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According to Gagarin, Antiphon was a pioneer in forensic oratory who laid the groundwork for the genre of oratory which came to replace drama as the most important medium of cultural activity in fourth-century Athens (5). He was thus as pivotal a figure for oratory as Socrates was for philosophy. This indeed is a large claim and one that G. seeks to support by arguing, as he has in the past, for a unified Antiphon. The aim of the book, then, is to «reunite the person of Antiphon and all his surviving works into one coherent figure» in order to assess his career and his importance to the development of Attic oratory (2). A unified Antiphon seems the simplest and most sensible solution based on the available evidence, though G. is careful not to press that evidence too far and is prepared to admit that it is by no means conclusive. But that’s the catch: those who are not prepared to accept a unified Antiphon will reject out of hand his premise that «to the extent that putting the pieces of Antiphon back together again produces a coherent, interesting and plausible picture of this fifth-century intellectual, it will support the case for a single Antiphon» (7). The circularity of the logic is clear and G.’s observations and arguments can cut both ways. Stylistic differences between different works can suggest that a single Antiphon targeted different audiences and for the unitarian easily account for the differences and enhance his appreciation of Antiphon’s sophistication as a writer, or they can suggest to modern separatists, as they had to ancient critics, different Antiphons, working in different mediums. The problem may be intractable but in the end G. has presented a highly accessible and sensible treatment of Antiphon and his works and the sophistic age in general.

In chapter one G. discusses the sophistic background to Antiphon. Characteristic of the sophists was their spirit of enquiry and skepticism (13). The innovative nature of their activity led them to challenge traditional thinking in ways that were provocative, paradoxical and playful (16). New ideas led to new styles of writing and new forms of intellectual activity that involved public performance and debate.

In particular, the writing down of oral performances led to a new form of sophistic discourse, Antilogiae, or opposing arguments (22) which were intended not so much for public performance as to display a sophist’s skill at argumentation and to examine new ways of thinking about legal, ethical and political issues. Antiphon’s Tetralogies, as G. argues in this and subsequent chapters, are a form of Antilogiae. According to G., it is misleading to suggest that the sophists were primarily interested in rhetoric but they were
interested in λόγος and in arguing both sides of an issue, which can lead to a greater grasp of the truth. Antiphon’s second Tetralogy, for instance, shows «that making a strong case for the prima facie weaker logos ... can lead to a deeper understanding of the issues of causation and responsibility» (26). Though truth was a primary goal of the sophists, they were aware that it was «often a matter of judgement rather than fact» and had to be «constructed and conveyed by logos and the same set of facts may give rise to different logos» (28). Once G. has set the sophistic background, he can then proceed to show how Antiphon «helped shape the sophistic views ... then drew on these views specifically to advance the study and practice of forensic oratory» (36).

In chapter two G. argues for a single Antiphon, providing a balanced analysis of the available evidence. The argument that Xenophon’s designation of Antiphon in the Memorabilia (1.6) as «the Sophist» was intended to distinguish this Antiphon from Antiphon of Rhamnus is, I think, thoughtfully dealt with by G.; this leaves stylistic differences as the only reasons given in antiquity for two separate Antiphons (43). Moreover, modern arguments based on doctrinal differences between the forensic and sophistic works, particularly ‘Truth’, seem no more compelling to G. In the case of the Tetralogies whose authenticity are sometimes denied based on legal and linguistic considerations, G. argues that because they belong to the sophistic tradition of Antilogiae, which were intended to explore new ways of thinking about ethical and legal issues and so develop skills in argument, the Tetralogies were never intended to teach the techniques of the court (55). Thus the Tetralogies give a general Athenian background but do not adhere to the precise details of the Athenian court (36). Instead they concentrate on methods of argument and issues that are much too narrowly focused for the courtroom.

Tetralogy 1 deals almost exclusively with arguments of probability, Tetralogy 2 with the question of agency and Tetralogy 3 with causation. Against linguistics arguments that might suggest a different author, namely the presence of Ionicisms, G. notes that early prose was written in Ionic and the Tetralogies were composed against that background. Moreover, the syntactical complexities of the Tetralogies can be explained by the mode of communication envisioned for them: they were written to be read and studied and not for oral presentation (62). For G., then «the clear differences in language and style of the Tetralogies and the courtroom speeches ... do not constitute evidence for separate authorship» (61).

In chapters three to six G. deals with Antiphon’s separate works in the following order: ‘Truth’, ‘Concord’, Tetralogies and finally the courtroom speeches. G. takes issue with Bilik’s suggestion that the papyrus fragments of ‘Truth’ are not from Antiphon but from another work of an unknown writer of the same period.

Instead G. argues that though the surviving fragments of ‘Truth’ deal with a different subject matter from ‘Concord’, these differences can be explained by the intended audience of each work: «Truth is a scientific work that treats many of the main intellectual issues of the day» (65) and as such responds to Protagoras’ ‘Truth’ (83); ‘Concord’, by contrast, «is more concerned with common human behavior and seems addressed to a general audience’ (65). Moreover, differences in content may also account for the stylistic differences between the two works, with ‘Concord’ being stylistically closer to Antiphon’s forensic speeches. Again as G. so often argues in this book, differences in content and style suggest only different purposes and different audiences for the two works, not different authors (65). In the fragments of ‘Truth’ there are many signs of the paratactic style; the
high number of pairs among the connectives indicates a high degree of parallelism, which often appears as πρὸς τὸν τοῦτον, "a feature of sophistic style especially associated with Gorgias" (90). Antiphon, however, avoids Gorgias’ verbal effects and is more intent on creating clear logical and reasoned arguments instead. But characteristic of sophistic writing there is a tendency to abstraction (90–91). Though the content of ‘Truth’ and ‘Concord’ can be reconciled in G.’s estimation, the two works clearly take different approaches to issues because they were written for different audiences. In terms of stylistic differences, ‘Concord’ is more rhetorical and less intensely analytical; ... it addresses popular concerns rather than the concerns of contemporary intellectuals as is the case of ‘Truth’ (97). Further, ‘Concord’ was written for oral presentation rather than reading, though not stylistically as oral as Gorgias’ ‘Helen’. Despite these differences there are also stylistic similarities; ‘Concord’ has ‘a generally paratactic style with a moderate amount of balanced phrasing and πρὸς τὸν τοῦτον’ (98), but is less logical than ‘Truth’ and with little of the abstraction of ‘Truth’.

The Tetralogies were not written for delivery but as Antilogiae. In the Tetralogies there is little or no narrative, circumstantial details are kept to the minimum and all effort is concentrated on argument (124). The complex style and complex argument suggest that the Tetralogies were written not for delivery in court but for reading and were intended for other intellectuals (125).

Tetralogy 1 involves a dispute over fact and provides a meta-discourse about proof, exploring the relative value of probability arguments (112–118). Tetralogy 2, where the facts are not in dispute as in Tetralogy 1, deals with questions of guilt and is concerned with the relationship between facts and speech (119); it presents a complex symbiosis of the two in which facts control words, but words also control facts, since truth of these facts depends on the words that represent them (119). This meta-discourse about the relationship between πρὸς τὸν τοῦτον and λόγος resonates with the views of several other fifth-century thinkers (119). Tetralogy 3, which focuses primarily on causation, picks up augments found in the first two Tetralogies but adds new arguments of its own, particularly on the relationship between πρὸς τὸν τοῦτον and λόγος, another important sophistic concern, and concludes that probability arguments belong on the side of λόγος (127–132). The fact that Tetralogy 3 alludes to arguments in the first two Tetralogies suggests that the works were composed as a group. As a whole they engage in a meta-discourse in which Antiphon explores a number of issues that were a concern of other sophists and suggest an alignment of probability, discourse and law on the one hand against direct evidence, facts and nature on the other (134).

G.’s discussion of the courtroom speeches (chapter 6) begins with a brief and highly accessible introduction to Athenian homicide law and continues with a examination of each speech that highlights Antiphon’s skill at composing forensic speeches.

Antiphon 6, ‘On the Chorus Boy’, hinges like Tetralogy 2 on the interpretation of facts; the accused χαριτὸς provides a narrowly circumscribed denial of responsibility, a deliberate strategy by Antiphon, since a detailed description of what happened might not support the defendant’s case and could implicate his associates. Rather he draws attention to the plaintiff’s conduct after the boy’s death that suggests that he had ulterior motives for his prosecution (141–142). For Antiphon 1, ‘Against the Stepmother’, which most scholars regard as a weak case, since the plaintiff offers no witnesses or other direct evidence, G. provides a very different assessment, which highlights the actual strength of the case and Antiphon’s forensic skill. Based on Aristotle’s comments in ‘Magna Moralia’ (1288b29–39), where a similar case of poisoning is described, scholars have assumed that the central issue in this case was whether the stepmother intended to give her husband a love potion or intended to poison him, that is deliberately kill him (148–149). But, as G. points out, the speaker of Antiphon 1 shows no interest in this question or even whether the step-
mother thought the drug was a poison or not, but rather his concern is simply with showing that she planned the whole thing. Antiphon’s strategy, then, is to portray her as the primary agent in a plot to administer a drug (150), which in and of itself is sinister. The case involving the murder of Herodes (Antiphon 3) presented Antiphon with different problems and called for a different forensic strategy. Since Antiphon could not make a strong direct argument for Euxitheus’ innocence, his strategy was “to cast doubt on the prosecution’s arguments by demonstrating the complexity and uncertainty of all arguments in this case” (155). The narrative provides a clear and detailed account of events before and after Herodes’ disappearance which conceals the fact that Euxitheus provides little information about the central episode that would prove his innocence: the drinking on the boat and Herodes’ departure. “The simple, direct, diachronic narrative seems to confirm Euxitheus’ innocence; by contrast, the complex, repetitious, and chronologically disordered sequence of arguments that follows suggest that these matters are debatable and uncertain” (155). Here Antiphon’s strategy has been “to produce confusion rather than clarity” (165). The analyses that G. provides for all three speeches highlight clearly Antiphon’s logographic skill and “show that he carefully constructed each speech to fit the needs of his clients” (164). As such the speeches “stand as pioneering works of logography” (164).

G. concludes the book with a short chapter, ‘From Sophists to Forensic Oratory’, in which he summarizes Antiphon’s works, emphasizing the continuity between the various works in a way that tries to highlight Antiphon’s pioneering effort in the area of forensic oratory. G.’s conclusions are all premised on a unified Antiphon, and those who do not accept this premise will not accept his general conclusions. According to G., Antiphon paid attention to style; his earlier works, which were aimed at intellectuals, were written in a complex, analytical style unsuited for oral delivery. Since he was the first to write speeches for delivery in court, he was forced to create a new style different from the intellectual argumentation of his other works and suited for oral delivery. “Thus Antiphon’s style changed over time” (171). In the Tetralogies Antiphon experiments with the new sophistic form of discourse, Antilogiae. “The structure of opposing λόγοι representing different perspectives on an act or event is also incorporated, though in a different form, into Truth. Here Antiphon introduces two perspectives with a single voice...” (173). Though the forensic speeches, unlike the Tetralogies, must cover a “full range of issues and arguments that might support the case”, they “noneetheless show the influence of the methods of arguments of other works”, the similarity being most evident between the arguments of Tetralogy 1 and Antiphon 3 (171). In terms of thought, two subjects stand out: 1) nature, law and justice and 2) words, deeds and truth. The first occupies the text of ‘Truth’; the second is explored implicitly in ‘Truth’ and explicitly in the Tetralogies (174), which also explore the connection between justice and nature. Courtroom speeches also raise concerns about justice and law, but given the forensic context that seems natural and need not necessarily stem from a sophistic mind. On this particular point, then, G. needs to draw clearer the line of continuity of thought between the courtroom speeches and the sophistic works. It is not clear to me how Antiphon’s sophistic works influenced the development in forensic oratory of ad hominem attacks which are “are presented as central to the justice of the case” (176) and are often found alongside expressions of support for law and justice. This practice, which according to G. may have been introduced by Antiphon, though he is ready to admit that it may have already been a feature

https://doi.org/10.17104/0017-1417_2005_5_398
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of Athenian law, continues in fourth century forensic discourse. Finally the other major interest of Antiphon is «truth and its relation to words and deeds» (176). The surviving fragments of 'Truth' only hint at what form the discussion might have taken but they at least suggest that though «truth lies in the correspondence of word and deed, correspondence does not yield a single, unequivocal truth» (176). A discussion of the relation between words and deeds and truth can also be found in the Tetralogies and in the forensic speeches. In this case the line of continuity drawn by G. seems clearer.

In the end G. concludes that the main influence of sophistic thinking was not on later thinkers but on the new genre of public discourse, forensic oratory. And in that Antiphon «deserves more credit than he has received as the pivotal figure between the intellectual achievements of fifth-century sophists and fourth-century politicians and logographers» (182). This may be true but to make his case more convincing, G.'s conclusion needs to explore this point more fully than he has, offering more parallels between Antiphon's works and later fourth-century oratory. This may be the only weakness in an otherwise highly accessible treatment of Antiphon.

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This is how a former editor of Nicander put it: «Some day, it may be, a better Greek scholar and more skilful emender than I will summon to his aid from among scientists familiar with the Levant a botanist, a herbalist, a herpetologist, and an entomologist, empanel for consultations a small body of medical men who have practised in the Near East, and produce an annotated text and translation of Nicander». Gow ([1951], 95) was well aware of the severe requirements to do the job properly – and he was right in everything except that it took a smaller number of people.

The history of the editions of Nicander of Colophon is quite straightforward and, until recently, frustrating. The first edition worth speaking of was that of...