Egyptological areas where classical scholars are often deficient, is impressive. Yet these admirable qualities should not conceal the fact that St.’s argument is as extreme and as one-sided as any that has been made on Alexandrian culture, and argued with the quiet passion of a convert. This is a book to be discussed, and it will be debated at length by the scholarly world. There is no way now that the Egyptian frame for the production of Hellenistic poetry can just be ignored. But for me at least, the provocative answer St. gives to how Hellenistic poetry and Egyptian culture interrelate is unconvincing in its social and cultural politics.

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Cratete di Mallo, I frammenti. Edizione, introduzione e note a cura di Maria Broggiato.

Crates, the second-century critic and grammarian, came from Mallos in Cilicia, flourished in Pergamum, quarrelled with the great Aristarch, and ‘was the first to introduce the study of grammar to the city’ of Rome (Suet. gramm. 2. 1). M. Broggiato has assembled his sparse remains. Her edition follows the hallowed pattern: introduction; texts, with apparatus; commentary; indexes. The book is elegantly presented and modestly priced. I have one complaint: there is no translation. Few of the texts are easy, and several are horribly difficult: the most austere scholar would tolerate a crib. Moreover, a translation will often do the work of a commentary, and do it concisely. It is true that a translation would have made a long book longer. It would also have made an excellent book even better.

The Introduction discusses earlier scholarship, reviews the information on life and chronology, sifts the evidence for the writings, and raises a number of general questions – Crates as textual critic, as geographer and astronomer, as aestheteician, as grammarian, as Stoic. The documentation is complete, and the presentation judicious.

One persistent question is this: did Crates write before or after Aristarchus? Much of the evidence B. adduces is illusory; but Varro seems clear: in L. L. 9. 1 (= F 104) he has Crates arguing against Aristarchus (cf. Strabo 1. 2. 25 = F 37), and in 8. 68 (= F 103), he says that ‘this is how Aristarchus wanted to reply to Crates’. Did Crates write before or after Aristarchus? – Both.

B. collects all and only those texts which mention Crates by name (p. lxviii). They are divided into 29 testimonia and 143 fragmenta. The principle of division is not evident, and one or two items classed as fragmenta (e.g. F 132, F 137, F 138) are testimonia if anything is a testimonium. The fragmenta – with one or two exceptions – are not fragments of Crates but snippets from later works. Twenty of the 170 items are asterisked as dubious; and there is a list of half a dozen spuria.

The criterion for doubt is not plain. F 102 (= Phld. poem. 2, PHerc 994 fr. 17) gets an asterisk: the apograph offers ΚΑΠΙΤΗΣ and the papyrus itself shows ΚΡΑΠΙΣ (with rho and alpha perhaps phantoms). F 101 is unasterisked. It too comes from Herculaneum – it is by far the longest text in the collection, and the most important witness to Crates’ views on poetry. The ascription rests on PHerc 1425, col. xxiv 25, where B. prints ΚΩΡΟΣ[θ]. She
says truly that 'the reconstruction is perfectly compatible with the traces of ink visible on the papyrus' (p. 261). No doubt F 102 and F 101 both convey information about Crates. But it is misleading to present F 101 as though its ascription were more secure than that of F 100.

Scholars have seen Crates in texts where there is no whisper of his name. A list of these possibilia, many of which B. mentions in the commentary, would have been useful; and there is a case for printing some at least of them – an edition of fragments ought to err on the side of generosity. Certainly B. owes us Athen. 490f, the continuation of F 59; see p. 226.

The texts are divided into eleven groups, the last of them labelled 'varia'. The division is thematic; for the sources rarely indicate a book-title – and virtually anything may find its way into a discussion of Homer. In any event, more than half the passages deal with Homer. Crates' guiding thesis – that Homer anticipated a Eudoxan cosmology for the universe and an Eratosthenean geography for the Earth – was recognized as dotty in antiquity (see Strabo, p. 261).

The smallest part of an utterance – he said 'smallest part' relative to the whole structure of articulated speech. The Suda entry s.v. Κρατέττας begins thus: 'Son of Timocrates, Stoic philosopher,...'. The surviving remnants have accordingly been combed for Stoic influence or Stoic interests. B. claims that there are 'precise links between the contents of Crates' work and the teachings of the Stoic school' (p. lxiii). She mentions three texts – and the index, s.v. 'Stoicism', adds a further dozen. Most of these passages have nothing particularly to do with the Stoics.

Thus according to F 7 = Steph. Byz. s.v. Τάγματος, Crates thinks that Homer's Tartarus is the thick, cold and dark air beneath the poles. 'This interpretation is not far from the Stoic one' (p. 148). In the proof-text (Plut. prim. frg. 94EF), the Stoics are said to hold that the primary cold is also the primary dark, and to adduce an etymology of the name 'Tartarus'. There is no Homeric exegesis there; and the passage is not concerned with the location of Tartarus. – In F 24 = Σ 496–498, Crates opines that it is better for young men to read certain Homeric verses than Tyrtaeus. B. finds 'an interesting parallel' in Cleanthes and in Seneca, each of whom claimed that poetry has a more powerful effect on us than prose (p. 186). What parallel? – Crates claimed (F 94 = S.E. M I 79) that, whereas a grammarian need only know about glosses and accentuation and the like, a critic must 'be experienced in the whole of λόγικη ἐπιστήμη', i.e. must know about every aspect of λόγος. According to B., the expression 'λόγικη ἐπιστήμη' is taken to refer to the set of philosophical doctrines bearing on language and the interpretation of literary texts; and the philosophical system to which reference is made is generally identified with Stoicism' (p. 249). But there is no allusion to any 'philosophical system', whether Stoic or not. – According to F 95 = Σ D.Thr. GG I iii 316. 24–26, 'Crates defines a letter thus: 'The smallest part of an utterance' – he said 'smallest part' relative to the whole structure of articulated

https://doi.org/10.17104/0017-1417_2005_2_104

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utterance’. B. comments that ‘the expression (τῆς ὀρθομμέτου ψηφιώτης) was a piece of Stoic terminology’ (p.252). Rather, it was an ordinary piece of linguistic jargon – and in any event the scholiast does not ascribe it to Crates. (So far as I know, no Stoic definition of στοιχείον has been preserved – the texts in Hülser, FDS 519–528, have no particular connexion with any Stoic.)

The three primary texts are these. (1) F 2 = Σ Α 66: Crates and Persaeus say that Achilles was neither prudent nor temperate nor courageous. This – pace p. 142 – does not presuppose any Stoic theory of the virtues; and only if you believe in guilt by association will you take it as evidence that Crates was a Stoic. (2) F 37 = Geminus, xvi 21–22: ‘Some of the older thinkers, among them Cleanthes the Stoic philosopher, affirmed that the Ocean flows beneath the torrid zone, between the tropics. Following them, Crates the grammarian ... makes the Ocean lie between the tropics, saying that in the whole of the description he follows the mathematicians’. Crates shared a view with a Stoic – along with several other thinkers; and although Geminus has him ‘follow’ Cleanthes and the rest, he himself claimed to be following ‘the mathematicians’. (3) F 104 = Varro, L. L. 9. 1: ‘Crates, a notable grammarian, relied on Chrysippus (a most astute thinker who left three books ‘On Anomaly’) when he attacked analogy and Aristarchus – yet in such a way, as his own writings reveal, that he seems to have understood the intention of neither of them’. This is indeed evidence that Crates had read a Stoic work – and that he had misunderstood it. But it is hardly evidence of Stoicism.

These texts seem to me to show nothing, whether individually or collectively; and even scholars who persist in finding a Stoic tincture in one or more of them will not discover a single reference to any centrally or characteristically Stoic doctrine. Perhaps Crates was a thoroughly Stoic thinker, although the surviving evidence happens not to show his philosophical leanings? Perhaps. But the only reason we have to search for Stoicism in Crates is the entry in the Suda; and it may be suspected that this entry, like so many others in that genial omnium-gatherum, is botched.

Ceaulmont

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This is a good time to be studying later Greek rhetoric, thanks not least to the stream of important new editions that Patillon has published in recent years. To Theon, [Apsines], the fragments of Longinus, and Rufus, he now adds the two treatises falsely attributed to Aelius Aristides. These treatises, on the style of political and plain (διάλεκτης) discourse respectively (henceforth Pol. and Aph.), are the earliest extant works on the stylistic categories which Greek rhetoricians (though not the author of Pol.) came to call ‘ideas’.

In constituting the text P. makes use of Par. suppl. gr. 675, which preserves a tradition independent of Par. gr. 1741, and contributes numerous conjectures of his own as well as weighing afresh earlier proposals. The improvements in Pol. are mainly minor; the text of Aph. is less well preserved, and requires more sig-