inoltre mancano, come si è visto sopra, alcuni testi e studi assai importanti che probabilmente avrebbero molto arricchito alcune delle interpretazioni proposte dall’A.

Fisciano

Michele Abbate

Posidonius was probably the most important creative Stoic next to Zeno and Chrysippus, and he may count as the most important philosopher of the first century BC. He was admired by such different personalities as Pompeius and Cicero, who both took the trouble to visit him in Rhodes (Cicero even called him his *magister*), and he was renowned for his lectures. Where his influence can be traced with any certainty it was considerable – one may think such authors as Varro, Cicero, Diodorus, Cleomedes and Seneca (partly through Posidonius’ pupil Asclepiodotus). In the past it has often been assumed that his influence was also considerable in texts, such as the sixth book of Virgil’s *Aeneid*, where it can *not* be traced with any certainty, but this tendency towards ‘panposidonianism’ is nowadays viewed with salutary scepticism.

The book under consideration here was published some years ago, but since it offers us no less than a new edition, with Italian translation and extensive commentary, of the Posidonian fragments, it still deserves to be carefully assessed. The book starts with an adequate introduction, which offers a balanced picture of the way in which Posidonius’ wide-ranging empirical investigations were embedded within an overall framework of Stoic philosophy, and it ends with useful concordances between this edition and the previous ones by Edelstein/Kidd and Theiler. This almost naturally brings us to the question of the *raison d’être* of this book. For precisely the fact that we already have the editions of Edelstein/Kidd and Theiler and the marvelous commentary in two volumes by Ian Kidd, some may doubt whether a new edition with commentary is called for, or even whether the preparation of an Italian translation of all the fragments (where we already have Kidd’s excellent English translation) should be among anyone’s research priorities.¹ To some extent such qualms may perhaps be put aside in view of the fact that the book seems to derive its rationale primarily from being embedded in a larger project: a complete Italian edition-plus-translation of all the fragments and texts of the ancient Stoics, from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius, published under the direction of Giovanni Reale in the series ‘Il pensiero occi-

dentale'. Yet, the preface by Roberto Radice explicitly claims (p. vi) that this edition of Posidonian fragments will not only derive its value from offering the first Italian translation, but will also establish itself as a work of reference, on two grounds: «per le innovazioni apportate alla scelta dei frammenti e per la completezza del commentario». These are strong claims which warrant a closer examination of the book’s added value, in terms of both its selection of fragments and the quality of its commentary. Let us first turn to the selection of fragments we are being offered.

Precisely because of all kinds of previous scholarly presuppositions or prejudices about the allegedly pervasive influence of his thought, the question which passages in later authors contain material that is to be traced back to Posidonius is complicated and has been much debated. Against the background of this so-called ‘Posidonian question’, and given earlier tendencies towards ‘panposidonianism’, the edition of Edelstein/Kidd played a sobering role in that it consistently restricted itself to views ascribed to Posidonius nominatim. No one, least of all Edelstein and Kidd themselves, would claim that this set of fragments exhausts the Posidonian material that is present in ancient texts. Nor would anyone in his right mind claim that the attested fragments are eo ipso always reliable qua content and form. But starting from the attested material does provide us with a methodologically acceptable (though, as said, not entirely water-proof) basis on which to build our picture of Posidonius the philosopher. The editor of this new collection of fragments, Emmanuele Vimercati (henceforth: V), is right to point out that this approach has its limitations: «L’edizione del Kidd va quindi considerata come un punto di partenza imprescindibile e non come un risultato definitivo per gli studi su Posidonio». Although a «punto di partenza» is arguably precisely what any edition should aspire to be, V thus invites us to examine to what extent his new edition goes beyond Kidd and to what extent this is justified. The answer to the first question is that he does not offer very much more (in terms of additional fragments). Where the edition of Edelstein/Kidd included a little more than 350 fragments and testimonies, the rival edition by Theiler, which also included many unattested passages, contained over 500 fragments. V largely follows Edelstein-Kidd’s selection and ends up with 335 attested fragments (labeled ‘A-fragments’; the way the fragments are combined, divided and numbered is not always the same as in Edelstein/Kidd), and then adds the rather modest number of 35 «passi non nominali» (labeled B fragments). Most of these were also included by Theiler, but as the numbers already show, a lot of what is

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1 Earlier volumes in the series include An neo Cornuto. Compendio di teologia greca (2001), edited and translated by Ilaria Ramelli, and Panezio: testimonianze e frammenti (2001), edited by Emmanuele Vimercati, the editor of the present volume.

in Theiler has been excluded from the present edition. This suggests that V thinks he has stronger arguments for including his 35 selected B-fragments than Theiler had for the rest of his selection. And that brings us to the question of the justification of the additions.

On closer view the B-fragments fall into two groups: the more strictly philosophical fragments (B1–15) and the historiographical fragments (B16–30). For the latter group V follows the practice of Jacoby (and Theiler) of including large unattributed scraps from the work of Diodorus – a practice which they defended on the basis of the supposition that Diodorus as a rule used one and the same source over larger stretches of text, without constantly naming this source. In most cases V offers no arguments for inclusion beyond the claim that «il passo è stato considerato posidaniano da Jacoby, Theiler e Malitz». One wonders, accordingly, why this argument apparently failed to carry sufficient weight in other cases, for V leaves out quite a number of passages that were also included by (Jacoby and) Theiler. In all these cases V’s policies may well be sound, but his principles are not spelled out, so there is no way we can tell.

In the case of the more strictly philosophical B-fragments we are dealing with sources that do not automatically allow the approach Jacoby and Theiler took with regard to Diodorus – sources such as Cleomedes (who professes to have used multiple sources) and Cicero (who uses multiple sources as well, and is also perfectly capable of rephrasing what he found in his sources in his own words). So here we definitely need arguments if we want to include passages that do not name Posidonius as their source. The main type of argument used by V appears to invoke the principle that where an unattested passage $y$ in a particular source is somehow like another passage $x$ which is explicitly ascribed to Posidonius, especially if this passage $x$ occurs in the same context, we may regard $y$ at as a fram-mento attribuibile. However, this means that where the relation is one of resemblance rather than identity, a degree of arbitrariness is inevitably involved in establishing what counts as sufficient resemblance and in deciding whether the elements in $y$ that are not paralleled in $x$ can still plausibly be attributed to Posidonius. Let me give three examples of cases where I found V’s way of arguing less than convincing.

First, fr. B1: a passage in Cleomedes on the size of the moon. In Cleomedes’ text it is directly preceded by an attested Posidian fragment (A74a in this edition) which tries to establish the size of the sun on the basis of the hypothesis that the heliacal circle is 10,000 times greater than the circumference of the earth. According to V, fr. B1 may be regarded

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1 Cf. Fin. I, 6: ‘Quid si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea quae dicta sunt ab iis quos probamus, esque nostrum judicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus?’ And even in the famous passage in Att. XII, 52, 3 in which he labels his Academica as ἀπόγραφα, he adds that he provides the wording: ‘verba tantum adfero, quibus abundo’.

2 Of course where in such cases $x$ and $y$ are identical, no problem emerges and $y$ may simply be regarded as a parallel to $x$ (though it would be inept to print it as a separate fragment).

3 It is unfortunate that V cites the fragments from Cleomedes using the outdated 19th century edition of Ziegler, instead of the modern standard edition of R. Todd, Cleomedes Caelestia (ΜΕΤΕΩΡΑ), Leipzig 1990.
as Posidonian too, because it deals with ‘problematiche analoghe’, namely a calculation of the size of the moon, offering «soluzioni sostanzialmente simili o identiche». However, this is to ignore the fact that this calculation of the size of the moon is only the first part of a more encompassing argument that offers a calculation of the size of the sun that may serve as an alternative to the one offered by Posidonius – one that is less hypothetical and as such ‘considered to carry a greater degree of cognitive reliability’ (Cael. II, 1, 296 Todt). So there are two problems with V’s approach: (i) the text of B1 breaks off halfway the argument, and (ii) the argument is not so much analogous to what we find in A74a, but rather offers an alternative, and the results are not ‘similar’, but the first (Posidonian) argument ends up with a sun of 3,000,000 stades, whereas the second concludes that it measures 520,000 stades. Of course it is possible that Posidonius was conscious of the hypothetical basis of the first calculation, and for this reason himself offered the alternative calculation of which V’s fragment B1 prints only the first half. But there is no way of knowing, and we should recall that (at the end of book I) Cleomedes announces this whole discussion of the size of the sun (i.e. the first chapter of book II) by claiming that he will offer the arguments ‘derived from a group of authors who have written treatises exclusively on this subject, among them Posidonius’ (Cael. I, 160162 Todd). So Posidonius is not his only source here, and the alternative argument may equally well have come from someone else. Kidd’s conclusion, in his commentary (p. 444), that the second argument «may or may not be by Posidonius» is the only sound one. If one decides to include it in a collection of Posidonian fragments, there is no reason not to include much more from the same context in Cleomedes.2

A second example concerns V’s fragment B3, a passage in Cicero ND I, 121–123 criticizing Epicurean theology. It is a passage which precedes another and rather well-known one (ND I, 123–124, fr. A98 in V’s edition) which refers to Posidonius’ views as they had been given in the fifth book of his On the (nature of the) gods, according to which (a) Epicurus was a ‘closet atheist’ who only introduced his theology to avoid popular odium; apparently because (b) one cannot imagine that he really believed in this insipid conception of god as human-like without a proper body, having limbs but not using them, caring for nothing and doing nothing. The text goes on to claim (c1) that a being like this could not exist, and secondly (c2) that even if it could, we would not need it. Strictly speaking only (a) can be attributed to Posidonius with any degree of certainty, but (b) may plausibly be added because it is connected to (a) by the particle enim. In the case of (c) we are on less secure ground, because it is grammatically not explicitly connected to what precedes, so that it could be an addition by Cicero himself. Strangely, V follows Kidd in including (c1) but not (c2), even though we are clearly dealing with two limbs of one argument (connected by primum ... denunde).3 Leaving this aside for the moment, and returning to V’s fragment B3 which, as noted, directly precedes A98, we may note that it adds at least two elements that are absent from A98: an attack on the connection between divine providence and weakness, allegedly made by the Epicureans (an implicit reference to Epicurus SV 1) and the fact that friendship, love or care is not a matter of reciprocal utility, but is gratuita. Neither of these two points is addressed in A98, so they may have a different provenance, and the latter one is a typical and recurrent element in Cicero’s polemics against Epicurus (see the discussion of friendship in Fin. II). So is this Posidonian material? It may or may not be. It may equally well reflect Cicero’s own view, or his own ‘mix’ of what he found in

1 See now the translation (not yet available to V at the time) of A. C. Bowen & R. B. Todt, Cleomedes’ Lectures on Astronomy. A Translation of The Heavens with an Introduction and Commentary, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 2004, 115–116, which conveniently numbers the sections of the argument.

2 This, presumably, is why in his corresponding fr. 290a Theiler prints the whole first chapter of the second book of Cleomedes (12 full pages of text) as a Posidonian fragment.

3 Theiler’s (partly) corresponding fr. 346 does include (c2).
various sources. Hence even Theiler did not include it.\footnote{Although the concordance at the end of the book suggests that V’s fr. B3 corresponds to Theiler’s fr. 346, Theiler only prints the very last two sentences of the relevant text (as an introduction to the text that corresponds to V’s fr. A98).} If we think its proximity to fr. A98 warrants inclusion as a Posidonian fragment, then other passages in the same context – starting with (c2) which immediately follows on A98 – may be included as well. Also in this case, in other words, closer view reveals that V’s selection, and delimitation, of non-attested Posidonian material is rather arbitrary.

Finally, a curious case. Fragment B13 is a passage in Strabo about various views about the length of the Persian parasang: 60, 30 or 40 stadia. Here again it is the resemblance between this text and attested material that induced V to regard it as material ‘attributable to’ Posidonius. The attested parallel fragment is printed as A177. It occurs in an anonymous work entitled \textit{Sylloge Tacticorum}, which some have ascribed to a certain Julian of Ascalon (5th/6th century), but which may be as late as the 9th or 10th century. It gives a list of definitions of the parasang: it was mostly thought to be 40 stades, 30 according to Xenophon, 60 according to others, whereas some took it to be even ‘much more than 60’, according to Strabo, who cited Posidonius as evidence for the \textit{logos}. The extant text of Strabo does not contain the passage referred to here (including the reference to Posidonius), so if the reference is correct, the information to which the \textit{Sylloge} refers must have been contained in a part of the work that is now lost. In a sense, then, our fr. B13 seems to be the closest thing we find in Strabo. But can it count as a Posidonian fragment? At this point it should be noted that the word \textit{logos} at the end of A177 seems to be ambiguous: it may refer to the last mentioned calculation or estimate (‘much more than 60’), or to the whole quasi-doxographical overview. In his commentary V, curiously enough, defends the former option (p. 620): ‘alti proponevano misure ancora maggiori; tra di loro vi era Posidonius’. But in that case it is very strange to include B13, which mentions 30, 40 and 60 stadia, but \textit{not} Posidonius’ own alleged option of ‘much more than 60’, as a Posidonian fragment. However, even if we take the word \textit{logos} in A177 to refer to the preceding account in its entirety, we can hardly view B13 as more than a partial parallel to the contents of A177 (omitting the name of Xenophon and omitting the final option, but offering no new information), i.e. we should regard it as at best Strabo’s partial reference to, or recollection of, the Posidonian information that was contained in the other passage that is now lost. Since, moreover, it offers no information that is not already contained in A177, treating it as an independent Posidonian fragment looks rather pointless.

What emerges from these examples is, first, that methodologically speaking it is not really possible to take ‘a middle course’ (as the introduction claims V does) between the policies of Edelstein/Kidd on the one hand and Theiler on the other. Either one sticks to the sound methodological principle of only including explicitly attested material, while recognizing that Posidonius’ influence is no doubt also apparent – directly or indirectly - in a host of other passages. Or else, it will be hard to draw boundaries and to find the right arguments to defend a policy that is more restrictive than Theiler’s. Secondly, and more importantly, the examples examined above suggest that V’s selection of B-fragments is on the whole insufficiently supported by argument to deserve to count as a useful supplement to the edition of Edelstein/Kidd.

We may now turn to the commentary. Any reviewer will inevitably find something to quibble about, or some lacuna to deplore, in a work of 439 pages of text and translation and 247 pages of commentary (densely printed in small typeface) on such a wide-ranging author as Posidonius. For although «completezza» is indeed what is claimed in the preface, it is hard to achieve and, frankly, no one...
will expect it from a work like this. However, the reader does have a right to expect clarity and accuracy: the commentary should really clarify the fragments and help us to understand Posidonius in terms of state-of-the-art knowledge in the areas of ancient philosophy and science. A few sample cases may serve to show that in these respects maximum reliability is not guaranteed throughout V’s commentary.

The first sample case concerns one of the most interesting, and most hotly debated, aspects of Posidonius’ philosophy, viz. his moral psychology. In books IV and V of his PHP Galen, who has a clear Platonizing and anti-Chrysippean agenda in this work, discusses a number of passages from Posidonius’ On Emotions which show, or so he wants us to believe, that Posidonius, though strictly speaking rejecting talk about ‘parts’ of the soul, nevertheless sided with Plato, against Chrysippus’ monism, in recognizing irrational faculties of the soul. The evidence of Galen is one of the main factors that have contributed to the widely spread picture of Posidonius as ‘Platonizing’ or ‘eclectic’ Stoic, and it has been taken at face value by prominent scholars. However, over the last decades there has been a strong counter-movement of scholars who have pointed to Galen’s polemical purposes, to the complete absence in other sources of any indication of Posidonian heterodoxy on this point, and to the possibility of offering different interpretations of the relevant fragments, which bring Posidonius closer to the Chrysippean orthodoxy. One may mention J. Filion-Lahille, Le De ira de Sénèque et la philosophie stoïcienne des passions (Paris 1984) and John Cooper’s 1998 essay ‘Posidonius on Emotions’, reprinted in his Reason and Emotion. Essays in Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton 1999), p. 449–484.1 Because V’s commentary ignores these dissenting voices, the reader has no idea that a serious debate has been going on about these fragments and their interpretation and that the picture of Posidonius as an ‘eclectic’ is now at least controversial.

My second sample case concerns Posidonius’ explicit theorizing about the differences between philosophical physics and mathematical astronomy. This is the subject of fr. A69 (Simplicius reporting Alexander reporting Geminus’ epitome of Posidonius’ Meteorologica), the otherwise strongly anti-Stoic Alexander of Aphrodisias was apparently prepared to include this text in his commentary on Aristotle’s own methodological remarks (in Physics II, 2) on the differences between (applied) mathematics and physics. For good reasons: after all, this text in principle came close to the Aristotelian position, while at the same time enlarging upon that position by taking account of post-Aristotelian developments in astronomy, such as the models making use of epicycles and eccentrics. The final section of the fragment contains a reference to Heraclides Ponticus which is notoriously puzzling. The claim that he thought we could save the ‘apparent anomaly with regard to the sun’ (ἡ περὶ τῶν ἥλιων ροινομενή ἄνωμαλία) by assuming ‘that the earth is moving somehow (κινουμένης πας τῆς γῆς) and the sun stands still somehow (τοῦ ἥλιου μενοντός παυ)’ is hard to fit onto the main astronomical hypothesis ascribed to Heraclides by our sources, viz. that the earth daily spins around its own axis, for that hypothesis takes account of the sun’s apparent daily motion around the earth, but not of any kind of ὀντωμαλία. On the questionable evidence of Calcidius, some have also attributed to Heraclides the view that the sun encircles the earth, but that Mercury and Venus in their turn encircle the sun; but the Wortlaut of Geminus’ text does not fit this hypothesis either (for on this hypothesis the earth is not moving, and the sun not at rest). It rather reads like a slightly vague reference to the heliocentric hypothesis of Aristarchus of Samos. Hence various attempts have been made to emend the relevant section of the text, for example by regarding the name Heraclides Ponticus as an uninformed gloss that got into the text.

V’s commentary on A69, however, tries to explain Heraclides’ system by offering an intricate but hypothetical reconstruction, involving a theory of epicycles (according to which

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1 One may add T. L. Tieleman, Chrysippus on Affections. Reconstruction and Interpretation, Leiden 2003, which makes a strong case for Posidonius’ basic orthodoxy; however, this book may well have appeared too late for V to have been able to take it into account.
not only Mercury and Venus, but also the other planets revolve around the sun, which in its turn encircles the earth – basically the system later adopted by Tycho Brahe). This reconstruction goes back to Schiaparelli’s ‘Origine del sistema planetario eliocentrico presso i Greci’ of 1898, but it is not based on any direct evidence in the sources on Heracleides, and it has certainly not been widely accepted by historians of ancient astronomy.\footnote{In fact, it can be said to have been basically refuted by Th. Heath, Aristarchus of Samos. The Ancient Copernicus, Oxford 1913, 269–275.}

This is a strange move in itself, but V further complicates matters by claiming that by proposing this system Heracleides «intendeva … dare soluzione alle apparenti irregolarità nel moto orbitale del sole e della terra» (my italics). All this is rather unhelpful, especially since V does not spell out exactly why this 'theory of epicycles' is inconsistent with our actual text. In all, we are offered a lot of rather confusing details, plus some references to some relevant studies, but the gist of the story remains unclear at points, certainly to the uninitiated reader. Unfortunately, also the commentary to the earlier parts of this intriguing fragment at times lacks clarity and precision. Thus, we are told (p. 514) that «l’astronomia ha bisogna … del metodo matematico della fisica» – but no such claim is made in the actual text of our fragment, and it is not clear what the 'mathematical method of physics' should be anyway. We are also told (p. 515) that whereas physics is «maggiormente teorica e filosofica», astronomy is «maggiormente empirica e practica». But what does this mean? For sure, mathematical astronomy is empirical to the extent that it sets itself the task of 'saving the appearances'. At the same time, however, its explanatory models are theoretical, whereas on the other hand also Stoic philosophical physics is not wholly theoretical, but has an empirical basis. And in what sense can we say that mathematical astronomy is 'practical'? All in all, I am afraid that V has missed the chance to make coherent sense of this intriguing fragment.

My final sample case concerns the book’s discussion of Aetius’ evidence on Posidonius’ conception of the (extent of the) extracosmic void. Here the commentary, rather than being merely incomplete or unclear, appears to derail more or less completely. We are dealing with two doxographical scraps of information (Ps.-Plutarch and Stobaeus; frs. A61a and A61b) which specify that Posidonius thought the extracosmic void to be (not infinite but) just as large as is required for the dissolution (εἰς διάλυσιν of the cosmos (i.e. the event of a conflagration). What goes wrong? First, the commentary claims (p. 514) that «da somiglianza tra le testimonie di Stoboe e ps.-Plutarco spinge a pensare che le notizie siano attendibile»; this suggests that we are dealing with two independent sources, whereas in truth what we have here are two versions of one and the same doxygraphy: Aetius. Secondly, the text printed as fr. A61b includes the ps.-Plutarchean lemma for the whole chapter as well: Περί τοῦ ἐκτὸς τοῦ κόσμου, εἰ ἔστῃ κενὸν, but the commentary mistakes this for a title of a work of Posidonius, adding that this title is not confirmed by other sources and therefore is «piuttosto desueto». Thirdly, the words αὐτάρκες εἰς διάλυσιν are translated as 'sufficiente per dissolveri', and the commentary specifies that the dissolution we are talking about is the dissolution, not of the cosmos, but of the tout (p. 513: 'l’estensione del vuoto è tale per cui esso si possa dissolvere'). Apart from the fact that the previous doxa (which gives the common Stoic view) speaks of εἰς ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκπέρσιον ἔναλυται τὸ κένον, thus making clear what the subject of the διάλυσις is supposed to be, the notion of a dissolution of the void is incomprehensible in itself. Hence «il rapporto tra finitezza e dissoluzione non è del tutto chiaro» (p. 514).\footnote{On p. 513 the reader is referred to K. A. Algra, ‘Posidonius’ Conception of the Extracosmic Void: The Evidence and the Arguments’, Mnemosyne 46 (1993), 473–505 for further clarification, but the interpretation there offered is completely different and makes no reference to the 'dissolversi' of the void.} Finally, the commentary offers a baffling piece of background information, namely that Aristotle «giustifica l’esistenza del vuoto all’interno del cosmo in base all’esistenza del movimento … e al principio della rarefazione/condensazione». Of course neither Aristotle nor Solmsen (who is here adduced as a reference) ever claimed any such thing.
A few further comments on points of detail.

The translation is not always accurate. Thus, in fr. B3 Cicero’s ‘quid optamus a deis immortalibus’ is translated as ‘perché chiediamo agli dei l’immortalità’. Other minor infelicities: in fr. B11 the last sentence of the translation finds no counterpart in the Greek text printed on the facing page; the commentary on fr. A1 (p. 473) claims that the evidence suggests that Posidonius wrote a book On the Void in at least ten books, but here ‘ten’ should be ‘two’; the title page (though not the front cover) rather ineptly claims that this edition on facing pages has the ‘testo Latino a fronte’.

In view of the preceding considerations our conclusions must be mixed. Italians may find it useful to have an Italian translation available of the fragments of this great Stoic, and in that sense the book may serve its purpose. But as an edition with commentary it falls short of what is required. Perhaps this should not surprise us. The wide-ranging Posidonian fragments require correspondingly wide-ranging scholarship on the part of those studying them. One should realize, in this connection, that Ian Kidd’s magisterial commentary was the fruit of a lifetime’s engagement with Posidonius, the sources and the ‘Posidonian question’. One may presume, by contrast, that the format of the series in which the present edition appeared involved that not too much time was available for its gestation. Nevertheless, one can still imagine that some careful proof-reading by the editors or by one or two knowledgeable peers would have sifted out at least some unnecessary obscurities, mistakes, and minor editorial infelicities. Things being as they are, this edition cannot be regarded as an improvement over the previous editions of Edelstein/Kidd and Theiler, and should rather be used with caution.

Utrecht

**Keimpe Algra**


The Graeco-Roman world, much like any period in history, had its share of professional interpreters of dreams. Among the ancient sources that inform us about their practices, pride of place is taken by the *Oneirocritica*, written by the second-century dream interpreter Artemidorus of Daldis. Consisting of five books, this masterpiece of divinatory literature contains hundreds of examples of dreams and their interpretations as well as discussions of interpretative techniques and theoretical reflections on the origin and classification of nightly visions. The *Oneirocritica* stood at the pinnacle of a once thriving Greek oneirocritical tradition, of which very little textual evidence remains.¹ Most of what we know today about the most famous Greek dream interpreters derives from the *Oneirocritica*.

Daniel Harris-McCoy has now greatly facilitated the study of the *Oneirocritica* by providing us with a revised edition of the Greek text, new English

¹ For an edition of the fragments and testimonia see D. del Corno, Graecorum de re oni-
rocritica scriptorium reliquiae (Milan, 1969).