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die Verbindung von antiker Rhetorik und moderner Pragmatik könnte viele schon in Π. angelegte und von D. entwickelte Beobachtungen, etwa bei der Bittrede der Thetis an Zeus (1,523–10) oder der Rede der Götterbotin Iris an Poseidon (15,176–183), die beide Höflichkeitsstrategien verwenden, noch deutlicher zum Vorschein bringen.

Trotz der oben geäußerten Vorbehalte und Kritikpunkte, die vor allem als Anregung für die weitere Beschäftigung mit der Rhetorik bei Homer verstanden sein wollen, gebührt D. das große Verdienst, das von den modernen Interpreten zu Unrecht vernachlässigte Περὶ ἐσχηματισμένων mit den Resultaten der modernen Forschung auf intelligente und kritische Weise verbunden und für die Interpretation der Reden fruchtbar gemacht zu haben. Dabei sind seine Thesen insgesamt plausibel und werden durch reichliches und ausführlich besprochenes Anschauungsmaterial gestützt.

Die Arbeit, die nur wenige Versehen und Druckfehler aufweist, besitzt S. nur ein Verzeichnis der behandelten Homerischen Redner, aber keinen Index der zitierten Stellen oder Sachen.

Freiburg i.Br.

Carlo Scardino


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Susanne Gödde’s study of euphēmía in Greek literature is long and dense but very readable and interesting. It has two main thrusts. First, she argues throughout that euphēmía does not imply ‘silence’ (though it is often so translated), definitely not a Christian-style piety or any particular religious attitude, but refers to vocalized ‘good speech’. Second, she investigates the use of euphēmía, the verb euphēmein, its compounds, dysphēmía, and other evaluative terms for speech, seeking out the ways in which ‘good speech’ is represented – claimed, contested, imposed, manipulated, undermined – in major literary texts from Homer to Plato and tracing developments in its conception. Her method is close reading, and she uses it well to get fresh, illuminating results. Her command of the scholarship is impressive.

Part 1 lays out Gödde’s argument against taking euphēmía as ‘silence’ and lists its various uses. The ‘paralyzing’ use of the imperative occurred in ordinary discourse to stop an interlocutor from speaking of something ill-omened or distressing. This was a secondary use in which (she says) the situation overrode the meaning, so it could command silence. The ritual use, also usually in the imperative, was performative, calling for joyful speech pleasing to the god and defining


1 So lese man etwa S. 23 semper statt sempre; S. 35, Anm. 87 Xηρακτήρες statt Χηρακτήρες; S. 56 μῦθοι statt μῦθο; S. 159 κειμήλια statt κειμέλια; S. 166 Andromaca statt Ecuba; S. 279 ἦκα statt ἔκα; mehr als einmal wird das feminine Substantiv ἀριστεία ‘Ariste’ wie ein Pluralwort behandelt (z.B. S. 150 und 171).
the speech that followed as joyful. Ololygê and paian are examples of it, as are other ritual cries and responses. When the imperative opens a song it refers to the song itself as euphemous. The meanings ‘euphemism’ and ‘praise’ appear later, the former already in Plato.

Part 2 investigates the isolated examples of euphêm- and dysphêm- stems in Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar. Here Gödde finds a connection with cleansing and with phêmê as reality-creating speech. In Iliad, euphêmia is linked to reconciliation but fails, and only lament can heal. Dysphêmos, found in Pindar (Nem 8, 37) and Hesiod, gets no independent investigation, being taken simply as the opposite of euphêmos, but Gödde compellingly links these passages to phêmê and its dangers, seeing in Pindar a complex meditation on the fate of Ajax and his own poetic role.

Part 3, on Oresteia, five other tragedies, and Aristophanes’ Peace, contains Gödde’s most complex analyses. The study of Oresteia, in which marked forms of speech play such a large role, is a tour-de-force. In Agamemnon the watchman, the herald, and the chorus (with Kassandra) all try to keep disturbing realities at bay by invoking euphêmia, but none succeeds. Klytaimestra, however, does disguise her intentions by her ritual utterances. In Choephoroi the question how to speak the good arises, put first by Elektra then later by Orestes. In Eumenides Athena redeﬁnes the Erinyes as ‘good’, and they are led to their new home to cries of euphameite and ololuxate. But, although qua ritual the combination here of euphêmia and ololygê is completely positive, the same combination is linked to Klytaimestra’s deceptive speech in Agamemnon. Aischylos invites the audience to note the parallel and the Erinyes’ continued dangerousness. Gödde stresses the parallel, however, without noting the redeﬁnition of the mother as a mere container for the man’s child. In agreeing to stay in Athens the Furies make the best of a new order that cancels their rationale for intervening on the female side. They become instruments of a state-deﬁned collective morality rather than agents of individual revenge. The ending reﬂects this change: euphêmia and ololygê are now collective rather than a solo voice. But Gödde’s warning comment remains true.

Sophokles’ Trachinias, Elektra, and Oidipous at Kolonos get a chapter apiece. Gödde shows that each plot is driven by problems or conﬂicts in the dominant style of communication. In Trachinias messages (some of them phêmai) substitute for direct interaction and are ambiguous or deceitful. Here she explores the relationship of euphêmia to lament, which she calls euphêmos (in the weaker meaning ‘appropriate’) when it is for the dead but dysphêmos when it is for the living. The question of Herakles’ apotheosis is tangled in the question when lament is ‘good’ and has no clear answer. A leitmotif of Elektra is logos versus ergon, in which logos includes Klytaimestra’s demand for euphêmia, the phêmê of Orestes’ death, Elektra’s accusing Orestes of dysphêmia, and Orestes’ demand that she speak euphêmia things. Elektra’s lament risks reducing Orestes to a ‘word’, and Orestes, who rejects the power of language over him, must still reclaim his life by silencing it. Indeterminacy over how Orestes is ‘spoken’, as alive or dead, reﬂects on the murder. In Oidipous at Kolonos Sophokles positions Oidipous at the border between forbidden and ordinary ground, where he
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speaks the ‘unspeakable’ in a place where euphêmia dictates that any speaking aloud is risky. His transgressive voice is powerful, but at the end he demands silence, which obviates worship of him as a hero and restores euphêmia.

Euripides’ Ion and Iphigeneia in Aulis pose more direct questions about what euphêmia is. In Ion, euphêmia as ritual purity is contrasted with parrhêsia, which requires pure Athenian blood. But neither purity can be maintained: Ion’s euphêmia leads to threats of violence against the birds and he is saved by a blasphêmia, while his right to parrhêsia is (Gödde says) only upheld by Apollo’s lie and Athenian ignorance of his parentage. (The audience’s participation is ignored here, for it, unlike Xouthos, was privy to the secret, and Ion was legitimized by parallel with Acropolis myth.) In Iphigeneia, euphêmia appears at two odd and ironic moments before the final scene. Then, in the least dubious part of the textually-contaminated ending, Iphigeneia asks that her mother not mourn her death and requests of the chorus: epeuphêmêsat . . . paiana (1467–8) – greet it with joyous, affirmative speech. Absent the original ending, we do not know quite how to take this, but Gödde describes euphêmia here as broken.

It is in Aristophanes that we most often find the ritual imperative euphêmeite, but Gödde questions whether it really reflects normal practice when it seems to mean ‘be silent’. When Dikaiopolis calls for euphêmia as silence (Ach 237–41), she claims that, since he one-sidedly accents ‘anxious’ silence, Aristophanes is using him to make fun of excessive ritual caution. That idea seems wrong, for Dikaiopolis is a common-sense everyman hero. In the opening of Peace, the call for euphêmia leads to ripe jokes, but it is not mentioned in the sacrifice scene, with its crazy rejection of any words recalling war. Gödde nonetheless uses this scene as her major evidence for parody of ritual caution in this play. I am not persuaded that euphêmia is the target; if anything, Aristophanes is using it as a vehicle for redefining acceptable civic behavior.

In Plato’s work (Part 4) euphêmia becomes a moral and theological concept divorced from ritual. (Plato is also fond of the paralyzing use.) Late in Phaidon Sokrates remarks, as others begin to cry (117ε2–3): ‘And indeed I have heard that one ought to die in euphêmia. So stay calm and be strong.’ Gödde notes how different this use is from the religious concept. In Phaidros, Sokrates’ palinode is euphêmia as cleansing speech. In Laws it is an essential quality for the lawgiver to inscribe in the laws, and (not coincidently) it first appears with the explicit meaning ‘euphemism’.

After a brief Part 5 on iconography, in which Gödde mainly discusses a vase-painting of the near-sacrifice of Phrixos by the Dareios Painter that includes a personified euphêmia, Part 6 recapitulates the arguments with further comment on the recurring relationship between euphêmia and purity and between euphêmia and death. The first is a useful synthesis; for instance, she pairs Oidipous at Kolonos and Ion as notably putting the boundary between euphêmia and dysphêmia into question. The second tries to do too much. Gödde also repeats her view that lament for the dead was euphêmos in the sense ‘appropriate’. But euphêmia was invoked in specific types of ritual, not including lament, which was neither euphêmos nor dysphêmos. The context of Aeschylus’ phrase

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Euphêmois goois (Fr. 40 Radt) is lost, but Hesychios, who cites it, suggests that it was paradoxical, and it was preserved because it was surprising.

I have hardly done justice to all of Gödde’s important observations and arguments. Her analyses are extremely rich and illuminating, ranging over a whole constellation of authors’ concerns with the nature of speech. In such a dense study all readers will disagree with some views, but all will find it thought-provoking throughout.

Gödde’s treatment of ritual euphêmia, however, is distorted by her making the opposition between speech and silence its fundamental premise. I agree that euphêmia should not be translated ‘silence’. But it is not so much ‘good speech’ (Rede) as ‘speaking in a good way’ (Sprechen), an act. The prefix eu- is adverbial. Speaking inevitably includes silence, since it is a discontinuous act. And ‘speaking in a good way’ involves both using words appropriate to the context and saying them at the right time; it therefore implies silence when it is not the right time (as Gödde recognizes at various points). Only so does the imperative euphêmeite make sense: it is a command to all within hearing to act by adapting their speaking to this constraint. Three further points should be made. First, this silence is not a reified paradigm of piety; it is both the ‘pragmatic’ silence to which Gödde refers and the other face of ritual speech. Second, euphêmeite is performative (as she says) in that it makes all other speech within its reach performative – but for good or for bad, since euphêmia could be violated. It is true that there are very few references to dysphêmia threatening a ritual, but we have little direct description of ordinary ritual. Third, Gödde’s assessment of ritual euphêmia as a formality (because evidence for violations is lacking) drains all the tension from ritual. The imperative to be simultaneously both joyful and mindful of being a mortal coming into closer proximity to a god is one source of sacrificial ritual’s power to create a special experience and have an emotional effect on its practitioners.

Gödde’s focus is on tracing thematic networks in the works she discusses, so her reductive view of ritual euphêmia does not have an overall impact. Most literary works do not reproduce ritual; she stresses, for instance, that one cannot deduce actual cult practice from Oidipous at Kolonos. What does affect her treatment of ritual in texts is her approach to literature: she tends to treat the text as complete in itself. Thus she sometimes assumes that in reported descriptions of ritual everything was included; what was not mentioned did not occur, as though the audience would not supply information from their intimate knowledge of ritual procedures. An example is the chorus’ report of Klytaimestra’s victory ritual. The singers say that ‘the altars blaze with gifts’ (Ag 91), then dwell on ‘royal pelanos’ in a lush sentence (92–96, in which Gödde takes lampas as ‘altar’ rather than ‘torch’). Since no animals are mentioned, Gödde argues that this was not an animal sacrifice, that pelanos must have been an independent libation offered to underworld gods, and that therefore Klytaimestra was already placating the Erinyes. But line 91 in the context of victory celebration is enough to suggest a full sacrificial ritual. What is interesting about the ‘royal pelanos’ is its adding to the subtext of Klytaimestra’s control over the palace and of the showy excess with which she greets the victory.
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These criticisms do not detract from the value of this study. Gödde compellingly shows that euphēmia always had the potential to suppress recognition of reality as well as present the good. Her book is a major investigation of intellectual conceptions and literary treatment of ‘good speech’ over time. It should be read by all those interested in these issues.

College Park

Eva Stehle


The title of David Leitao’s book on the «myth» of «the pregnant male», as well as its cover, should be inviting to anybody interested in Greek myth, at least in understanding the curious habit of the Athenians to represent their patron goddess at the moment of her miraculous birth. In addition, the «metaphor» in the title refers to a host of texts not normally subsumed under the category of ‘mythical tales’. What the reader is offered is a broad range of close readings of philosophical and dramatic texts, both well-known and more obscure passages. In addition to analysing some tragic and comic dramas the author focuses on texts that will interest specialists of the pre-Socratics as well as Plato and the Sophists. He arrives at conclusions on the specific use of the metaphor of ‘the pregnant male’ and related images as they are adopted by various authors, sometimes varying within the corpus of one and the same author.

The volume is structured in an introduction and additional six chapters, each chapter presenting itself as a self-contained study. There is no concluding chapter, but we are given 2 appendices, as well as an index.

In the Introduction Leitao presents his suspicion that the impregnation metaphor in Diotima’s discourse in the Symposium did not emerge ex nihilo as Plato’s original idea, but was part of a widespread network of metaphors drawn from the semantic field of parturition, including the role of midwife (in the following referred to as ‘the pregnant male’ metaphor). According to Leitao this metaphor has served as a means to think through and talk about a number of issues and controversies, among them the origin of the embryo’s soul, the role of providence in the world, the nature and origin of thought and creativity, legitimacy of birth and civic status, ownership of intellectual property, and the nature of teaching (§). Leitao traces the scientific discourse on this metaphor within the fields of social anthropology and psychology. While psychoanalytic research assumes male pregnancy fantasies as expressions of «womb envy» (7), the ethnographic record has identified customs such as the couvade staging fathers ‘giving birth’ (6). Leitao notices that instead of intra-psychic conflicts ‘the pregnant male’ metaphor rather appears to be a conceptualization of kinship and citizenship during the classical period (10). In Artemidorus’ dream exegesis a dream staging a man who is giving birth predicts success in business or marriage (11). Agreeing with methods developed by Nicole Loraux and Page Dubois who follow the metaphor in concrete textual expressions rather than ontogenetic or phylogenetic