flächliche Eingehen auf philosophische Sachfragen einen weiteren Fortschritt verhindert haben.


Jena

Matthias Perkams


This fine study has a double focus, summed up in the two keywords of the title: «emotions» and «transformation». First, Polleichtner (hereafter P.) rightly notes that the understanding of the emotions may differ from one culture to another, and that we must be wary of projecting our own concepts onto those of classical antiquity. What is more, philosophical debates over the emotions were particularly intense in Virgil’s own time, and he, and his readers, were fully conscious of these issues as he composed his great epic. As P. puts it, the protagonists’ emotions «are projected as examples of complex moral behavior for the reader to sort out» (17). Second, Virgil created his poem in counterpoint with earlier epics, no less in scenes involving the emotions than in other respects; to understand his intentions, we must observe how he transformed his models. In itself, this is scarcely news, but P. makes a strong case for the special, and neglected, influence of Apollonius Rhodius in this connection. In the comments that follow, I inevitably emphasize points where I differ with P., but this is not to disparage the book, which offers many subtle readings based on careful and extensive research.

P. begins with a survey of modern views of the emotions, emphasizing the increasing consensus that cognition plays a crucial role in emotional response, as opposed to a sharp contrast between reason and passion, and that social values, accordingly, enter into the construction of the emotions in different times and places. He then offers a brief review of ancient philosophical treatments of the emotions, from Plato and Aristotle to the Stoics and Epicureans. Plato is said to identify eighteen different emotions, from *aidôs* to *khara* (43), but I doubt that he identified them as emotions: Plato never makes clear what an emotion might be, as opposed to an appetite, for example; the modern notion of ‘emotion’ does not map easily onto his psychological scheme. Aristotle allowed that the emotions (*pathê*) have an important function, whereas for the Stoics «emotions are bad as such» (47); but given that the Stoics approved of what they called *epathetiai*, which include *khara*, for example, we see the danger in a straightforward equation between *pathos* and ‘emotion’ across the several ancient schools. So too, I very much doubt that «Epicurus held a view that distinguished four basic categories of *pathê*» (50), just like the Stoics; what we are told by Diogenes Laertius
is that he regarded pleasure and pain as *pathê*; there is no good evidence that the term covered what we think of as emotions. But the overall picture provided by P. is clear enough.

P. next discusses the nature of poetic allusion: Virgil’s variations on Homeric formulas, for example, are significant, but only on the condition that they «mark an intentional move by the author» (55); otherwise, «every allusion becomes a meaningless coincidence» (56). This is to put the issue backwards; we infer an intentional allusion when we perceive and can demonstrate its significance: ‘intentionality’ is a handy fiction, which can never be assessed directly. I agree with P., however, that meaning in literature may well have been understood differently in Virgil’s time and ours (61), but this does not imply that there is a «unique message of a text» (62) – in fact, the contrary is the case, inasmuch as classical authors, and Virgil in particular, deliberately (I would say) challenged their readers with enigmatic passages that defy a single, definitive interpretation.

P. then proceeds to examine in detail six scenes in the *Aeneid*: the initial storm and landing (plus the later storm off Crete), Aeneas’ meeting with Venus, his arrival at Carthage, his viewing of the temple of Juno (all these in the first book), his encounter with Helen (as narrated by himself), and the duel with Turnus that concludes the epic. P. notes the parallels between Aeneas’ departure from Drepanum in Sicily and the Argonauts’ from Phaeacian Drepane (Apollonius 4.1223), and that both are stranded in the African Syrtes: «The parallels even reach the point of inversion» (74), in that Triton helps the Trojans to land and the Argonauts to leave Libya. P. wonders further about the «Argonauts’ feelings» as they depart Drepane, and assumes that they «must have been glad about their quick progress» – this, even though «we do not hear anything about the Argonauts’ feelings during the storm» (75). P. then offers an ingenious account of the expression, *extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra* (Aen. 1.92), partially repeated in reference to Turnus at 12.951, and modelled on the Homeric *luto gounata kai philon êtor*, with a possible echo of Livius Andronicus’ *cor frixit prae pavore* (fr. 30). Homer makes no mention of cold, but P. sees a «double meaning» in *frigus*, referring both to Aeneas’ fear and to the chill in the air, since given the weather conditions «a sudden drop in temperature can be expected» (76). And yet, as P. remarks, Aeneas’ must have recovered quickly from his freeze, since in the very next verse «he is able to raise his arms» (77), which suggests to me that Virgil perhaps did not have the climatological aspect in mind here (P. doubts that Aeneas could have kept his arms raised «for nine lines» during a violent storm, but though he deduces that the gesture is important for «its overall meaning», there is a risk here of overliteral reading). After discussing some further intertextual analogies – one problem with the double focus of the book is that attention to the emotions often gives way to other topics – P. observes that the Trojans’ joy (*laeti*, Aen. 1.35) at leaving Sicily echoes Odysseus’ upon leaving Calypso’s island, and then notes that Apollonius in the parallel passage does not explicitly ascribe joy to the Argonauts; still, they were sailing under a serene sky, and this persuades P. that they too were experiencing «great happiness» (82). Perhaps: but why suppose that Virgil drew this inference? Contrariwise, in the storm off Crete (Book 3), Virgil failed to «include an account of the emotions that probably stirred the minds of the Trojans» (100), despite a precedent in the *Odyssey*.
again, it is not easy to know what to make of his reticence here, though P. sees it as a means of heightening the reader’s expectations (102).

Aeneas’ joy soon turns to despair, and P. dutifully indicates the parallels in Homer and Apollonius, concluding that «Vergil attributes parts of the behavior of both Odysseus and Jason to Aeneas and yet creates a new epic hero out of a very delicate intertextual balance» (90) – one who «feels anxiety or fear in the face of disaster ... yet does not let his sorrow and anxiety lastingly impair his ability to think on his feet and plan ahead» (94): a fair enough judgment, but not yet based on a specific discussion of ancient conceptions of emotion, to which P. turns at the end of the chapter. Here, P. notes that, for Aristotle, courage requires a measure of fear: «a person would be mad or insensible to pain if he feared nothing, whether earthquakes or waves, as they say is the case with the Celts» (EN 3.7, 1123b25–30), a passage not, I think, mentioned by P. (I am not convinced that Plato would have agreed with Aristotle on this score [118]). P. makes good use of Philodemus’ De morte col. 33, where he explicitly criticizes Odysseus’ wish to have died at Troy rather than at sea (120). Finally, P. suggests that Aeneas’ initial reaction to the storm may, from a Stoic point of view, be regarded as a ‘pre-emotion’ or instinctive response (cf. Seneca De ira 2.3.3), without developing into a full-fledged pathos, to which he would have to have given his assent. This would make good sense of Virgil’s use of the word frigus, a kind of automatic chill not identifiable with fear as such (which requires a judgment), but oddly enough P. does not mention in this context Virgil’s choice of language.

P. compares the encounter between Aeneas and his mother with that between Telemachus and his father (Od. 16), as well as with Odysseus’ meeting with Nausicaa, whom he compares to a goddess, and other Homeric passages, all of which «trigger a cascade of associative thinking and expectations in the reader’s mind» (133). That «Aeneas’ behavior toward his mother can be called somewhat pubertal» (135) is perhaps an exaggeration, but it is true that his relationship with her is problematic, as P. observes. Still, to locate a precedent in Apollonius’ account of Aphrodite’s troubles with her son Eros (3.112–57), as P. does (138–40), strikes me as oversubtle. In the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite, the goddess confesses that she has no desire for children, but I would have wished to see more on why Virgil should have cast Aeneas here as an abandoned child: is there a particularly Roman dimension to this representation?

P. considers whether Aeneas feels envy (phthonos) when he sees Carthage already burgeoning, and rightly notes that this was a deeply negative emotion, more like spite, and hence not «the appropriate term for Aeneas’ feelings» (151). Instead, he proposes zêlos or ‘ emulation’, as Aristotle defines it, which is fair enough, if indeed Virgil was familiar with this section of the Rhetoric. Whether Aeneas’ sentiment can be equated with Stoic aemulatio, which according to Cicero might take a positive or a negative form (Tusc. Disp. 4.17), is perhaps moot. In his discussion of the ecphrases on the temple to Juno, P. notes (as others have before him) that Aeneas «seems to overlook the fact that it is the temple of the sworn enemy of Troy» (168), something that a sophisticated reader might well note, though such a reader might be less likely to wonder whether the images that Virgil describes were «the only pictures on the on the walls of Carthage’s temple» (165), and hence see Aeneas’ perception as selective. P. develops,
on the basis of this scene, an «implicit poetics of the Aeneid» (171), with reference to the philosophers’ views on the value of poetry. In giving way to grief via the vicarious identification with the figures in the pictures (which include his own experiences, like Odysseus’ reaction to Demodocus’ song of Troy), Aeneas reveals the danger of poetry as Plato described it in the Republic (664c–666d), especially to those who do not understand properly the nature of its effects: «Vergil’s animum pictura pascit inanis ... could be directly modeled on Plato’s critique of poetry and painting», (176). I am not convinced, however, that Aeneas is meant to represent such an untutored observer, simply because he «does not know what these pictures, which he is looking at, are», that is, painted «in all likelihood to document the victory of Juno» (173). P. adds that, on an Aristotelian view, «Aeneas should also ask himself what he can learn from the Iliad» (179), with its representation of mainly virtuous characters (Philodemus’ views in this matter are taken to be close to Aristotle’s). Aeneas is, as it were, taking his first steps as a reader: «Therefore, Aeneas cannot simply be blamed for what he experiences, but the audience will follow Aeneas’ next steps very closely. Will his very emotional encounter with the Iliadic past strengthen or weaken the hero?» (188).

On the Helen episode, P. agrees with Jeffrey Fish’s argument that it «nicely fits into the Philodemean teachings on anger and restraint» (192) and hence that it is likely to be authentic; what P. contributes is a comparison with episodes in Homer and in Euripides’ Orestes, adding for good measure Glaucus’ epiphany to the Argonauts’ task to explain the departure of Heracles and assuage Telemon’s anger (1.1320–25). Above all, Aeneas’ hesitation recalls Achilles’ moment of doubt as to whether to kill Agamemnon in Iliad 1, where «it is a deity who advises Achilles how to channel his anger» (197; P. notes that Odysseus too, at the beginning ofOd. 20, is obliged to restrain his anger, again on Athena’s advice). I do not agree, however, that Achilles’ rage ... points in a new direction after the death of Patroclus, and that «Hector has replaced» Agamemnon (197–98) as its target, at least if we take seriously Aristotle’s view that anger is a response to a slight or oligoria (Rhet. 2.2, 1378a31–33): for in what way has Hector insulted Achilles? Turning then from the poetic tradition to the opinions of the philosophers, P. declares that the «fundamental philosophical problem with which Vergil’s reader is confronted is why Aeneas needs somebody from the outside to prevent him from killing Helen and to direct him to more pressing issues» (214). On an Aristotelian view, Aeneas «does not act acratically»: he simply has not considered all the relevant arguments: «Recognizing that his mother is right, Aeneas changes his plans and avoids acratic behavior» (215). This same hesitation, according to P., rescues Aeneas from the Stoic charge of yielding to rage, since his original impulse can be considered a ‘pre-emotion’, to which he has not assented: «This way, the Helen episode fits the picture of a perfect Aeneas who in the end keeps his cool in an extreme situation» (216). But Aeneas is explicitly described as furious (tutia iactabam et furiosa mente ferebar, 2.588); having argued that the episode itself is genuine, P. offers no reason to reject this verse in particular (though some editors do). Philodemus, in turn, would have seen Aeneas’ initial response as excessive, especially because he thinks of his own glory in executing Helen. Venus follows Philodemus’ prescription for allaying anger by showing Aeneas vividly (pro ommatôn) the consequences of his act (De ira col. 1.21–24); Venus is
thus «the Philodemean wise teacher» (218). Certainly, her sudden gesture of lifting the fog from Aeneas’ eyes and allowing him to see the gods directly at work in the destruction of Troy is as powerful an example of enargeia as one could ask for. But just here one wants an account of the nature of Venus’ revelation, which certainly has nothing to do with the Epicurean doctrine of gods who are far removed from concern with human affairs: Aeneas’ anger is deflected because he sees that Helen is merely a pawn in a larger game being played out by vengeful divinities. It is a chilling vision of human blindness, in the light of which mortal anger is trivial and irrelevant. Perhaps – though P. does not raise this idea – there is an implicit Stoic message here, an invitation to imagine the hidden rationality behind events that seem to us evil because we have only a partial view of the whole; if so, however, Virgil has nevertheless left the reader to wonder at the apparent violence that informs the gods themselves (apart from Jupiter, who would, on the Stoic view, represent the cosmic nous). We are left to ask yet again: *tantaene animis caelestibus irae*, Aen. 1.111).

In the final chapter, P. takes up the slaying of Turnus, and the question of its possible justification. As usual, P. begins by examining the antecedents to the scene in earlier Greek poetry, in order to highlight where and how Virgil goes his own way, and follows this with a dicussion of relevant philosophical considerations. Thus, «Turnus is at the same time both like and unlike Hector», and «Turnus is unlike Jason» (235). P. then asks: «Where did Vergil find a model for Turnus’ plea for mercy?» (236), and suggests the scene in which Menelaus is on the point of sparing Adrastus in *Iliad* 6, when Agamemnon runs up and kills Adrastus with his spear. Of course, unlike Adrastus, Turnus does not ask that his life be spared, only that his body be returned to his father: major heroes do not beg for mercy. That Turnus does not deserve *clementia* (which is only doubtfully in question here) because he fails «to acknowledge fully what he has done» and is thus «some kind of hypocrite» (243) seems questionable to me; the demand for an apology is more a modern than an ancient idea. More plausible is the suggestion that, in Aeneas’ exclamation that it is Pallas who sacrificing (*immolat*) Turnus (12.948–49), there is an allusion to Pallas Athena, who would thus yet again be advising a hero at the point of slaughtering an enemy, as she did with Achilles in the *Iliad* and Odysseus in the *Odyssey* – except that here she induces the hero to carry out the deed. P. also adds the slaughter of Apsyrtus in Apollonius, noting that if burying him in the earth is a violation of the Colchian custom of suspending their dead on trees (3.200–07), then there may be an implicit contrast with Aeneas’ apparent intention not to violate Turnus’ body (246), though in fact any such decision remains unspoken. P. argues that the slaughter of eight captives on the pyre of Pallas and the killing of Mago are forms of sacrifice or immolating, and suggests that «Turnus is one last victim in this series of ritualized killings executed by Aeneas after Pallas’ death» (250–51): but Aeneas’ motives in slaying Turnus are unrelated to ritual, so far as I can see, save perhaps for that word *immolat*. Despite the resonances with earlier scenes in the *Aeneid* and in Greek poetry to which P. calls attention, the slaying of Turnus remains unsettling, and I cannot wholly agree with P.’s comforting affirmation: «From the perspective of Roman custom and sacral law as well as from the viewpoint of the
epic tradition, we cannot find fault with Aeneas’ behavior in the final scene» (256).

Still more dubious is P.’s attempt to defend Aeneas’ action from a Stoic point of view by arguing that the ira that motivates him is really a kind of pre-emotion (262). P. takes it that Aeneas overcomes his initial angry impulse and «either has enough time or thinks he has enough to see that Turnus deserves to be punished for several reasons» (264); thus, his action is based on sober reflection, despite the adjective fervidus in the penultimate line of the poem, which P. tries to explain away with the observation that «Fervidus obviously does not go so far as to let Aeneas not think about the consequences» (ibid.). P. is on more secure ground when he appeals to Aristotle’s account of anger, which is perfectly compatible with reasoning and justification. Still more relevant, perhaps, is Philodemus’ distinction between orgê, which he allows may be justified, and thumos, which he treats as excessive and based on empty opinion. But it is just the tension between the Aristotelian (or Epicurean) and Stoic views of anger that lend the final episode its corroscating tension.

Virgil begins the *Aeneid* with a question that hovers, unresolved, over the entire poem: *tantaene animis caelestibus irae?* The conclusion, in my view, exploits the multiple resonances with prior texts and the divergent views of the philosophical schools to force the reader to continue to ponder this problem, and its reflection on the human plane. P. allows a crucial role for the reader, and I agree fully with him in this – but one has the obligation to be an informed reader. P.’s careful delineation of the background to Virgil’s emotional scenes, together with his account of the philosophical issues at stake, will be a valuable guide for all readers of this profound and mysterious poem.

New York  
David Konstan

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Ce petit livre de 126 pages (bibliographie et index inclus) se veut ambitieux puisque son auteur entend situer le récit de la tentation d’Ève que raconte de manière très détaillée au livre 2 (vers 140–260) de son épopée biblique *De spiritualis historiae gestis* le poète Avit, évêque de Vienne (ville du département de l’Isère, au sud de Lyon, dans la région actuelle de Rhône/Alpes et non dans l’Auvergne comme indiqué p.7). Le but de S. Döpp est d’expliquer, pour un public qui excède le cercle restreint des spécialistes de la littérature latine de l’antiquité tardive, le récit d’Avit d’un triple point de vue (p. 9): a) tout d’abord par rapport au substrat biblique, c’est-à-dire par rapport au récit de la *Genèse* 3,1–6, dans ses différentes versions: hébraïque (La *Tora*), grecque (la *Septuaginta*) et latine (la *Vulgate*), toutes présentées dans leur texte original; b) ensuite en relation avec les différentes exégèses, juives et chrétiennes, du passage biblique; c) finalement, en fonction de la tradition poétique dans laquelle s’inscrit Avit.

S. Döpp divise son propos en 10 chapitres articulés autour de trois axes principaux, après la présentation du sujet, (chap. 1): 1. Les chapitres 2–4 (p. 10–27) don-