously been developed with the Latin language (and literature) in mind» (89 n. 24) – thus carelessly inviting us to infer that he has devised the categorization himself.

This is ironic, in that L.'s view of FDD (88. 90–4) does seem to be original, and is in any case an improvement on the more usual treatment (of which I omit details). L.'s FDD accommodates the, surprisingly, relatively frequent situations in which we are given a 'quotation' that is nevertheless not 'real' DD, but only an approximation of what was actually said. L. gives the example of Val. Fl. 1631–3, 'tristius an miseris superest mare? ... haec iterant ... : we are given a collective utterance, which conveys an impression of the individual utterances of the members of the group. FDD thus defined also usefully covers the cases, frequent esp. in historians, where a speaker is claimed to have said 'something of this kind' – though it is characteristic of the inconsistency of the book that elsewhere, L. simply neglects such markers (talia, tōūcē, tōūtvus; e.g., on p. 264 Aen. 4.222 tali mandat is translated as 'dictated this message'). In addition, L. suggests (94) that all utterances in verse could be considered FDD; after all, people do not speak in verse. Fortunately he mitigates this philistine approach by noting that here as elsewhere in literature, we 'suspend disbelief'. Indeed, as L. says elsewhere, in fictional narrative, DD 'reported' by the writer/narrator is always by

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1 Of the indirect modes, L. initially (88) mentions only nos. 3 and 4, but adds no. 5 later (95–6).
3 L. does not note that part of his sensible objections (91. 93) to the more usual variant of FDD (basically, untagged DD, i.e., without quotation marks or a verb like 'he said') was already (and rather more elegantly) voiced by Genette (o.c., 56–7).
definition exact (112–3, 152) – a point not new but sensible and necessary. All the more astonishing to see that L., in his later discussion of Aeneas’ lament during the storm in book 1 (Aen. 1.94–101), dons the philistine garb again: this speech must be FDD, because «Aeneas <could not> articulate all this in circumstances such as these», i.e., in the middle of a storm (161; likewise 163–4 on Juno’s speech Aen. 1.37–49). If we must call Vergil’s ‘quotation’ of Aeneas’ words here ‘inexact’, it is because the speech is introduced by tālīa voce refert (1.94); this is one of the occasions where L. chooses to ignore such markers (note their absence from the introduction of Juno’s speech).

These theoretical chapters, then, have some good points, but are generally disappointing.

Chapter 4 offers a discussion of speeches in ancient historiography. For want of space, L. can only note the main issues. L. emphasizes the welcome (but not really new) point that the use of DD should not be taken automatically to imply (a claim to) verbal accuracy; he applies this particularly to Thucydides (143–8; the latter’s frequent use of τοιάδε and τοιάντα, however, remains undiscussed: above). Other points include an in my view inadequate treatment of the expression ipsa verba in Tacitus (127–31); and the proposal of a (rather unpromising) «new model» for the classification of reported discourse in factual narrative (138–43), which is not put to the test.

Chapter 5 deals with several aspects of speech presentation in the ‘Aeneid’. Most notable is the discussion of the beginning of the work, showing how speech presentation helps to draw the reader into the narrative of the poem (157–64); yet it is also here that we find the crude contentions about the speeches of Aeneas and Juno (1.94–101 and 37–49: above). L. also treats the question why the majority of speeches in DD remain unanswered. Two cases are singled out (183–92) where the lack of response has a dramatic effect (6, 455–74; 8, 538–84); for the others, L. offers an explanation in terms of power relations (183–96): in the world of the ‘Aeneid’, «authority has the last word» (194). This is straightforward and not perhaps implausible, but it does not strengthen his case that by way of proof, he resorts to over-interpretations and to sweeping, untenable generalizations about ‘the’ ancient epic genre – we are treated to such statements as: «like modern ethnography, much ancient epic seems to have evolved in the shadow of imperialism» (198).

An example of over-interpretation: the end of Ascanius’ speech to the Trojan women in book 5 (5, 672–3): «en, ego vester! Ascanius! – galeam proiecit inanem. L. contends that «Ascanius uses his own name to set a seal on his claim to authority» (195). But Servius, and Williams (671, note), are surely right that Ascanius’ name here serves to reveal his identity, because (he assumes that) the women do not recognize him: see en, combined with the suddenness of galeam (etc.), and his emphasis not on authority, but, through vester, on his close ties with the women.

Petronius’ ‘Satyricon’, discussed in chapter 6, obviously gives much scope for narratological analysis. The chapter, despite some problems, is accordingly generally the most attractive of the book. Especially interesting is the application (217–21) to the ‘Cena’ of the concept of Angled Narration of Dialogue intro-

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1 Explicitly, e.g., Genette, o.c., 50; I. J. F. de Jong, Narrators and Focalizers, Amsterdam 1987, 178. 193.
duced in chapter 3 (above). The Encolpius of the ‘Cena’ has been described as Petronius’ mouthpiece (L. 216 mentions Veyne), and L. here demonstrates how that is brought about: in this long account, Encolpius generally presents his own utterances indirectly, but those of others in direct discourse. Thus he almost disappears behind his own narrative, turning from an involved character into a ‘transparent’, trustworthy narrator. The most deep-rooted problem in the chapter is the ‘ideological’ approach to Petronius’ (apparent?) parody of vulgar language.

Some problems: (a) In the section on ‘the presentation of Encolpius’ speech’, L. mentions the parallel with the Lucretia-Tarquin-story in 9.2–5 (invoked by Giton himself, as – of course – reported by Encolpius). He comments that the connections with the versions in Livy 1.58.2 and Ov. Fast. 2.791–6 are in the end made by Encolpius (235; cf. 245). But why not by Petronius, through the mouths, but ironically over the heads, of the characters? Or perhaps we are not (meant to be) able to tell? (b) Ideology (247–55): L. accuses scholars of ideological bias in their detection of vulgarisms in the language of lowly characters like Echion, and in their belief that the ‘elegant’ Petronius satirizes this vulgar language. Yet L. himself has no trouble seeing ‘vulgarisms’ in Echion’s self-consciously lower brand of Latin in 46.1–2 (L. 247, 254). In L.’s own view (253–5), Encolpius the narrator, in satirizing ‘lower’ language, is in turn satirized by Petronius, i.e., he is portrayed as a snob. But surely (despite 248, 253), L.’s own characterization of Encolpius here as a trustworthy narrator, i.e. as Petronius’ mouthpiece, forbids us to posit such a distance between Encolpius and Petronius. L. clearly thinks the satire of lower-class characters is objectionable; why the reluctance to blame Petronius?

Chapter 7, called ‘Allegories of representation’, deals with messenger speeches, taken from epic texts ranging from Verg. Aen. to Milton’s ‘Paradise Lost’; it is rounded off by a discussion of Pan (in Plat. Crat.) and Vergil’s Fama. The messenger-scenes are an attractive subject, and although the discussions are selective and sometimes rather unsurprising, fanciful interpretations are here combined with some rewarding pages. A final chapter offers what L. sees as directions for further research.

I note a good analysis of the almost unparalleled way in which Juno tells Iris the message she is to deliver to Hersilia in Ov. Met. 14, 829–39 (L. 285–7); some interesting observations on Val. Fl. (291–6); and a neat point about Milton (296–300). Rather less satisfactory: (a) A fanciful meta-poetic interpretation of Fama in Aen. 4, 188–94, based on the superficial notion that here (despite lines 188, 190), ‘Fama is peddling only facts’ (273–4; inconsistent with this the comment 280); cf., e.g., Austin ad 194. (b) The play with truth and falsity in the interpretation of the story of Ceyx and Alycone in Ov. Met. 11 is misguided (L. 281–5); Ovid’s game with these is different and more elegant.

In the above I have, proportionally speaking, given much space to some interesting points of theory and interpretation in L.’s book, rather than cataloguing the bad points. Yet it will have become clear that these good features are discernible only to readers willing to work their way through much theoretical and interpretational debris. Existing theories are often overstretched or misrepresented; L.’s own ideas are of uneven quality, and the good ones are inconsistently applied. And among the debris are also some remnants, scattered throughout the book, of rhetorical theory: a confusion of speech as such with rhetoric (109); a description of ethos that distorts the concept virtually beyond recognition (312); etc. In short, surprising as it is, the book lacks theoretical sophistication.
All this is aggravated by severe faults of presentation. The very full bibliographical information in the footnotes may impress some, but is often so general as to be useless (e.g., no indication is given that the titles adduced about historiography, n. 1, offer widely diverging views); as already suggested, L. seems to list more than he has (properly) read. Infelicities of style and confusing slips in the English make for difficult reading (64 «the relation between verse and prose to the narrative/story distinction»). Finally, the appearance of the first words of Aen. as arma virum cano (158) may serve as an emblem of the sloppiness of L.’s quotations.

Perhaps most disconcerting are the numerous mistakes in the translations (L.’s own: p. xv) and in other issues of Latin. At best, this suggests a contempt for some of the basics.

Translations: An elbow (cubitum) is transformed into a couch (231; Petr. 329, 9); in Catullus 64, 165, externata malo (‘crazed by woe’) becomes ‘exiled by my evil deed’ (226); etc. Elsewhere too, the Latin has baffled L.: in Petr. 83, 8 (is ergo ad latus constitit meum), ergo is not ‘therefore’ (L. 227 n. 36, following N. Slater), cf. OLD 54; the same applies to igitur in 132, 9 (L. 231).

In short, this book, despite some good ideas, does no justice either to the texts discussed or to the potential of the theories invoked.

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Auf eine knappe Einführung, in der F. neben der Darlegung seiner Intention (S. 3) und Methode (5) zugleich seine Untersuchungsergebnisse skizziert, folgen drei Kapitel oder eher in sich abgeschlossene Essays zu Horaz, Persius und Juvenal. Bereits in der Einleitung wird deutlich, daß man von F. keine neue Untersuchung der einzelnen Satiriker erwarten darf; vielmehr greift er auf stereotype

1 Vgl. Werner A. Krenkel, diese Zeitschr. 68, 1996, 368–70.