leichter erschlossen werden könnte, neben den von Er. behandelten Fragen zur Semantik (z. B. ζηλόν / διόκειν VI 8, 266) und den theologischen Kernbegriffen vor allem die zahlreichen, bisweilen traktatähnlichen Exkurse, etwa über die Sprache der Apostel (VI 6, 230–254) und insbesondere des Paulus (VI 8, 80–84), über die Aussprache des Griechischen (VI 6, 138–144) bis hin zu Er.s Stellungnahme zu Fragen von Ehe, Ehetrennung und Zölibat (VI 8, 144–188), Buße (VI 8, 400–402) oder der Kirchenmusik (VI 8, 274–278). Doch solche Gedanken sollen und können den Wert der beiden kommentierten Editionen nicht mindern. ASD VI 6 und 8 stellen einen entscheidenden Fortschritt im Verständnis aller Phasen der komplizierten Textgenese dar, und dies nicht nur weil die von Clericus auf den unteren Bereich der Seite ins Schattendasein von Fußnoten verbannenen Annotationes nun überhaupt wieder als voller, eigenwertiger Text, der NT und Er.s eigene Übersetzung begleiten, wahrgenommen werden können. Der Dank derer, die den Text der Annotationes verstehen möchten und bislang oft auf sich allein gestellt waren, dürfte beiden Herausgebern in Zukunft gewiß sein. Den Dank des Rezensenten haben sie jedenfalls schon jetzt.

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The pendulum of history swings at least once in a generation and after a period in which Demosthenes was mainly seen in the shadow cast by Philip, we are today witnessing a rehabilitation of Demosthenes as a statesman, attested in a series of biographies: one in French by Pierre Carlier (1990), one in English by Raphael Sealey (1993), and now one in German by Gustav Adolf Lehmann (2004). Unlike Sealey’s biography, but like that by Carlier, Lehmann’s is intended for the general public rather than the specialist: all quotes are in translation; technical terms are transliterated and duly defined in an informative glossary; there is not a single word in Greek characters; the readership is principally academics of all disciplines who take an interest in ancient history and civilisation (229).

The biography of Demosthenes is combined with a succinct account of the foreign policy of Athens from the 360s to 322 B.C. and, in a book written by a prominent specialist for non-specialists, it is necessary to some extent to generalise and simplify. One example is the brief account of the Social War of 357–5.

It was caused by the secession of Byzantium, Chios, Kos and Rhodos from the Second Athenian Naval League (66) – but we do not know for sure that Kos was a member of the League.¹ Lehmann further writes that the four revolting poleis were democracies. – That is true for three of them but Chios may have been an oligarchy.² We are told too that, after the peace of 355, Lesbos left the League. –

¹ M. Dreher, Hegemon und Symmachoi (Berlin 1995) 123 n. 53.
² M. H. Hansen and T. H. Nielsen (eds.), An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis (Oxford 2004) no. 842 p. 1067b. I note, by the way, that The Social War is one of the many examples that disproves the historical underpinning of the Democratic Peace Theory, now so popular with many republican neoconservatives in USA (cf. Hansen and Nielsen (supra) 85 and Dem. 15.17).
That can be shown for Mytilene, but not for Methymna, and we have no information at all relating to Antissa, Eresos and Pyrrha.¹ I can add scores of similar examples; but all are quibbles which belong in a much longer account written for specialists. In a book of this kind the picture has to be painted with bold strokes, and Lehmann’s analyses, including that of the Social War, are essentially perspicacious and convincing.

Though intended for non-specialists the book can be read with profit by specialists too. A point in case is the comparison of Demosthenes’ political outlook in the First Philippic (iv) and in the speech for the Rhodians (xv). Lehmann turns against the common view that, from 352/1 when Demosthenes delivered his First Philippic, all his efforts were focused on fighting Philip. The speech for the Rhodians, delivered in 351/0, shows that Demosthenes’ political horizon was not as monolithic as some historians suggest: he was much more subtle and flexible than commonly believed (92–8). Following Radicke, Lehmann accepts the dates of Demosthenes’ speeches established by Dionysios of Halikarnassos and rejects the various attempts to downdate the First Philippic to 350/49 (93). But the issue was reopened by Robin Lane Fox in 1997 who, pace Radicke, argues that the First Philippic was delivered in 350.² Obviously Lane Fox did not persuade Lehmann. I would like to know why not. I agree that Lehmann cannot, in a book like this, devote several pages to a discussion of the issue, but he may want to develop the point in a future article.

According to Lehmann, Demosthenes was a statesman with a keen eye for practical politics (e.g. 216, 219) and an almost prophetic gift for anticipating the outcome of a political crisis (158 in connection with Lehmann’s analysis of the Chersonesos speech). Demosthenes’ much-debated involvement in the Peace of Philokrates is assessed as follows: «Mit seiner prognostischen Kraft im Hinblick auf sichtbar gewordene Gefährdungen und Zäsuren sowie seiner Bereitschaft, aus der schlüssigen Diagnose heraus unverzüglich für notwendige Änderungen in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, ohne Preisgabe der patriotischen Grundorientierung, einzutreten, ragt Demosthenes zweifellos über das Normalmaß von Politikern – auch nachantiker und moderner Epochen! – weit hinaus» (129). This view, forcefully argued and substantiated throughout the book, calls for two cautions.

Our sources for assessing Demosthenes as a politician are, first of all Demosthenes’ own symbooltic speeches. Unlike other Athenian political leaders, Demosthenes published several of the speeches he had delivered in the Assembly – and in particular those by which he had not succeeded in persuading the Athenian people.³ We have to admit that Demosthenes’ fame as a statesman to a large extent is based on Demosthenes’ self-glorification, corroborated by the Hellenistic tradition.

¹ Hansen and Nielsen (supra) no. 798 p. 1027 (Mytilene) and no. 797 p. 1025 (Methymna).
Lehmann’s interpretation of Demosthenes as a sagacious politician is based on the view that Demosthenes’ symboleutics speeches were published currently by himself, and, by and large, as they had been delivered (22 (general view), 78 (xiii), 97 (xv), 111, 118 (i–iii), 161 (ix)). I agree with Lehmann, but I note too that there is an alternative view recently argued by, e.g., Trevett,1 i.e. that the speeches we have were published posthumously. If the symboleutic speeches of the 350s and 340s were published much later – e.g. in the 320s by Demosthenes or posthumously by his nephew Demochares – we cannot preclude the possibility that they were revised in the light of later events and that Demosthenes’ clever analysis of a political situation is evidence, not of foresight but of hindsight. I share Lehmann’s view but I note that there is a problem which we have to face and probably cannot solve.

Lehmann is presumably prepared to assent to the view of Demosthenes expressed in the epigram inscribed on the socket of the statue of the statesman set up in 280: εἶπεν Ἰωάννης θῆκεν ὁ Ἐλλήνων ἔργα Μόσχην (Plut. Dem. 30.5, quoted page 22). However, Lehmann is not blind to the fact that poleis and leagues of poleis were no longer a match for the Hellenistic great powers, partly the new monarchies and partly the federal states, in particular the Aitolian and Achaian federations (19).

The title of Lehmann’s book is ‘Ein Leben für die Freiheit’, but throughout the book freedom is associated with democracy and Demosthenes described as the champion of democracy as well as of freedom, i.e. the freedom of all Hellenic poleis (11, 19, 21, 95, 160, 180, 202, 229, quoting Dem. 8.41–2; 15.20–21; 20.108 and Plut. Mor. 811C).

In ancient Greece one form of freedom (eleutheria) was indeed closely connected with democracy and understood partly as participation in the running of the political institutions and partly as the freedom to live as one pleases (Arist. Pol. 1317a40–b17). But it was not this specific democratic form of freedom for which Demosthenes fought. The democratic institutions sometimes obstructed his policy, and the Athenians’ propensity to live as they pleased was in the way of the patriotism and spirit of self-sacrifice required to put up a fight against Philip. Demosthenes’ ideal was not the freedom within the poleis but the freedom of the poleis in the sense of autonomia, i.e. the freedom from external control, and that form of freedom was the concern of all Hellenic poleis, oligarchies as well as democracies (Dem. 18.100, 208).

Lehmann acknowledges the distinction between foreign and domestic policy and emphasises that Demosthenes devoted almost all his energy to foreign policy (154 with n. 1, cf. Dem. 18.59 etc.). His counterpart was first Euboulos (55) and later Lykourgos (205) for both of whom domestic policy was the primary concern.

Demosthenes was, of course, a democrat as all other fourth-century Athenian statesmen, and he knows how to exploit all the democratic watchwords when it suits his case (cf. e.g. viii and xv). But often he cannot suppress his irritation with the democratic political institutions which cause unnecessary delays and are an obstacle to the conduct of an efficient foreign policy (Dem. 2.23; 3.14; 4.45; 8.32–

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4: 13:16–17; 18:132, 235; 19:136, 183–6) while Philip, as a monarch, can strike when and where he wants unimpeded by democratic chains (112, 158, cf. Dem. 14: 8:11–12). In their duel before the court in 330 Aischines accuses Demosthenes of being anti-democratic, in fact an oligarch in disguise; Demosthenes does not refute these charges but counters by accusing Aischines of being pro-Macedonian. I shall be obliged if Lehmann will devote a future study to the complicated relationship between freedom and democracy in Demosthenes’ thought.

The principal illustration in the book is, of course, the statue of Demosthenes set up in the Athenian agora in 280 B.C. in connection with the posthumous rehabilitation of Demosthenes (21–3, 198). Of the preserved marble copies of this bronze statue Lehmann has chosen the one in the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek in Copenhagen. Lehmann has an interpretation of what the sculptor tries to tell us about the man’s character (22), but Lehmann seems unaware of the fact that the forearms and hands are reconstructed. It is apparent from Plut. Dem. 31.1 that Demosthenes stood with his hands folded, but none of the preserved copies shows how he held them.

Lehmann’s book has a strong personal profile and a clear message. I cannot follow him all the way in his assessment of and admiration for Demosthenes, but his rehabilitation of the leading Athenian statesman is forcefully and often convincingly argued, and I strongly recommend his book as a valuable contribution to the discussion. There will undoubtedly be several ancient historians who, in response, may want to push the pendulum in the opposite direction.


Nach der Ermordung Caligulas im Januar 41 wurde im Senat über die Zukunft und politische Verfassheit des römischen Staates diskutiert. Nicht der Initiative