Unrecht: «Da das Öl Christi ... gar keine Sünde an sich hat ...» In *Sermo* 266,4 wird Simon der Magier erwähnt, der meinte, daß der Geist Gottes durch Menschenhand geschenkt wurde. Augustin betont dagegen, daß der Geist Gabe aus Gottes Hand zugunsten der Menschen ist. Verf. folgt hier, mit einer kleinen Textveränderung, wieder M: *venit ut deus et implevit, venit ut dominus et (M ut) redemit.* Die Mauriner Ausgabe hat: *venit ut deus et implevit, ut venit dominus et redemit.* In dieser Fassung ist *dominus* ‘prädikativ': `als er als der Herr kam`. Es scheint mir, daß Verf. mit Recht M bevorzugen: sein Text bietet ein schönes `Asyndeton` mit Parallelismus. In *Sermo* 266,8 fügt M ganz am Ende die Worte *ergo deneceps lectiones attentius audiamus* zu, die die Ausgabe der Mauriner nicht hat. Verf. folgt M und schließt daraus (94), daß im Verlauf des Gottesdienstes noch Lesungen aus der Heiligen Schrift folgen. Er übersetzt: 'Laßt uns also die folgenden Lesungen aufmerksam hören'. Ich frage mich, ob *deneceps* hier nicht 'von nun an', 'in Zukunft' bedeutet. Der Terminus *deneceps* weist nicht nur auf das, was unmittelbar folgt, hin, sondern auch auf eine längere künftige Zeitspanne.


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As Näf points out, the mythical Atlantes are the only humans spared the anxieties, fears, and frustrated pleasures of dreaming (Hdt. 4,184,4). Their culture is the poorer for it. Among us non-Atlantes, it is not necessary to look far in any period to find the dream experience stimulating responses that range from intellectual speculation to literary fantasies to crass profiteering. In less than 200 pages of text, N. provides a survey of the various ways in which the West has attempted to make sense of dreams. The mastery of both primary and secondary material is impressive; however, in a presentation of this sort, it is difficult not to resort simply to an unhelpful list of names (a fault from which N. does not always escape), and interesting opportunities for comparison cannot be taken up (e.g., between the similar approaches of Suetonius, Dio Cassius, and Josephus; or on the history of worship of Asclepius). The book is directed to a general readership, but range and scholarly apparatus also render it particularly valuable to cultural historians of antiquity. N. emphasizes not the interpretation of dreams narrated in the sources, but provides an historical survey of dream interpreters (famous and anonymous), their methodology and sign systems, and in particular the continuities and discontinuities in the practice of interpretation and in speculation on the nature of dreams. Such a survey has not been attempted since the late nineteenth-century. Complementing a recent surge of scholarly interest in the topic, N.’s survey points to numerous areas for further study.

The first chapter, ‘Altorientalische Zeugnisse der Traumdeutung und ihr Einfluss auf die antike Welt’ (19–36), begins by considering the nine categories, nec-
necessarily overlapping, that N. lists in his introduction as encompassing the ways Greeks and Romans approached dreams: dreams in literature; scientific/philosophical explanations; dream books; dream interpretation; dreams in temples; folk belief; dreams used in medicine; dreams for self-fashioning; dreams of the powerful. Eight of these nine categories (excluding philosophical explanation) already are extant in our sources from ancient Asia Minor and Egypt, and yet it remains unclear whether or in what ways these earlier forms influence the Greek and Roman traditions. Of particular note, the material includes: dream catalogs dating from c. 1700 BCE Babylon; the earliest known treatise on interpretation, from c. 1200 BCE Egypt (including more than 200 dream-types); a similar treatise from Assyria five hundred years later treating approximately 3,000 dreams. The chapter closes by remarking on how this desire for encyclopedic knowledge is especially important in legitimating monarchy or theocracy, a notion that will reoccur in discussions of Alexander and his successors, the Roman Empire, and Christianity. Legitimation through dreams also plays a role in inspiring some of the earliest extant literature, for which one may compare two later foundational poets, Hesiod and Ennius.

In ‘Frühe griechische Traumdeutung’ (37–42), N. notes that the ways in which even the earliest Greek poets integrate dreams into a larger narrative structure marks a remarkable innovation over Near-Eastern precedent. The chapter also introduces, via Penelope’s division in the Odyssey, the distinction between true and deceptive dreams, a distinction whose validity will be contested and refined throughout the subsequent tradition, from Plato to Posidonius to Augustine to Jung. Hesiod’s confrontation on Helicon with the Muses in Theogony seems informed by this same notion of divine laissez-faire. Also during this period, fragments of the Presocratics hint that a rational approach towards dreams may be developing. Nevertheless, conflicting convictions of doubt and belief in dreams (and their interpreters) remains the principal theme of ‘Traumdeutung in der Polisöffentlichkeit’ (43–54). Among the numerous texts and figures mentioned, we are told that tragedy and Herodotus depict dreams as encoded by the gods with messages, to be ignored by humans at their own risk. Even Aristophanic parody implies a widespread belief in the validity of incubation dreams, and a dream narrative plays an important role in an oration of Hyperides. In a milieu such as this, it is unsurprising to see the creation of a number of treatises on the subject, including a Hippocratic piece on diagnosing illness from dreams, and the rise of professional interpreters. The chapter closes with anecdotes of artists who claimed inspiration from dreams. ‘Die philosophische Reflexion der Phänomene Traum und Traumdeutung im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.’ (55–62) concentrates primarily on Plato, who uses dreams from such a variety of perspectives that N.’s brief discussion cannot help but be unsatisfying. Aristotle, in contrast, turns away from dream narratives to a consideration of the experience of sleep, and becomes an influential authority for the claim that most (but not all!) dreams arise purely from physiological processes.

A new political climate produces ‘Neue Horizonte der Traumdeutung im Hellenismus’ (63–79). N. lists numerous examples of Alexander and his successors seeking out professional interpreters of their dreams to justify their rule. In response, skepticism arises among intellectuals such as Polybius, who critiques
Scipio for a similarly propagandistic practice. At the level of the individual, there survive since the fifth-century numerous dedicatory plaques, to Asclepius and other deities, describing epiphanies in dreams. In a later chapter, N. argues suggestively that the formulaic nature of these texts, combined with the systematic procedure of incubation, induced the sleeper to dream in stereotypical ways (116–7).

The next chapter turns to ‘Hellenistische Traumdeutung und ihre Adaption in Rom’ (80–91). N. characterizes Roman poets as following Greek predecessors in incorporating dream interpretation into literature, while increasing emphasis on the artful narration of personal dreams, in particular dreams of the dead. The necessarily cursory survey includes Ennius, Plautus, Lucretius, and Vergil (with expected emphasis on the Gates of Sleep in Aeneid 6). More time is devoted to Cicero, especially those portions of De Divinatione that treat Cicero’s skeptical interpretations of his own dreams and his decision to cast the end of De Republica in the form of a dream. The Republican period, N. concludes, demonstrates intense interest but widely divergent attitudes, ranging from the attribution of the entire experience to natural causes (Lucretius) to apparently ambivalence (Cicero) to uncontested belief. Focus on Rome continues with ‘Von den Träumen reden – eine Mode im Prinzipat?’ (92–102). The chapter opens by considering how visual representations of sleep differ from their corresponding textual discussions; with Endymion, for example, his sleep as depicted on sarcophagi expresses the hope that death is a blissful sleep. After a quick overview of imperial poetry (Silius, Valerius Flaccus, and Statius receive one sentence each, Ovid three paragraphs), N. resums the theme of autocrats using dreams for propaganda (as seen most notably in Suetonius). Tacitus, predictably, provides a cynical picture of interpreters and their clients. Nevertheless, dreams have hardly lost significance among either the elite or the general public, as the correspondence of Pliny and the Greek magical papyri attest.

‘Traumdeutung in der griechischen Literatur und Geschichtsschreibung der Kaiserzeit’ (103–13) concentrates on the contrasting views of Plutarch, Lucian, and Dio Cassius. Plutarch includes more than fifty examples in the ‘Lives’ to create more rounded psychological portraits, while his essays argue for the significance of dreams for prophecy. Lucian, by contrast, ridicules the concept of truthful dreams (and their interpreters), whether his apparent purpose is pedagogical (Somn.), literary (Ver. hist.), or broadly satirical (Gallus). Dio Cassius’s decision to become an historian, finally, stems from a dream book he had composed that greatly impressed Severus and, accordingly, significant dreams recur throughout his history. The next chapter treats the contemporary phenomena of ‘Kaiserzeitliche Medizin und Inkubation’ (114–23) by surveying ways in which dreams were used by Galen and in the presence of Asclepius. The latter discussion includes an excursus on Aelius Aristides.

‘Professionalsierte wissenschaftliche Traumdeutung’ (124–8) turns to Artemidorus, the most well known if not, as N. is at pains to convey, the most representative dream interpreter from antiquity. Despite this status, Artemidorus claims to have practiced his craft with a combination of both personal interviews and scholarly research and is careful to distinguish his own focus from that of other professions, revealing an acute awareness of the personal aspects of the
dream experience that ensures that he will remain a valuable resource for cultural historians.

The following chapter (129–41) reviews continuities and discontinuities from the tradition on display in Jewish and early Christian writers of the imperial period. Josephus, for example, in addition to including in his narrative famous dreams from Hebrew scripture, follows Dio Cassius in narrating his own, a step that allows him to establish himself as a master interpreter. N. places Josephus’s claims for his interpretive skills in the context of Philo and rabbinical scholars. The New Testament provides a strong contrast to earlier tradition; here dreams are without exception true, and contain no potential ambiguities. This transparent hermeneutics is soon forgotten however; in early Gnostic texts and martyr narratives dreams once again contain symbols and allegory, with interpreters no longer trained professionals, but charismatic personalities such as Perpetua. Contemporary patristic writings follow the same lines as the earlier philosophical tradition, with one major difference: bad or misleading dreams are now attributed to demons. N. sees this new distinction as leading to polemics that hinder understanding the dream experience. Some of these consequences are outlined in ‘Die Frage nach dem Ende der alten Traumdeutung’ (142–4), which includes a law in the Theodosian Codex punishing dream interpreters for being humani generis immici (9,16,6). Despite this legislation, significant dreams remain part of the literary tradition.

The establishment of Christianity reorients attitudes toward dreams (145–56). Incubation continues, but with saints such as Thekla or Cosmas and Damian replacing pagan deities. Christian dreams inspire military victories (Constantine), the discovery of relics (Helena and the true cross), or personal conversion (Arnobius). Cassian outlines for ascetic orders a graduated process by which unwanted dreams, particularly sexual ones, can be eliminated from nighttime experience. ‘Der Traum als Anstoß christlicher Erkenntnis’ (157–66) considers Gregory of Nyssa’s complex discourse on the origins of dreams, Augustine’s belief that divine visions can be seen only through God’s grace, and Jerome’s dream of being punished for his study of pagan writers. ‘Traumdeutung bei Exponenten des Neuplatonismus’ (167–72) explores the roughly contemporary attempts of Neoplatonists to analyze dreams as a revelation of, and thereby a means of partaking in, the divine. These few pages summarize in particular the complex views of Porphyry, Iamblichus, Calcidius, and Macrobius, climaxing in Synesius’s claims for the divinity of all dreams, and the ability for men and women of any social class to access them, provided they lead a virtuous life. Penelope and the subsequent tradition following her are incorrect: false dreams do not exist and interpreters are worthless.

The final chapter, ‘Rezeption der antiken Traumdeutung’ (173–92), is a necessarily select survey of the pragmatic and scholarly use of dreams from Isidore through the twenty-first century. Among items considered are: the tenth-century Oneirocriticon of Achmet; the writings of John of Salisbury and Albertus Magnus; the influence of fifteenth-century printed editions and translations of Artemidorus and Synesius; Melanchthon; J. C. Scaliger. The chapter continues with Freud’s simultaneous rejection and use of material from antiquity in his own researches, and its more straightforward appropriation by Jungians. At the book’s
close, N.’s immense bibliography is a sure starting point for those wishing to delve deeper. It is unfortunate, then, that not all texts mentioned in the many notes are given in the final bibliography.

Concise and learned, the book has a sobering moral. N.’s diachronic approach reveals scholarship engaging in endless cycles, with little discernible progress in understanding. Even where research into sleep and brain activity has been advanced by technology, N. bemoans that here scientists have lost the personal contact that had proven so successful for interpreting dreams in previous epochs (191–2). N. successfully shows the ways in which knowledge is tied to historical conditions. It is to be hoped that more focused studies will lead to a better understanding of how this knowledge is controlled by mechanisms of tyranny, be they of the individual, of religion, or of science.

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Jens-Uwe Krause, ordinario di Storia antica a Monaco di Baviera, presenta, non solo agli specialisti, la sua interpretazione della storia criminale dell’antichità, bilanciando i temi delle recenti tendenze storiografiche su ‘Crime and History’ con una buona sintesi istituzionale sulla repressione criminale dell’antichità classica, di cui l’A. si è già mostrato studioso consapevole.¹

Dopo una breve introduzione, in cui puntualmente si dà conto delle difficoltà dell’indagine rispetto allo status quaestionis storiografico e alle sparse testimonianze, il volume, in sostanza, si partisce in due sezioni, la prima dedicata all’Atene classica, la seconda all’Impero romano. A loro volta queste si suddividono in due capitoli ciascuna, secondo un disegno simmetrico: prima si tratta di repressione penale e di criminalità ad Atene, poi delle due prospettive nel mondo romano. Per una serie di motivi non difficili da riconoscere (non ultimo l’importanza delle fonti giuridiche latine), la sezione romana è più vasta di quella greca.

La trattazione s’inizia con la ‘polizia’ nell’Atene classica: l’A. mette in evidenza come accanto agli ‘Undici’, magistrati incaricati della custodia della prigione pubblica, ma privi di funzioni preventive, non vi fosse un’organizzazione ‘statale’ di controllo della criminalità. L’osservazione serve ad introdurre l’analisi della ‘Selbsthilfe’, fondamentale struttura sociale di sorveglianza e repressione dei fatti di reato nel mondo antico. Krause, con l’attenzione sempre rivolta alle fonti, scrutata tra vicini e passanti, che sentivano un obbligo morale d’intervento a favore della vittima, la quale spesso si dedicava direttamente ad una ‘Detektivarbeit’ per ottenere soddisfazione rispetto al torto subito. Lo stesso arresto del criminale, quando possibile, era in primo luogo un atto di tutela privata. La giurisdizione

³ K., op. cit. 15 s.