En maints endroits, le lecteur aura intérêt à consulter les travaux cités par K. Il constate que ce dernier néglige plus d’une objection qui s’y trouve formulée. K. ne défend ainsi pas sa cj. spumigerum (v. 455) contre les arguments métrique et grammatical que je lui ai opposés. K. maintient son interprétation et sa version des v. 17–20 sans s’aviser que certior et seruanda sont nécessairement mis apo koion, comme l’ont vu Langen et Housman à Manilius 1,657. K. reste persuadé que l’ordre transmis des vers du catalogue des Argonautes est le bon, mais il n’est guère plausible a) qu’après avoir mentionné (353–354) le chef de nage de bâbord (Télamon) en premier et celui de tribord (Hercule) en second, le poète énumère les rameurs de tribord (354–390) sans préciser de quel bord il s’agit avant le v. 387; b) que le passage du tribord au bâbord (391 ss.) soit indiqué par Tu quoque … Colchos … petits. Certes, avec la transposition que j’admets (403–410 après 382), le v. 387, quin etiam Herculeo consurgit ab ordine Tydeus, introduit d’une manière peu adéquate l’énumération des rameurs de tribord, mais le v. 387 me choque moins que le v. 391 comme vers introducteur de l’autre bord. Quin etiam est-il fautif, comme le suppose Langen? Qu’on ne croie pas que K. est plus prudent, parce qu’il garde l’ordre transmis: il sug- gère de transposer 411–412 après 402. Last, but not least, K. continue de croire que les deux derniers vers du chant I, mirantur tantos strepitus turbamque ruentem | et loca et in- fernos almae uirtutis honores, se rapportent l’un comme l’autre au séjour des Bienheureux, pourtant incongrûment caractérisé par tantos strepitus et turbam ruentem (cf. 7,402 per Chaos [= Tartaron] occurrunt caecae sine uocibus umbrae). K. objecte que les parents de Jason ne peuvent pas voir ce qui se passe dans le Tartare, mais le Lucain de Stace, Silves 2,7,117 ss., voit, de chez les Bienheureux, Néron dans le Tartare, Certes, et loca fait obscu- rément la transition, d’où et contra Baehrens pour et loca et mais, pour un tel emploi de et, cf. par ex. Hand, Tursellinus, II, 496 § 4; Draeger, Hist. Synt. d. lat. Spr., II, 21–23.

Paris

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From the correspondence of M. Cornelius Fronto with his imperial pupil, as from the speeches of Aelius Aristides, some scholars have inferred that the professions of rhetor and philosopher were in a state of institutional conflict, even though frequently united in the same man. It is this inference that Kasulke (hereafter K.) challenges in his useful if not always persuasive book, maintaining that the rivalry begun in the age of Plato and Isocrates had been resolved by Cicero – but how many Greeks either read De oratore or listened to Romans on philosophy? – and, more to the point, by the consumer’s will that both be taught.

Yet in the second century AD the debate appears to resume; for K. this was not due to the greater prominence of rhetoric in the Second Sophistic, which was «quantitativer, aber nicht qualitativer Art» (57). But ‘Quantität schlägt in Qualität um’; what the outside observer calls a change in quantity may seem to those affected a whole new quality. Nevertheless, in the best materialist fashion, finding no political or social ground for the rivalry to revive, K. infers that therefore it did not; no more logically, criticisms of philosophers whose public displays resembled those of sophists are taken to show that ‘Halbphilosophen’, rhetors, and poets all passed for philosophers (69) – as if now, because some members of the clergy talk like politicians, politicians were members of the
clergy. Rather, a Maximus or an Apuleius took a broader view of that which be-
seemed a philosopher than earlier philosophers had done or than certain con-
temporaries still did; when Hadrian was minded to deny Favorinus’ title of phi-
osopher, was it for being a rhetor (75) or a hypocrite? (Cf. D. 27,1,6,7.)

Next K. turns to reported conversions from rhetoric to philosophy, demol-
ishing those of Dio and Lucian; he does not deny that such things took place, al-
beit for show as in Isaeus’ case, but his first case, Gellius 10,19, is nothing of the
kind. Transgressum (§1) denotes not conversion, but the normal transition from
rhetorical to philosophical studies; and Taurus objected not to that, but to ‘some-
thing’ (quiddam) that the student had done, as he objects to lack of seri-
ousness in rhetorically trained pupils at 1, 9,10, 17,20,4. K. cites neither these
passages nor Demosthenes’ conversion from philosophy to rhetoric, related with
perhaps subversive intent in 3,13 and emulated (also subversively, so K. 138f) by
Aristocles of Pergamum.

K. next denies contemporary significance to Aristides’ defence of oratory be-
cause its target is Plato; but (as Chinese culture reminds us) past reference does
not preclude present relevance, and it better suited Aristides’ style to disdain
living opponents (2,465, 3,66ff) and concentrate on the classic and classical po-
lemic than to answer the crabbed pedantries of more recent critics petitiofugy
for petitiofugy (e.g. Quint. Inst. 2,15ff). Likewise, it was seemlier to defend
Demosthenes than himself, to redefine philosophy than to attack it, and to pro-
claim respect for Plato even while refuting him than to deny his reputed wisdom.
Yet there is malice in ‘father and teacher of orators’ (§465, cf. Cic. De or. 1,47)
and the invoking of Isocrates (3,677); in or. 4 his claws are far sharper than the
feeble Capito’s. More successful is the demonstration that Sextus Empiricus’ at-
tack on orators, employing arguments that had been in use for centuries, was not
provoked by Aristides; indeed, Sextus’ plan required him to compile such a book
though Aristides had never written.

And so to Marcus, whose letter 4,13 to Fronto has been taken to show a sud-
den rejection of rhetoric in favour of philosophy that as K. observes is apparently
contradicted both by the Augustan History’s assertion that he adopted the philo-
sophical lifestyle in his 12th year and by his own acknowledgement to Diognetus
in the Meditations; but the former (if not a pagan parody of Luke 2,42ff) need
record no more than a childish fad and the latter (even if credible of a painting-
master) may be the usual reconstruction of one’s past as one wishes it to have
been. No such picture emerges from the correspondence with Fronto, least of all
from the antisocial frivolity of ep. 2,16. Yet even if interest in philosophy in-
creased after his 25th year, interest in rhetoric certainly continued, for as em-
peror he heard more than one sophist and indulged a taste for archaism unmod-
ated by Fronto’s concern for clarity (Cass. Dio 71. 5,3). There was more to
Marcus than the Meditations.

K. finds philosophical commitment in even the early letters’ emphasis on love
of truth and loathing of flattery; but (even assuming total sincerity, which the
negotiations over the forensic battle with Herodes Atticus do not entirely bear
out), this did not entail «ein bewußtes philosophisches Bekenntnis» or even «eine
durch die Philosophie bedingte Sensibilität» (214; 214), being in part a personal char-
acteristic (hence the nickname of Verissimus) and in part a natural reaction to the
falsehoods of court life. As K. points out (214), M. Caesar found himself flattered and lied to (ep. 2,8,1); that was enough to reinforce any distaste he may have felt by temperament (or indeed by age: Arist. Rhet. 2,12, 1389'32f) at tickling his hearers’ prejudices (ep. 2, 2, 2) or saying things obliqua et insincera et anxia et verae amicitiae minime adcommodata (ep. 3,16,1). Was it philosophy that implanted this distaste, or this distaste that drew him to philosophy?

In any case, philosophy, to which despite Trimalchio and Athenaeus most people paid lip-service, pertained to common culture; witness Fronto’s various philosophical allusions and above all his revisiting of Phaedrus in Add. ep. 8. Cicero had told his son, philosophiae quidem praecipa noscenda, uinendum autem esse cissiliter; as K. demonstrates (23off), ep. 4,13 represents not the moment when Marcus decided that living like a good Roman citizen was not enough, but a passing fit of enthusiasm adduced as a student’s excuse for not getting down to his assignment.

But what of Marcus’ assertion (Med. 1,7,3) that Rusticus had taught him to abstain from rhetoric, poetry, and elegance of language? K. no less convincingly reads this in the context of §2 (246ff): Marcus is not to be a sophistic ’Halbphilosoph’. Yet even so he was taking the matter more seriously than Fronto cared to see; the jealous-lover-like complaints that he had neglected rhetoric for philosophy may be exaggerated but are not invented. But Marcus had public business and a household to attend to, and despaired of further progress (Med. 1,17,8); yet he had not forgotten what he had learnt (K. 254ff) even before accession brought back the need to consult Fronto about his speeches.

Notoriously, in Med. 1, 11 Marcus does not acknowledge Fronto’s rhetorical teaching (more relevantly since he is writing in Greek, he makes no mention of Herodes); but as K. observes (274f), in the Meditations he concentrates on ethics, ignoring other values, and filters his educational debts accordingly. Though otherwise sceptical of Fronto’s influence, K. finds it in the detailed application of ready-made images to the lessons being imparted (321ff).

Nevertheless, Fronto and Marcus did find themselves in disagreement, the former deeming the latter to have deserted the hard work of rhetoric for the soft option of philosophy (eloq. 4,5). Scornful of Stoic ethics (ad am. 1,2, 1,15,2), he saw in Marcus’ objection to rhetorical artifice, as in his scruple about Matidia’s codicilli (ad am. 1,14,1), no more than an error out of which he could be persuaded. He respects philosophy as a body of knowledge and a locus of arguments; he has no use for it as a way of life. Despite K. 347, there was a difference in world-view, albeit Marcus returned to rhetoric and referred Matidia’s case to his unphilosophical brother, who no doubt decided it in the interest of his bride-to-be Lucilla.

The relations between rhetoric and philosophy in the second century AD were complex, but not all exponents of one discipline either practised or appreciated the other. K.’s study is rather a necessary corrective than the last word, but necessary it is.