utterance’. B. comments that ‘the expression (τῆς ἀρχηγίμετου ψωφιῆς) was a piece of Stoic terminology’ (p.252). Rather, it was an ordinary piece of linguistic jargon – and in any event the scholiast does not ascribe it to Crates. (So far as I know, no Stoic definition of ὁργίμος has been preserved – the texts in Hülser, FDS 519–528, have no particular connection with any Stoic.)

The three primary texts are these. (1) F 2 = Σ Α 66: Crates and Persaeus say that Achilles was neither prudent nor temperate nor courageous. This – pace p. 142 – does not presuppose any Stoic theory of the virtues; and only if you believe in guilt by association will you take it as evidence that Crates was a Stoic. (2) F 37 = Geminus, xvi 21–22: ‘Some of the older thinkers, among them Cleanthes the Stoic philosopher, affirmed that the Ocean flows beneath the torrid zone, between the tropics. Following them, Crates the grammarian … makes the Ocean lie between the tropics, saying that in the whole of the description he follows the mathematicians’. Crates shared a view with a Stoic – along with several other thinkers; and although Geminus has him ‘follow’ Cleanthes and the rest, he himself claimed to be following ‘the mathematicians’. (3) F 104 = Varro, L. L. 9. 1: ‘Crates, a notable grammarian, relied on Chrysippus (a most astute thinker who left three books ‘On Anomaly’) when he attacked analogy and Aristarchus – yet in such a way, as his own writings reveal, that he seems to have understood the intention of neither of them’. This is indeed evidence that Crates had read a Stoic work – and that he had misunderstood it. But it is hardly evidence of Stoicism.

These texts seem to me to show nothing, whether individually or collectively; and even scholars who persist in finding a Stoic tincture in one or more of them will not discover a single reference to any centrally or characteristically Stoic doctrine. Perhaps Crates was a thoroughly Stoic thinker, although the surviving evidence happens not to show his philosophical leanings? Perhaps. But the only reason we have to search for Stoicism in Crates is the entry in the Suda; and it may be suspected that this entry, like so many others in that genial omnium-gatherum, is botched.

Ceaulmont

Jonathan Barnes


This is a good time to be studying later Greek rhetoric, thanks not least to the stream of important new editions that Patillon has published in recent years. To Theon, [Apsines], the fragments of Longinus, and Rufus, he now adds the two treatises falsely attributed to Aelius Aristides. These treatises, on the style of political and plain (ἀπόδια) discourse respectively (henceforth Pol. and Aph.), are the earliest extant works on the stylistic categories which Greek rhetoricians (though not the author of Pol.) came to call ‘ideas’.

In constituting the text P. makes use of Par. suppl. gr. 670, which preserves a tradition independent of Par. gr. 1741, and contributes numerous conjectures of his own as well as weighing afresh earlier proposals. The improvements in Pol. are mainly minor; the text of Aph. is less well preserved, and requires more sig-
significant (and inevitably more uncertain) interventions. P.’s text supersedes Schmid’s 1926 Teubner; but Schmid did his work well, and the overall advance, though definite, is not radical. In other respects these two volumes mark a much more significant advance. The supporting material is far richer than anything available hitherto: the first complete translation into a modern language (Ian Rutherford translated Aph. into English in ‘Canons of Style in the Antonine Age: idea-theory and its literary context’ [Oxford 1998]); 280 pages of introductory essays (a general introduction, including an extended study of the earlier history of stylistic theory, and lengthy ‘notices’ to each book); extensive annotation. Those familiar with P.’s earlier work will not need to be told that he writes with an expert knowledge of the history of ancient stylistic theory; and he provides a generous, but just and perceptive, appreciation of the merits of these works. The following observations are a small tribute to the stimulus his work provides.

The attribution to Aristides can be traced back at least as far as the learned late ancient commentary on [Hermogenes] ‘On Method’ that was the common source of Gregory of Corinth and John Diaconus (see Rabe RM 63, 1926, 113, overlooked on p.ix). It is certainly incorrect, but little else is certain. The two treatises present many problems. Pol. falls into three parts: in the first the theoretical exposition is richly illustrated, mainly from Demosthenes; the examples disappear entirely from the second part (129–140); the last part (141–186), a collection of miscellaneous pieces, is not on any view an integral part of the original text; Aph. contains doublets and structural oddities; the two books differ in terminology and doctrine. To account for these facts P. proposes a complex redactional history. Pol. combines a work by Basilic us with material from an abridgement of a work by Dionysius of Miletus; the additional material was later grafted on to that. Still later Aph., a work by Aelius Harpocration that had already suffered interpolation, was added to that composite (with some editorial modification) to produce the two books as transmitted. Redactional theories often raise methodological worries, and this is no exception. If we are free to postulate redactors interventionist enough to explain away the signs of an integrated whole (e.g. the fact that the introduction to Pol. covers all of 1–140) but not interventionist enough to have eliminated what we take to be signs to the contrary (e.g. discrepancies between Pol. and Aph., disruptive interpolations), we risk making explanation too easy. A theory of this kind must display significant superiority in explanatory power if it is to earn our assent. So how strong is the case for a second source for Pol.? The methodology in 1–128 and 129–40 is strikingly similar, except for the absence of examples after 129, a difference for which more than one explanation is possible. P. acknowledges that the text might have been abbreviated in transmission; it might also be incomplete. One could imagine the author setting out his theoretical framework in a first draft, and then starting to supplement this outline with examples, but never completing this revision. The unintegrated afterthought at Pol. 88 might be symptomatic of this incompleteness (avoiding the need for P.’s transposition).

P. lists items of vocabulary in 129–40 that do not recur elsewhere in 1–140; these, he claims, are sufficient to establish the difference in authorship. He offers no test of the significance of the data, but his word-index makes it relatively easy to supply one (though this exercise brought to light some omissions and false references in the index). The first section of text of comparable length that P. does not suspect of adaptation (3–11, excluding the Demosthenic quotations) contains 34 words that do not recur elsewhere in 1–140: this is more than P. thinks sufficient to diagnose separate authorship in the case of 129–140. There is
one complication: 4 of these words are in 1.8, which is widely held to be interpolated from Tiberius’ treatise on Demosthenic figures (thus Schmid, and Tiberius’ editor Ballaira). Consistency suggests that P. should find this section’s vocabulary suspicious, but he does not consider the point when he argues that the passage is authentic in Pol., interpolated in Tiberius. I am inclined to support P.’s conclusion (though I find his text hard to believe at points). But even if he is wrong, dropping 8 from the sample and adding 12 to compensate only brings the count of unique words down to 32, still more than P. finds in 129–40. The vocabulary test fails to support the case for two sources.

One point on which P. lays particular stress is that ἐπίνουσα is used only in 129–140. In this section ἐπίνουσα appears alongside νόημα; the rest of Pol. varies between νόημα, ἐννόημα, ἐννοου and (unless one has already accepted P.’s redactional theory) ἐπίνουμα (2); Aph. varies between ἐννόημα, ἐννοου and ἐπίνουμα. Given this level of terminological variation the distribution of a single term is not compelling evidence for a change of source in Pol. – or, indeed, for different authorship of the two books. Since some of the words that P. singles out in 129–140 also appear in Aph., it is natural to wonder whether we do not, after all, have two works by the same author. If Pol. is incomplete, perhaps the doublets and structural problems in Aph. likewise result from the author’s failure to complete his project.

Against common authorship one may note that, whereas Pol. 2 analyses style in terms of thought, figure and expression, the corresponding scheme in Aph. 2 adds rhythm; the manner of treatment (μεταχειρισμός) of thoughts, never mentioned in Pol., is added soon after (4). On the other hand, rhythm and manner of treatment are introduced in Aph. to distinguish political from plain styles, not as a tool for discriminating different types of political style; arguably, therefore, they are introduced at the point they become relevant. Moreover, rhythm does appear in Pol. 16 as transmitted: P. follows Schmid in a deletion here, but in so far as this rests on the mention of rhythm (I see no other compelling reason) there is a risk of circularity. In another respect, however, Aph.’s scheme may be further from that of Pol. than P. recognises. He interprets Aph. 2 as equating expression and diction, with figure as a separate category as in Pol. 2; but the distribution of connectives points to a hierarchical structure: thought and expression, the latter subdivided into diction, figure and rhythm (cf. the epitomator quoted on p.lxxiv). Since there are other apparent doctrinal differences (not least a divergence with regard to the range of types of styles recognised), the most reasonable conclusion to draw is that the treatises are the work of different authors.

It is not a criticism of P. to point out that his attributions are speculative and unprovable: the incompleteness of the evidence makes that inevitable. He rightly discounts Zeno, whose work on ideas is a phantom produced by a Byzantine misunderstanding of Syrianus. But we should also discount Dionysius of Miletus: since John of Sicily explicitly names Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Aристides as writers on ideas at RG 6.95.4f. it is reckless to treat his reference to Aristides and Dionysius at RG 6.111.24–30 as evidence for an otherwise unattested work by another, less well-known Dionysius. We lose nothing by this elimination if, as I have argued, P.’s two-source theory about Pol. 1–140 is unnecessary. There is nothing to be said against Basilicus, long a favoured candidate for Pol. (a work on Demosthenes’ style is attested by Syrianus), or Aelius Harpocratio (who wrote on ideas and on Xenophon: Suda A4013). If, however, Aelius Har-
pocration was the Harpocration of the Anonymus Seguerianus, one would expect to find significant connections between Aph. and the stylistic material attributed to Harpocration in Anonymus; so far as I can see there is none. We have no reason to assume this identification, and P.’s attribution is more plausible if it is relinquished. Even so, since neither Basilicus’ nor Harpocration’s claim to authorship is supported by positive evidence, it would perhaps have been wiser to adopt a more neutral way of referring to the authors of the treatises.

P. also identifies Aelius Harpocration with the Harpocration who criticised Hermogenes on a disputed point in issue-theory (RG 7.349.24–6). That, though not certain, seems to me more plausible; and if it could be established that Hermogenes knew Aph. it would follow from P.’s attribution that Harpocration and Hermogenes were contemporaries who interacted. But the evidence for Hermogenes’ knowledge of Aph. is unfortunately inconclusive. We should certainly not attempt to determine chronological order on the assumption that the theory became progressively more elaborate, as P. is inclined to do. We know a little about what the theory became in the hands of Tiberius, who wrote three books on ideas (Suda T 350). The elements of his analysis of styles were thought, figure and diction (F 2 Ballaira = RG. 7.1041 n.14). This is the same scheme as Pol., and much simpler than the eight elements in Hermogenes’ analysis. Tiberius’ system of ideas may also have been simpler than Hermogenes’, since he did not make the distinction between ἐνέχων and καθωτός as species of σωφρίνος (F 3 = RG 7.911.5–18). Yet Tiberius must postdate Hermogenes (his work on figures cites Apsines). Tiberius also, interestingly, wrote a work ‘On Demosthenes and Xenophon’, a parallel to the pairing of Pol. and Aph. The detailed contents of the fragments make it impossible to attribute either treatise to him, but he was clearly working in the same tradition; indeed, if P. is right about Pol. 8, we can observe Tiberius making use of one of his predecessor’s work.

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On imagine assez mal aujourd’hui combien un document comme la ‘Bibliothèque’ de Photios représentait un brûlot au moment où, vers le milieu du XVIe s., il commença à circuler sous les manteaux des principaux intellectuels d’ Europe occidentale. Déjà de son temps, celui qui fut probablement le savant le plus prodigieux de Byzance fut une cause de divisions: deux destitutions, pas de biographie et la responsabilité d’un schisme qu’on lui prêta à tort. Est-ce uniquement un hasard si la seule édition critique véritable et la seule traduction en une langue vernaculaire, œuvres toutes deux de R. Henry, parurent seulement dans la seconde moitié du XXe s.? En consacrant de vastes recherches à l’invention du texte et à ses premières éditions, L. Canfora, entouré d’une importante équipe de collaborateurs, comble une lacune et continue ainsi des travaux antérieurs sur l’histoire des bibliothèques dans l’Antiquité et à l’époque byzantine.

Un premier livre avait été consacré à l’édition, réalisée, par Jean et David Berthelin, à Rouen (la Rothomagensis) en 1653 (La biblioteca del patriarca. Fozio censurato nella Fran-