oder dem Melierdialog) in der Rede der syrakusanischen Generäle und des Gy-
limpos in VII 66–68. Man hätte auch gern die abschließende Meinung H.s zum
vieldiskutierten Problem der Authentizität der thukydideischen Beschreibung
von Wahrnehmungen, Emotionen, Gedanken und Intentionen der Handelnden
erfahren (z.B. S. 95, 375, 381, 725, 965), obwohl er im vorliegenden Band sich
hier der bekannten Theorie Schneiders vom fiktiven Charakter dieser Informati-
onen anzuschließen scheint, und vor allem hätte man mehr zu
8,46,5 erwarten,
wo Thukydides zum ersten und letzten Mal in seinem Werk seine Vorgehenswei-
se verrät (καὶ διενοεῖτο τὸ πλέον οὕτως ὁ Τισσαφέρνης, ὅσα γε ἐπὶ τῶν
ποιουμένων ἢ εἰκώτως). Unerklärlich und eines Verlag es wie Oxford University
Press unwürdig sind die zahllosen Fehler in der Akzentuierung griechischer
Wörter, hauptsächlich in den Lemmata – sehr häufig wiederholt sich der gleiche
Fehler zwei-
oder auch dreimal auf derselben Seite (eine unvollständige Liste: ελθῶσιν auf S.
115 dreimal; παράσχον zweimal auf S. 158 und zweimal auch auf
S. 166; μίας auf S. 241 zweimal – die obliquen Kasus dieser Kardinalzahl werden
in konstanter Weise falsch akzentuiert; εὐελπίδες zweimal auf S. 362; πέζηι auf S.
812 zweimal; ἔξωταις auf S. 943 und 944, sowie ἔξωτος auf S. 347,
πανστρατίαι auf S. 150, 177, 145, καθήιρειτο auf S. 92 und 93, διαβλήθηι auf S.
108 und 109 etc.). Doch all das sind Quisquilien in Anbetracht der großartigen
Leistung, die H.s dreibändiger Thukydides-Kommentar darstellt.
Thessaloniki


Dunn’s project in this beautifully written book is a close look at what he per-
ceives as a radically new mentality emerging in Athens in the last decades of (our)
fifth century BC, which he terms «present shock». The term derives from Alvin
Toffler’s «future shock» and is meant to designate a feeling of disorientation or
shock in the face of a rapidly changing present. It involves a feeling of disjunction
from the past and uncertainty about the future. In his introduction D sketches
what he sees as a change from people «knowing their place» in Homer and the
archaic age to the late fifth century when anything could happen to anyone. His
book belongs in the category ‘history of ideas’ and, whilst taking a synchronic
view of the chosen period inasmuch as D examines various branches of art and
society in an ‘interdisciplinary’ manner, his stance is diachronic in positing
change over time and change relative to earlier times. Throughout the book he is
concerned with ‘content’ not philology, with barely a Greek word to trouble the
polished English surface. His translations of Greek passages are conspicuously
good; this is a book which seems to illustrate the best one can hope for in an age
of ‘classics in translation’. In the introduction he runs quickly but knowledgea-
ble through some previous scholarship on ‘Greek time’ and advocates a view of
history which leaves room for the active agency of humanity and individuals as
opposed to a Foucauldian position where the momentum or inertia of culture
tends to «efface human agency» (§).
The first chapter traces the Athenian developments in the measurement of time compared to the simple inherited model dependent on the sun’s apparent trajectory through the sky (sunrise, midday, sunset) and some simple stellar observations.

He shows how the klepsydra was introduced in conjunction with the rise of private litigation in Athens following Ephialtes’ reform, an instrument permitting the measurement of both ‘buckets’ (choes) as well as ‘barrels’ (amphorae) of time. Similarly the civic calendar was made independent of the old lunar calendar by dividing the year into ten prytanies. Thirdly, the astronomer Meton (and others) were responsible for a vastly improved calculation of the ‘natural’ seasons, i.e. those dependent on the solar year. A heliotrope is said to have been placed on the Pnyx by Meton in 432 BC, thus permitting the Assembly to follow the solar year accurately. D then follows developments in chronological schemes, showing how very vague genealogical schemes in the early fifth century were refined until e.g. the Trojan War or the Dorian Invasion could be ‘dated’. Other chronological schemes such as dating by Athenian archons, priestesses of Hera at Argos or by Spartan Ephors were all invented in the fifth century. And Hippia’s list of Olympic victors became, after refinement by Eratosthenes in the third century, the pan-Hellenic standard. What D emphasizes at the end of the chapter are the Athenian innovations in the late fifth century – the klepsydra for litigation, the accurate tropical calendar for the Assembly and Boulé, Thucydides’ chronology based on the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. He concludes (p. 36) that «all these innovations devote special attention in some way to the here and now, to a present that is not understood by reference to past (or future).» Although I found this chapter a fascinating read and an excellent introduction to ‘Greek time’ I rather doubt this concluding point. It is clear that the timing of speeches in a lawcourt bears no relation to the heroic past; Thucydides’ unique chronology (by summer and winter of the war) is firmly anchored in the ‘Archaeology’ to yesteryear (Troy especially) and the civic calendar (divorced from the traditional lunar calendar) goes hand in hand with dating by archon, surely an attempt to produce continuity. The only actual evidence of ‘shock’ among Athenians at these innovations he can produce is the passage of Clouds in which the Moon complains that the gods are being diddled out of their sacrificial meals by the new civic calendar. This is comedy, hardly shock. Moreover, although in the introduction he had disavowed an evolutionary model of ‘progress’ in antiquity, one might conclude from this section that it was in fact developments in science and technology which permitted the Athenians’ rapidly more sophisticated ‘take’ on time in this period.

The second chapter, ‘Human Time’, takes us through pre-Socratic and sophist ideas about universal and subjective time, showing first how the physikoi sought to reconcile Eleatic strictures about the pure, whole and unchanging nature of being with the observable fact that things change physically over time, then passing to the Sophists who turned the focus of attention onto the human experience of temporality.

Democritus, he finds, combined a feeling for, and understanding of, the vicissitudes of life with a belief that escape from the hurry-burry into intellectual calm offered the best hope of happiness. Interestingly he compares this ethical stance with Democritus’ physical dualism, which postulated an unruffled substrate of atoms in ever-changing combinations and motions. Protagoras, on the other hand, is shown to have privileged the experience of temporality without advocating flight from pragmata. Protagoras’ ‘Man is the measure’ enshrines the relativism of human experience, combined with emphasis on the importance of kairos, the right moment for certain behaviour or words. In particular, D suggests that Protagoras’ pioneering ‘division of time’ (πρῶτοι μήρα χρόνου διώρισε DL 9.52 = A1 D-K.) showed an awareness of the different degrees of knowledge possible about future, present and past time. One hears about the past, guesses about the future and only knows (subjectively and temporarily) about the present. D then shows how Protagoras’ skepti-
cism about absolute truth was taken to absurd extremes by Gorgias who seems to have revelled in epistemological paradoxes, indulging in what D calls his ‘comedy of knowledge’ (51). In this chapter D builds up to a thinker he clearly regards as a climax in sophistic thinking, the Athenian Antiphon, whom, following a trend set by e.g. Gagarin, D takes as one person, author of both philosophical works and forensic speeches. D shows how Antiphon engaged sympathetically with everyday human experience, for example, the worries of marriage and parenthood, and advocated the principle of individual human liberty and dignity, a belief which D claims – probably correctly – was at odds with the ‘freedom’ championed by the Athenian demos involving as that did falling in line with majority opinion (or folly).

These sections on individual thinkers are all stimulating and illuminating but I find myself doubting his major conclusions at the end of the chapter: (1) ‘The first revolution (sc. in intellectual history) was broadly temporal, replacing the authority vested in the atemporal worlds of myth and being with the temporal worlds of the polis and its human inhabitants’. It seems to me that traditional Greek religion (Homer, Hesiod and myth) is precisely a response to the temporality of human experience as it accounts for contingency by the changing moods of gods. The archaic Greek felt ἀμηχανίη in the face of powers greater than himself and resorted to divination, sacrifice, prayer, theoretic missions, to try to fathom the unfathomable and determine the indeterminate. One might counter that the philosophers argued for greater stability in the universe, seeking natural laws and principles, and that the sophists sought to bring the vicissitudes of life under control by rhetorical and intellectual τεχναι. (2) ‘The second revolution was particularistic, replacing the collective authority of the polis and of men in general with the autonomy of local events and specific individuals’. This flies in the face of the conspicuous lack of ‘collective identity’ among the Homeric chiefs, for example, or Hesiod’s polemics against ἐρίω ἐν σοφίᾳ, or the historical facts of tyranny and stasis in the early centuries of the polis’ development. The Athenian democracy in the second half of the fifth century precisely replaced the anarchy of vying aristocrats with the relative stability of majority vote. Indeed D involves himself in a contradiction here when he acknowledges (on 63) that the individualism advocated by Antiphon went against the polis, but finds (on 64) that a trend in late fifth-century Athens was «the assertion of the individual’s priority in deliberation and action».

The third chapter in a long sweep takes in Euripides’ innovations in drama as a further link in D’ claim that Athenians in this period lived «more in the present».

In some forty pages D covers a large number of dramas of all three major dramatists and, although his remarks are convincing, one’s head begins to swirl. On the whole I think he makes a good case for the proposition that Euripides’ plays involve more ‘presentness’ and less appeal to the authority of the past. He concentrates on «incidents», «accidents» and «undecidedness» to show that, in Euripides, there is much confusion or drama of incident, many startling (and apparently accidental) developments and a considerable degree of undecidedness among characters. All these factors show, in D’s opinion, a de-mystification of the past – revealed also in the matter-of-fact, dry Euripidean prologue which simply tells what past events have led to the present pass (contrasting with e.g. Oedipus’ painful reconstruction of the past in OT) – and an emphasis on the similarity of Euripides’ characters’ position to the experience of members of the audience, locked as they are in temporality. Euripides’ well known ‘modernisation’ of myth is taken by D to reveal a changing attitude to time and history itself, with Euripidean characters struggling to survive and make sense of developments in an ever-changing, unpredictable world.

The fourth chapter, perhaps the best, is concerned with narrative perspectives in Thucydides, highlighted by comparison with Herodotus.

D notes that both historians move away from poetry and other earlier genres by dismissing mythology as true evidence of the past and concentrating on more recent events for which there is better evidence. But whilst Hdt reports events a few decades before his
time, Thucydides says he started writing his *History* when the war started and kept pace with its progress in his writing. In a fascinating exegesis D shows how Hdt writes with the benefit of hindsight, giving the reader (or listener) indications of what’s coming, and standing back at points in the narrative in order to gather threads and draw conclusions, whilst Thucydides «recreates the moment» in the past, placing his readers in a similar position to the agents in his narrative, who do not know how things will turn out, nor what consequences their decisions will have. D compares Herodotus’ account of Croesus’ assumption of power (a course initiated by Gyges) with the Athenians’ fatal involvement in the Kerkyrean War in Bk. 1. Hdt’ account leaves little room for individual choice, showing rather how things ‘had to happen’ like that (D emphasizes χρῆν in 1.8.2), whilst Thucydides shows the Athenians teetering in two successive meetings of the Assembly toward a non-aggression pact with Kerkyra which will lead to fighting between Corinthians and Athenians. D analyses features of Th’s narrative—the seasonal chronology, «atomistic» narrative in which developments are split like beads on a necklace, piecemeal explanations of minor incidents by the historian—which combine to reenact a «virtual present» in the reader’s mind. Although D acknowledges the «ironic» reading of Thucydides (attributed e.g. to Kitto and Morrison), according to which Thucydides wishes the reader to draw conclusions about underlying causality in history without ever spelling these out, D prefers to locate Th’s interest in the movement in Athens at the time deciding policy.

In this chapter D does not explicitly align Th’s ‘presentness’ with a wider intellectual movement in Athens at the time although presumably the analysis of his historical method is intended to take its place in D’s thesis that the Athenians were obsessed by the present in this period. I myself would take the more conventional view that the war and plague and loss of empire concentrated their minds on the present by unfortunate necessity. At one point Thucydides says that the Athenians during the plague «lived as if there was no tomorrow», because the future had become so uncertain (2.53.2–4). In his comparison of Herodotus and Thucydides D leaves out the question of divine will. Herodotus makes it clear that ‘god’ or ‘the divine’ is steering human affairs behind the scenes, even if human methods of ascertaining god’s will are inadequate; nevertheless the existence of fate or divine will means that, for Hdt there is a purposefulness or ‘grand design’ in history which only emerges in hindsight. Thucydides on the other hand omits this dimension entirely, although he does allow individuals their recourse to religious explanations (even Perikles: the *damounta* which are affect- ing Athens 2.64.2). Where D sees in Thucydides’ concentration on the uncertain present moment for acting humans a literary strategy, the phenomenon could also be explained by Thucydides’ refusal to attribute the course of history to higher powers. The omission of the gods entirely from the narrative must lead to a disconnectedness in one’s view of history, as the gods’ will (however abstracted) was the model of ultimate causality for the Greeks. It is very difficult for us moderns, steeped in chance mutation and natural selection, to remember that. I expect that D could easily accommodate this objection in his thesis by saying that loss of belief in the gods in late fifth-century Athens was a concomitant of, and contributory factor to, their greater concern with the present. However, religion does not feature in his analysis.

The fifth chapter looks at a number of (chiefly) Athenian texts dealing with human development and progress.

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1 Although at one point (147) he says that Perikles’ speech to the Athenians during the plague is «worthy of Antiphon» in its sympathetic understanding.

2 However, as many have argued, the reader has only to connect up Thucydides’ tacit juxtapositions (epitaphios-plague, empire-ignominy) to sense ‘tragic destiny’ in the work and to wonder whether Thucydides has not hidden god completely from sight, but not his works.
The subject is clearly relevant to D’s project as ideas about ‘how we’ve got to where we are’ relate to present consciousness. After showing that Hesiod’s myth of the five ages does not allow for gradual or even radical progress (as we’re all doomed as members of the grim age of iron), he first points to Aeschylus’ *Prometheus Bound* in which Prometheus describes how he vastly helped mankind by giving them the wherewithal for technology. The next stopping point is Sophokles’ famous ‘Ode to Man’ in *Antigone* in which the chorus steps back to admire man’s wondrous inventiveness, his *deinotés*. These models serve as contrast to those which D discovers in Protagoras (as far as we can reconstruct his position from Plato’s portrayal in the *Protagoras*), Democritus and – his crown witness in this chapter – the Hippocratic *Ancient Medicine*. This last describes how early man learnt a sensible diet by a long and painful process of trial and error. D believes the author is not merely a traditionalist opposing new-fangled philosophical approaches to medicine based on abstract entities like ‘the hot’ and ‘the cold’. Rather, according to D., he represents a collective, empiricist idea of progress by which doctors everywhere gradually accumulate expertise about dietary prescriptions for medical conditions. D wishes to assimilate the ‘presentness’ of the state of medical knowledge envisaged by *On Ancient Medicine* with characters in Euripides and Thucydides who must muddle through without recourse to unassailable rules or certainty about results. It follows ... that *Ancient Medicine* fully embeds events in time in a way that other narratives of human development do not.» (169) At the end of the chapter D acknowledges that this treatise is an example of the tendency to ‘professionalizes’ science in this period, with a variety of *technai* emerging representing empirical skill. I wonder whether the emergence of just these *technai* does not undercut D’s thesis of presentness: they came to replace the old models of e.g. gods and class with new canons: but just these were invented to avoid the problems of ‘muddling through’ in an uncertain present.

In the epilogue D broaches a last group of texts, the *epitaphioi logoi*, in order to show that Thucydides’ Perikles turns away from traditional topoi in his speech for the fallen to concentrate rather (among other things!) on consolation for the bereaved.

This, in D’s opinion, shows Thucydides addressing the here-and-now rather than the timeless topos of these speeches. Thucydides’ sympathetic (?) remarks to the bereaved show him, like Antiphon in *Homonoia*, making more or less practical suggestions for making the best of a bad job.

At the end of the book we have been introduced to a number of presents related to text genre: present situations (Euripides), strategic present (Thucydides), heuristic present (Hippocratic author), ethical present (Thucydides’ *epitaphios*). All these bear out what D sees as a new and challenging engagement with present time in these highly-strung decades at the end of the fifth century in Athens. D has taken us through well known texts (except perhaps *Ancient Medicine*) and presented an original and well-argued insight into a kind of new mentality which he detects. At the end, questions remain for me. I’m not sure one could not find an equal engagement with the present in, for example, Alkaios’ lyric poetry addressing Lesbian politics, or Sappho’s love poetry, or indeed Pindar’s *epinikia* (are not they devoted to the moment of athletic success?). Second, I find an ambiguity in D’s thesis: is the development he detects a result of ‘scientific’ progress in medicine, measurement, psychology? Or is it a result of the pressure placed on Athenians because of the war and plague? Or is it a combination of the two: great intellectual advances in

1 See A. Rubel, Stadt in Angst. Religion und Politik in Athen während des Peloponnesischen Krieges, Darmstadt 2000.
this period combined with great material and political losses? And I personally cannot imagine treating Athenian views on life, time and individual responsibility without grappling with ancient religion. The metaphor of the title 'present shock' combined with the 'after shocks' of the epilogue (192) makes me wonder whether the precarious present of life in California has not played a part in shaping the author’s reception.

Heidelberg

William D. Furley


Die Frage nach Dantes Homerwissen ist deswegen eine intrikate Frage, weil Dante weder Griechisch konnte noch über lateinische Übersetzungen der homerischen Epen verfügte: Solche gab es zu seiner Zeit schlicht noch nicht. Cerri erwägt