By 1914, Britain’s Second City hosted a German business community of around 100 individuals whose trade networks extended not only to Germany but also to other markets around the world. Analysing the roots, structure and transnational activities of this group gives insights into aspects of economic globalisation and Anglo-German relations during a period which has traditionally been analysed under the primary lens of a rising antagonism. In light of political and economic tensions it would be futile to contest the main axiom of this literature. However, more recent approaches which move away from clear national demarcations and instead focus on transnational connectivity have led to a recalibration of the binary picture. Academically trained elites in both countries, for example, shared much of the same outlook and value system, and industrial innovation was characterised by intense cross-border exchange of knowledge and hardware. In this vein, the following article introduces a German business community under the auspices of economic opportunities and social interaction with local elites. What emerges is a bourgeois group leading those «transnational lives» which have been identified as a feature of «global modernity». Economic and social ties were entertained locally at an inter- and intra-ethnic level; transregionally with other places in Britain; and transnationally with Germany and beyond. The article is,
therefore, a periphery-led case study of German globalisation which, at the same time, questions a clear centre-periphery dichotomy as both spheres were fluid and permeable.6

The microhistorical analysis is based on extensive biographical and company data. These give insights into a relatively successful community of merchants, clerks and managers with high levels of endogenous employment and self-employment. A number of theoretical angles help to embed this case study into the wider field of entrepreneurial migrations. These will include the question of human capital in the form of education and transcultural competence as a predisposed or acquired asset. Did the specific business education in Germany and the ability to lead «transnational lives» generate comparative advantages within British labour market and trading structures? A second angle will be the question of social capital in the form of mutually supportive ethnic networks. What was the role of ethnic associations in creating a group identity and facilitating access to collectively-owned social capital? And thirdly, did specific features of an ethnic enclave economy foster access to, and career prospects on, the local labour market for members of the ethnic group?7

The German business community in Glasgow was a local manifestation of Germany’s expanding economy in the second half of the 19th century. A community had existed in London since the middle ages,8 but this was now reduplicated on a smaller scale in provincial cities. By 1914, Germany had superseded France and Britain in terms of industrial production. Her export rates rose faster than those of world exports generally. Almost a quarter of domestic industrial production was exported, as opposed to 15 per cent for Britain and France respectively. Her share in world trade rose from 9.5 per cent in 1874/78 to 12.2 per cent in 1909/13.9 A side effect of economic globalisation was the growth of German merchant communities in all world-regions with trading potential. Whether in the Pacific, Brazil, the United States or the Ottoman Empire, whether in Hong Kong, St. Petersburg or Mexico City:10 Germans grasped the opportunities of...
globalisation, extended their networks, and acted as facilitators in situ to move goods and money across the globe. German emigration research has long focused on the United States, but the multitude of destinations reinforces the need to extend the geographical scope of investigation. This also applies to intra-European movements, which are still under-researched.11

Entrepreneurs in Imperial Germany were particularly mobile. 72 per cent of businessmen from Dortmund, Bremen and Frankfurt had spent a lengthy period of time abroad. Unsurprisingly, the highest figures were to be found in the trade sector.12 These years were often spent in junior positions as clerks. Those who returned had acquired mercantile and technical know-how, had improved their foreign language proficiency, and had established important business contacts which were often kept alive across time and space. These skills were conducive to entrepreneurial success when returnees established their own businesses back home. During their stay abroad – which could range from short-term to indefinite – they profited from a similar set of skills based on intercultural competence. As Sir Jacob Behrens, who had himself come to England from Germany and risen to leading textile producer in Bradford, explained: «The German clerk, who has a good knowledge of three or four languages, who has been taught to understand the working of the exchanges [and] the tariffs of different countries [...] will find employment and rise to an important position or to independence much sooner than the English clerk.»13

Predisposed human capital in the form of specialist education and skills is a crucial factor to determine migrants’ success in a different labour market context. Italian and, from the 1880s, Eastern European Jewish immigrants did not have comparable skills at their disposal and played no role in this segment of the British labour market.14 The poignancy of human capital in the migration process is also highlighted in more recent comparisons from the Americas. Post-revolutionary Cuban migrants in Miami for example – who often hailed from middle-class backgrounds – have tended to fare better than their Mexican counterparts in California.15
Within a diachronic perspective it is necessary to include clerks in our analysis. Most of the individuals discussed below started off as clerks before becoming business partners or owners, and ethnic associations brought together Germans at all stages of their career. Britain was the second most important destination for German clerks after the United States. According to census data for England and Wales, their numbers more than doubled from 1,262 in 1871 to 2,748 in 1911. As Gregory Anderson has shown, they were increasingly perceived as competitors by their British colleagues. They were also used as a convenient projection screen for educational reform. Britain’s relative decline in world trade was increasingly explained by reference to insufficient educational opportunities. Prospective clerks usually left school at the age of 14 or 15 before entering a three-year training period with a company. When simple routine tasks such as type-writing increased towards the end of the century, even this period ceased to be an integral part of the training for clerks. Educational reformers referred to Germany as a positive example: there, the training not only included business know-how but also foreign languages. It lasted, on average, three years longer than in Britain. When trade colleges (Handelshochschulen) were established from 1898, students could extend their training up to the age of 25. German clerks were popular with British employers for two reasons. Firstly, they filled the shortage of home-grown trained personnel with foreign language and other intercultural skills. Such personnel were indispensable for an economy with global trading connections. Secondly, many of them regarded their stay abroad as part of their training and were therefore ready to make compromises on salary and working-hours.16

The presence of German clerks and merchants in Britain rose in line with bilateral trade. Between 1860 and 1913 the value of German exports to Britain rose more than fivefold, and Britain’s exports to Germany tripled.17 Glasgow’s rise to Second City of the Empire was accompanied by rocketing trading figures with continental Europe and Scandinavia. The tonnage of shipping entering Glasgow from «Northern and Nearby Europe» in 1861 amounted to 16,458 tons. 50 years later it had risen by 38 times to 621,887 tons. Similarly, export figures rose by 35 times from 16,057 tons to 555,053 tons. Within half a century the Scottish city had developed into Britain’s third largest trading port after London and Liverpool. The most important export materials and products included coal, pig iron, steel and iron products, and chemicals. In terms of import, the most important goods brought into Britain via Glasgow were iron ore, corn, flour, wheat, and timber.18

German merchants established themselves on the back of these booming trading links with mainland Europe. Although their activities were mainly with Germany, they were by no means confined to bilateral trade. Endemann & Co., for example, «purchased coal in this country for export to customers in Germany, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden». Carl Kiep & Brother traded timber with Scandinavia, Russia, in Britain see Antje Hagen, Deutsche Direktinvestitionen in Großbritannien 1871-1918, Stuttgart 1997.

17 Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism (cf. n. 2), 45, 293. For German FDI
North Central Europe and America. As will be shown, German merchant houses such as Endemann or Kiep were mainly represented in the boom branches of Glasgow’s trading sector. Three main factors for the existence of a German merchant community in Glasgow can, therefore, be identified: career and mobility patterns in Germany which included a period of professional training and practice abroad; a significant expansion of global and bilateral trade; and a promising local business environment in a booming industrial and trading city with a skills-shortage to conduct trade with Central and Northern European countries.

Collective Biography

According to national census figures, the number of German merchants living in the whole of Scotland was 21 in 1911. A microhistorical approach, in contrast, generates significantly higher figures. My prosopographical database is fed by a wide range of sources, including consular and company records, newspapers, trade journals, the Post Office Glasgow Directory, and records of membership in ethnic institutions. The database lists 71 merchants for Glasgow alone in 1908 (table 1). Of these, 41 were business owners or partners. One factor which explains this discrepancy are the particularly high naturalisation rates amongst merchants. The latter were not counted in the census as «Germans» but as British citizens.

These database figures have to be seen as a minimum as they only include those individuals whose German origin could be identified beyond doubt through participation in ethnic activities. Where this was not the case, narrative sources had to provide a clear indication of German origin. Within the company hierarchy, the individuals had to be either owner or partner, or had to occupy leading positions at management level. This enables their differentiation from commercial clerks, who is listed in table 2. The German merchant community in Britain was significantly larger than postulated by scholarship which only operates with census data.

The example of Hugo Frosch elucidates this approach. He does not appear in the published local company directory (Post Office Glasgow Directory) as a business owner. Being naturalised, he also would not be counted as German in the census figure. He is an example of an individual who would have fallen under the radar of existing scholarship. Nevertheless, he is one of the 71 merchants in table 1. His biography shows typical

20 Census for Scotland, 1911.
21 See for example Anderson, German Clerks in England (cf. n. 16), 210; Panikos Panayi, German Immigrants in Britain during the Nineteenth Century 1815-1914, Oxford/Washington, D.C. 1993, 120. Figures cited there for England and Wales: Merchants 736 (1861), 1084 (1871), then decline to 318 (1911); Agents/ Factors 202 (1861), then steady rise to 661 (1911); Commercial Clerks 883 (1861), then steady rise to 2,513 (1911); Commercial Travellers 171 (1861) to 457 (1911). For a wider discussion of census data see Stefan Manz, Migranten und Internierte. Deutsche in Glasgow 1864-1918, Stuttgart 2003, of. and passim. For the high proportion of German merchants in Manchester and Birmingham see Hartmut Berghoff, Englische Unternehmer 1870-1914. Eine Kollektivbiographie führender Wirtschaftsbürger in Birmingham, Bristol und Manchester, Göttingen 1991, 72-75.
Frosch was born in Saalfeld/Saale and came to Glasgow in 1894, where he joined the leading glass bottle and beer import business of A. Bischoff & Co. Hugo Frosch was integrated into both the ethnic and the host community:

«[He] soon rose to the highest position in the firm and was assumed as partner, and on Mr. Bischoff’s death became managing director. Mr. Frosch is now a naturalised Scotchman [...] He is a splendid musician, and is a Mark Master of the Masonic Lodge Blythswood, No.817, and still retains a warm interest in church matters of the land of his birth, being a prominent office-bearer in the Deutsche Evangelische Gemeinde».22

Frosch married the daughter of a Scottish wine merchant and also appears in the membership list of the local Deutscher Verein. Frosch’s biographical data are telling in terms of

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22 The Victualling Trades Review 1 (1906), 254f.
their hybrid character. He led a transcultural life which was rooted in both his culture of origin and the host culture. These two spheres did not exclude each other. In their complementary form they constituted a «third space» which has recently been appropriately termed as a «rooted cosmopolitanism».23 The discussion of further individuals and associations below should be read with this theoretical consideration in mind.

High naturalisation rates among merchants lay at the root of the numerical mismatch between census and prosopographical data. All merchants whose life details could be traced and who set up businesses became naturalised British citizens. As the German pastor in Glasgow put it, «the circumstances simply forced Germans here to become naturalised if they wanted to make any progress with their business.»24 Before the 1870 Naturalisation Act, foreigners were not allowed to own land or British ships. And even after 1870 they were not entitled «to any right or privilege as a British subject». Although they were now entitled to purchase land within Britain, they still could neither obtain British ships or land outside the UK, nor could they run for public office.25 Johannes N. Kiep is a case in point. After completion of an apprenticeship as a business clerk in his native Hamburg, he moved to Glasgow in 1867 to join the established timber merchant business of his brother, Carl Kiep. After five years as a junior clerk he became partner in 1872 and, only one year later, became naturalised «for business reasons».26

Did naturalisation equal assimilation into the host society and alienation from the culture of origin? The sources suggest otherwise. Heinrich Lindemann from Warnemünde, for example, was 22 years old when he came to Dundee in 1890 as a clerk in a local coal firm. Three years later he went to Glasgow and founded a coal export company with the British national W. A. Burns. Exports went to Germany and its neighbouring countries. In 1897, Lindemann became naturalised «for business reasons». In 1909, the company had an annual turnover of between 250,000 Pound and 350,000 Pound. Lindemann’s own annual income amounted to 3,000 Pound, and his personal property 30,000 Pound. In the same year he applied for the post of German Honorary Consul, and the General Consulate in London wrote in his support that, despite his naturalisation, «he is still closely connected with the German colony in Glasgow as a member of the local German Protestant Congregation, the German Club, the Navy Club and other associations.» He also held leading positions in these associations.27 For German merchants in Glasgow and elsewhere in Britain, naturalisation was taken mainly for pragmatic reasons. In order to assess the level of assimilation, a mix of factors including language use, business practices or socialisation patterns have to be taken into account. Taken by itself, naturalisation is not a sufficient indicator for assimilation. On the contrary: The driving forces behind the ethnic associations – which were

24 Article by Pastor Münchmeyer in Tägliche Rundschau, 25.7.1903.
increasingly permeated by pro-German nationalism – were all naturalised British citizens.

Considering the fact that the port of Hamburg was the main hub for Anglo-German trade, it is not surprising that this was the predominating place of origin. The minute books of the Deutscher Verein, whose members were mainly merchants, lists places of birth for the years 1864 through to 1886. Amongst the 347 individuals who were recorded during this period, 42 (twelve per cent) came from Hamburg, followed by Berlin (26; 7.5 per cent), Frankfurt a. M. (15; 4.3 per cent), and Danzig and Nürnberg at eleven each (3.2 per cent). The remainder originated either from other German cities, but also at a significant percentage from other countries (19.3 per cent). The latter figure also points to high fluctuation rates. It would be erroneous to imagine the merchant community as a solid block of permanent «settlers». The annual fluctuation rate of the Deutscher Verein hovered around 25 per cent. In 1905, for example, the total membership of 97 included 23 resignations and the same number of new registrations. Some merchants returned to Germany after retirement (e.g. timber merchant Johannes N. Kiep), others moved on to third places, especially at the level of clerk.28

Endogenous recruitment both within ethnic and family structures prevailed: Johannes N. Kiep, for example, found employment with his brother Carl Kiep. Paul Rottenburg joined the chemical import firm Leisler, Bock & Co, with Louis Leisler being Rottenburg’s uncle and a partner in the firm. In 1908, Leisler, Bock & Co employed at least twelve Germans: four at management level, a commercial clerk, a foreign correspondent, and six further individuals whose position could not be ascertained.29 Of the 102 individuals working in the trade sector, only 15 (14.7 per cent) could be identified who worked for Scottish firms. Of these 15, however, nine were employed by the cotton thread producer J. & P. Coats – whose sales director was Hamburg-born Otto Ernst Philippi. Transnational bonds based on common origin and family played an important role for the prevailing endogenous recruitment pattern. Those moving abroad did not enter unknown territory but followed pre-existing pathways and networks.30 Within the spectrum of German companies this recruitment pattern made sense, as business contacts primarily existed with Germany and other mainland European countries. A command of pertinent languages and knowledge of different business practices was indispensable for staff. Considering the negligible numbers entering Scottish firms, we can also critically engage with contemporaneous fears that German clerks pushed the indigenous workforce out of employment. The actual numbers rather suggest that hardly any Germans worked for local Scottish firms. Notions of an Anglo-German economic competition were projected onto the internal labour market and consequently led to misleading assumptions.


29 See the more detailed case study of Leisler, Bock & Co below.

30 German consulates warned not to come to Britain without having secured a permanent position beforehand («[… nicht eher herüber zu gehen als bis sie fest engagiert sind.»), in: Bundesarchiv Berlin R 901/29193 (film), 15.5.1911.
The skills gap argument also applied at the senior management level. The rise of large scale multinational enterprises in Victorian Britain required corresponding managerial skills. Economic historians agree, however, that «there was insufficient expertise available to manage the emergent ‹giant› enterprises that possessed the potential capacity to grapple with American, German and Belgian competitors.»31 Howard Archer has pointed to foreign managers in Britain such as Otto Ernst Philippi (J. & P. Coats), Fred Gaissberg (Gramophone), or Basil Zaharoff (Vickers) and holds that «these foreigners were all major driving forces in their respective company’s multinational development».32 This phenomenon can be demonstrated most pertinently with the example of Otto Ernst Philippi (1847-1917). He was born in Hamburg. After his commercial training he joined an uncle’s cotton-broking business in Liverpool and became naturalised in Britain. In 1878, he was appointed foreign sales manager of the thread-making company J. & P. Coats, which was based in Paisley near Glasgow. He soon transformed its sales and management structures in ways which lay at the heart of Germany’s global economic success: Sales in international markets were now managed by a J. & P. Coats sales department and company representatives. The previous, rather loose structure of independent commission agents was disbanded. Philippi also pushed for cartel agreements and formal mergers with the main British competitors, and a tighter management style was introduced.33 By 1914, J. & P. Coats had developed into the largest industrial company in Britain and third largest worldwide. Its market value stood at 70 mn Pound. The company had a virtual monopoly on the world market for the production and selling of cotton thread with manufacturing plants in the United States, Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Japan, as well as ten countries in Europe. Previous scholarship has explained this success with Philippi’s «genius» and «Prussian» qualities, but an explanation based on a skills gap and the transfer of German management practices is more convincing.34 This embeds Philippi’s activities into the collective biography of the German business community in Glasgow.

A Community?

The question whether it is legitimate to talk about a merchant «community» inevitably leads to a discussion of ethnic institutions and associations. This can be understood as the creation of social networks as catalysts of social capital. The latter is understood as a resource based on a sense of belonging to a group. Belonging is not a given but has to be constantly maintained, negotiated, and institutionalised through interaction. Group

members receive benefits not only in social and emotional terms, but also in economic terms as participants and recipients of information flows about professional opportunities. Ethnic leaders can represent the group at the level of local administration or government.  

Within Germany, the nineteenth century has been aptly labelled «the century of Vereine (clubs)», and migrants also reproduced this form of socialisation abroad. Britain, just as other countries of destination, hosted a plethora of German clubs not only in London but also in provincial cities. The Deutscher Verein in Glasgow was founded in 1864. It was mainly frequented by merchants. In 1908, the Verein had 87 members. The professional background of 90 per cent of the members could be traced.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Business/Trade</th>
<th>Engineering/Other</th>
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<td>79.7% (63)</td>
<td>7.6% (6)</td>
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<td>12.7% (11)</td>
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After steady expansion the peak number of 106 members was reached in 1899. Subsequent years experienced a contraction to 67 in 1914. This cycle is representative of the development of German ethnic life not only in Glasgow and Britain, but also in the United States. The Deutscher Verein hosted manifold social and cultural activities such as lectures, theatre performances, Christmas celebrations, and the Kaiser's annual birthday celebration. Another example involved festivities organised for the officer crew of a German battle ship squadron which anchored in the River Clyde in 1898. A ball in the upmarket Windsor Hotel was attended by 260 people. «The strapping German figures in their shining marine uniforms mingled with the radiant ladies' dresses. This was interspersed with glowing British military uniforms (amongst them the Lord Provost). One could see the broad magistrates' chains and the Scottish national costume.» German merchants in Glasgow were keen to mingle with local elites and demonstrate pride in the achievements of the unified fatherland. They saw themselves as the spearhead of a confident ethnic minority.

This can be elucidated through a third club, namely the Flottenverein Glasgow (navy club), which, on the eve of World War I, was the biggest German club in Glasgow at a membership of about 135. Its aim was to collect monies for the German battle fleet, but

36 Knut Borchardt, Die Industrielle Revolution in Deutschland 1750-1914, Stuttgart 1977, 190.
37 For the following see the German Club, 1864-1927, Minute Books, in: Glasgow University Archives DC 402; and Manz, Migranten und Internierte (cf. n. 21), 174-184.
38 German Club, Minute Book, 9.6.1898, in: Glasgow University Archives DC 402/1/1.
39 Fuhrmann comes to a similar assessment for Smyrna and Saloniki, see Fuhrmann, Der Traum vom deutschen Orient (cf. n. 10), 270-328.
also to develop into a patriotic «solid bulwark of Germanness abroad».

The club was founded in 1898 at the initiative of timber merchant Johannes Kiep who, together with the below mentioned Otto Froude, was the main sponsor. Just as within Germany, the navy was a symbolic rallying-point for Germans of all classes. Although its gatherings were, indeed, attended by cross-sections of the ethnic community, positions of power and influence remained in the hands of the middle-classes.

The same is true for religious life. A small German Protestant Congregation which catered mainly for the lower middle and working classes was established in the early 1880s. In 1898, the «better German circles» established a second one which had the reputation of being a «church for the rich». Although it managed to reach out to other classes, its positions of power, again, remained in the hands of the Bürgertum. In terms of its financial position, the congregation was almost entirely dependent on contributions from German merchants. Glasgow fits into a pattern which the sources also mention for other British cities: The motives for these merchants were not necessarily religious but came from the desire to exert power. One visitor from the Protestant Church Council in Berlin remarked that Johannes Kiep «clearly donated for nationalistic, and not so much for religious reasons, and certainly not always for altruistic reasons». When, in 1906, Kiep donated the sum of 2,600 Pound for a church building, he invited 250 Germans to the Hotel Windsor and hoped in his speech «that the Germans in Great Britain will move closer and closer together and that the German congregations are destined to play a growing role in the well-being and the faithful allegiance to their fatherland and Germanness». Merchants, however, were notoriously absent during church services. The paradoxical situation arose whereby the existence of the congregation was dependent upon a group of about 15 to 20 wealthy merchants who rarely attended services. This group instrumentalised the church to convey ethnic awareness and nationalism, and to claim power within the ethnic group.

How closely knit was the merchant community? Membership records have proven to be useful to assess this. For many young merchants and business clerks, one of the first steps upon arrival in Glasgow was to join the Deutscher Verein for both social and professional reasons. There are also a striking number of multiple memberships. German merchants created and supported a variety of platforms which allowed them to congregate regularly on an ethnic basis. In addition, there was a multitude of informal contacts, most notably in the form of dinner and other invitations. A high percentage of the group participated in these activities. Therefore, a wide range of both qualitative

40 Satzungen für den Hauptverband Deutscher Flottenvereine im Auslande, 1902, 1, in: Bundesarchiv Militärarchiv Freiburg RM 3/9920/12.

41 Merchant domination was a global feature of this association. See Stefan Manz, Nationalism Gone Global. The Hauptverband Deutscher Flottenvereine im Auslande 1898-1918, in: German History 2 (2012), 199-221.


45 Manz, Migranten und Internierte (cf. n. 21).
and quantitative sources suggest the existence of a group identity for the German merchants of Glasgow. This corresponds with the above analysis of family ties and endogenous recruitment patterns. Merchants regarded themselves as an elite group within the German ethnic colony and, at the same time, developed some internal stratification with the Leisler, Kiep and Rottenburg families providing ethnic leadership. Any explanation for the group’s relative economic success has to consider the social capital which was generated by these multifaceted ethnic ties. This is not to say, however, that all Germans in trade were successful. For clerks, it became increasingly difficult around 1900 to find even «precarious» employment, and «in many cases they are just forced to take what they are offered and make a bare living as good as they can.» There was also business failure. The mentioned shipbroker and Vice Consul in Glasgow, Otto Froude, «last night shot himself; it is reckoned that unfortunate stock exchange speculations were the reason for this apparent suicide.» Overall, however, the previous analysis has shown that German merchants fared well in Glasgow. One of these merchants, Paul Rottenburg, and his chemical export company Leisler, Bock & Co. is introduced in the following.

Paul Rottenburg and Leisler, Bock & Co.

Paul Rottenburg (1846-1929) was the offspring of a cosmopolitan merchant family from Danzig whose wealth was based on the wine and grain trade. Family and business interests were closely intertwined and operated on a transnational basis. After his apprenticeship in a herring export firm and the decease of his parents, Rottenburg was taken in by relatives in Glasgow in 1867. His maternal aunt was married to the merchant Louis Leisler who, in the 1840s, had established a chemical import and export business together with Richard Bock from Hamburg. Rottenburg, who spoke several languages, became naturalised and, in 1871, married an early acquaintance from Danzig. He then joined his uncle’s expanding merchant house, Leisler, Bock & Co, and soon rose to become a partner. After Louis Leisler’s retirement to Germany and Richard Bock’s death, he took over in the mid-80s and ensured that the company now remained in family hands. His brother Fritz joined the firm in 1881, and his son Francis in 1906 as third partner. The company was finally dissolved in the 1960s, ending a German business tradition in Glasgow spanning 120 years.

46 Hannoverscher Courier (17.9.1896). Also see the example of a young Dane who had left a good position in Berlin to come to «the alleged Eldorado for merchants» but could not find a position in Glasgow. His savings shrank, his health deteriorated, and he ultimately died of pneumonia. See Reinhard Münchmeyer, In der Fremde. Einige Zeugnisse aus der Auslandsarbeit, Marburg 1905, 90f.
47 General Consulate London to Auswärtiges Amt, 28.10.1903; in: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, R 140772/14705.
48 Charlotte Kiep (1858-1939), Erinnerungen aus Kindheit und Jugend bis zu meiner Heirat, Pulauch 1996 [private print], 34-36. Intermarriage rates for the community at large cannot be ascertained from the sources.
The entangled Rottenburg, Leisler and Kiep families can serve to exemplify an important function of transnational merchant networks, namely that of social safety and support network. Paul Rottenburg’s parents died in 1866 and 1867 respectively, leaving behind five children. Paul and Fritz were adopted by their maternal aunt and joined her husband’s business in Glasgow. Two younger sisters, Therese and Charlotte, were also adopted. When Therese developed health problems in Glasgow, she was taken by Paul to Bordeaux, where their paternal uncle, Casar, was a wine merchant. Charlotte, meanwhile, remained in Glasgow, later marrying timber merchant Johannes N. Kiep.50 The fifth sibling, Franz, embarked on a political career in Germany, but, as a safety option, had asked Louis Leisler «whether he could join the firm of Leisler, Bock & Co in case he did not have any success with Bismarck since, in that case, his political career would be stalled. Of course grandad Leisler replied that there was no impediment to this». Franz von Rottenburg became head of the Reich chancellory under Bismarck and later rector of Bonn University. This, in effect, meant that he did not have to take up the offer. The two godfathers of his son Otto were Chancellor von Bismarck and Louis Leisler.51 When Johannes N. Kiep applied to the German Foreign Office to become Honorary Consul, a recommendation pointed out that «his spouse was a sister of the rector of Bonn University, the former Under-Secretary of State von Rottenburg».52 Business, politics and family were closely intertwined and operated efficiently on a transnational basis.

Returning to Leisler, Bock & Co, some figures highlight the dimensions of this firm. At an estate value of 247,807 Pound after his death in 1929, Paul Rottenburg was one of the wealthiest Glaswegian businessmen. In comparison, one of the leading local businessmen with interests in shipping, rail and banking, Sir James Bell, left an estate valued at 291,000 Pound in the same year.53 As Rubinstein shows, wealth holders at this level profited most from the war economy,54 and the account ledgers confirm this assessment. Profits for Leisler, Bock & Co. were around 30,000 Pound per annum in the immediate pre-war years, rising to over 40,000 Pound between 1915 and 1918. During the first year of the war, the profit for each of the partners doubled.55 As a point of comparison, an annual income of 500 Pound provided an upper middle class standard of living in Victorian and Edwardian Britain.
Paul Rottenburg held various positions in the Chamber of Commerce before acting as its president for two years in 1896 and 1897. As his obituary mentions, «he was a model chairman, conducting the business with firmness, courtesy, and despatch».\(^{56}\) He was an ardent supporter of free trade and a modernisation of the postal and telegraph system, and was also consulted on questions of continental trade. In cooperation with Joseph Chamberlain, who was then Colonial Secretary, he organised an exhibition in Glasgow of samples of foreign-made goods which were supplanting British products in the colonies. Also, he did not hesitate to quote foreign business practices in order to pinpoint British deficiencies. In a presidential speech to the Chamber of Commerce, for example, he brought forward:

«Continental people, for a certainty, devote much more time and energy to adapting their manufactures to man's demands in trade and commerce than to politics and sport. [...] It does not suffice to sing ‘Britannia rules the waves’. It requires energy and cool, far-seeing judgment».\(^{57}\)

Besides his business activities, Paul Rottenburg held a multitude of positions in scientific, philanthropic, artistic and professional organisations. Multiple office holding and associational membership were, indeed, a feature of the British entrepreneurial classes. Berghoff counts an average of 4.9 honorary positions for entrepreneurs in English provincial cities. Richard Trainor has a narrower focus on the Glaswegian top business elite and identifies a «core group of institutions» – such as Chamber of Commerce or Merchants’ House – in which about 14 per cent held positions of power and leadership.\(^{58}\) In the light of this framework, Rottenburg’s public engagement was above average, and he can be placed in the Glaswegian core business elite. He held leading positions in a total of 23 organisations, either simultaneously or serially. These included: Chamber of Commerce (President), Merchants' House (Director), Scottish Geographical Society (President of the Glasgow Centre), Royal Philosophical Society (Vice-President), Royal Glasgow Institute of Fine Arts (Council Member), Glasgow Choral and Orchestral Union (Council Member), Homeopathic Hospital (Chairman of Board of Directors), Glasgow School of Cookery (Chairman), and the Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress (local Chairman). In 1901, Rottenburg was awarded an Honorary Doctorate in Law from Glasgow University. Two of his sons married into the Scottish aristocracy.\(^{59}\)

Despite his firm integration into the upper echelons of the British host society, and despite his British nationality, Paul Rottenburg kept in close contact with the German

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\(^{56}\) Glasgow Herald (4.2.1929).


\(^{58}\) Berghoff, Englische Unternehmer (cf.n. 21), 277; Trainor, Elite (cf.n. 53), 235.

\(^{59}\) Entry Paul Rottenburg, in: Glasgow Contemporaries at the Dawn of the XXth Century, Glasgow 1900; Oliver&Boyd’s Edinburgh Almanach 1908, Western Supplement, 133; Glasgow Herald (21.5.1908), 4.2.1929; Glasgow Chamber of Commerce – The Journal, LXVIII/1 (January 1983), 44.
ethnic community in Glasgow. Together with his brother-in-law, Johannes N. Kiep, he was a main benefactor of the German Protestant Congregation.\textsuperscript{60} Immediately after his arrival in Glasgow, Rottenburg also joined the \textit{Deutscher Verein} and acted as its chairman between 1893 and 1913. Again, he was the main benefactor together with Kiep, contributing 100 Pound in 1905 for the purchase of a new club house. At home, he conversed in German with his wife Ida, and «in the evenings and on weekends the Rottenburgs’ friends came along, Zimmermann, Richard Bock, Harmens and Cohnitz».\textsuperscript{61} Rottenburg reconciled a high degree of acculturation with a strong rootedness in his culture of origin. Connecting both spheres, he led a «transnational life», and, although excelling in terms of wealth and reputation, was thus representative of the merchant community in Glasgow. It was no contradiction for him to deliver the festive speech to the \textit{Deutscher Verein} on the occasion of Bismarck’s 80\textsuperscript{th} birthday,\textsuperscript{62} and almost simultaneously express his loyalty to Queen Victoria as representative of the Chamber of Commerce.\textsuperscript{63}

Rottenburg was part of a «cosmopolitan trading community [...] in which nationality was often very blurred.»\textsuperscript{64} Ideas of economic competition and nationalism, however, increasingly permeated these communities and their host societies, and after the outbreak of war Rottenburg was exposed to anti-German pressure just as his co-ethnics in Glasgow, Britain, and elsewhere in the world. Together with the merchants C.H. Römmele and H.E. Steegmann he drafted a loyalty address which was published in the local press «to repeat, with emphasis, the oaths of allegiance to His Majesty the King which we took when we became naturalised British subjects».\textsuperscript{65} Pronounced Germanophobia in public life, however, forced him to withdraw from active business life and from public offices. Although he did not face internment or repatriation as did his non-naturalised compatriots, his health suffered and he was an invalid for the remainder of his life.\textsuperscript{66} Leisler, Bock & Co. fared well during the war, but other businesses such as Endemann & Co (coal export) and C. Schneider & Co (chemical trade) were liquidated under the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 1914.\textsuperscript{67} Textile manager Otto Ernst Philippi shared a similar fate with Paul Rottenburg. In 1916 he resigned from the management of J. & P. Coats due to internal germanophobic pressure and died in 1917.\textsuperscript{68} All the German ethnic institutions and associations in Glasgow were disbanded during the war. Although German merchants continued to live and conduct business in Glasgow after 1918, they had ceased to constitute a community.

\textsuperscript{60} See Annual Reports in Evangelisches Zentralarchiv Berlin 5/1823 and 5/1299.
\textsuperscript{61} Kiep, \textit{Erinnerungen an meine Jugend} (cf. n. 48), 170. Further references to ethnic socialising: 95, 200, 202, 206f., 197.
\textsuperscript{62} Minute Books, German Club, DC 402/1/1, 10.4.1894, in: Glasgow University Archives.
\textsuperscript{63} Chamber of Commerce Reports 1897, 5-7, in: Mitchell Library Glasgow, Strongroom.
\textsuperscript{65} Glasgow Herald (14.5.1915).
\textsuperscript{67} Liquidation files Endemann & Co, 18.2.1918, in: Scottish Record Office, West Register House, BT 2/8461/14; Edinburgh Gazette (5.12.1914), (3.7.1916), (17.1.1919).
\textsuperscript{68} J. & P. Coats Ltd., Minute Book, 153 (12.12.1917), in: Glasgow University Archives UGD 199/1/1/3.
Conclusion

The significance of a selected expatriate German business community during an age of economic globalisation went far beyond the local context. Complex transregional, bi-national and global entanglements in economic, political and social terms connected the Germans in Glasgow with their country – or region – of origin, as well as with the wider world. Analysing a selected community enabled insights into aspects of globalisation and international trade, and, in terms of methodology, generated microhistorical findings which refine, expand, but also question the results of scholarship which operates at higher levels of analysis. These findings can be summed up as follows: When determining the size of ethnic business communities, local prosopographical data generate significantly higher results than census data, which exclude naturalised foreigners. The significance of naturalisation for the process of assimilation is often overestimated. This step was mainly taken for pragmatic reasons to avoid disadvantages in conducting business. Taken on its own, it does not necessarily signify alienation from the culture of origin.

The roots of the merchant community included rising Anglo-German trade figures and a promising business and labour market environment, as well as a skills-gap which could not be filled by the indigenous workforce. The latter point was relevant both at the junior level of commercial clerk as well as the level of senior management. At both levels, Germans provided intercultural know-how and international connections which were indispensable in a globalising economy. The highest percentage of merchants originated from Hamburg, and fluctuation rates especially at the junior level were relatively high. Recruitment patterns were largely endogenous. Most new arrivals found employment in firms run by fellow countrymen. They did not displace indigenous candidates to the extent suggested by contemporaneous observers whose view was clouded by notions of an Anglo-German economic antagonism. Recruitment into firms with a German background had usually been pre-arranged before the point of departure. Family connections were an important factor in this transnationally operating employment market.

The transregional and transnational connections were complemented with a dense network of local intra-ethnic contacts. These existed at the professional level in the form of business partnerships and common workplace. They also existed at the social level in the form of ethnic associations and institutions. The question whether it is legitimate to speak of a community which, in turn, generated social capital, was therefore answered affirmatively. In a Portesian sense, the study confirms some positive assets of ethnic enclave economies such as labour market accessibility through «bounded solidarity», the dampening of cultural differences that would impede integration into the mainstream labour market and ethnicity as an asset within a transnationally operating economic sector.69

Merchants were the financial backbone of ethnic institutions, but also used them to solidify leadership positions within the ethnic community at large. Introspective sociali-

sation on an ethnic level, however, was complemented with integration into the local business elite of the host society. German merchants were an integral part of urban Scottish business communities and, as the case of Paul Rottenburg demonstrated, could establish themselves in the very elite. They led transnational lives, combining a rootedness in their culture of origin – which included rising pro-German nationalism – with integration into the host society. Whilst this intermediary status had been useful as human capital for conducting international business, it proved problematic after the outbreak of war. Clear national demarcations were required, and German merchants often found themselves on the side of the enemy, if not by nationality then by origin.

The main desideratum arising from this research is the need for more regional studies with a similar microhistorical approach. German merchant communities in cities such as Liverpool, Bradford, Manchester or Newcastle would be a worthwhile field of investigation. Relevant studies would help to determine whether specific aspects of the relationship between migration and entrepreneurship were peculiar to the Glasgow context or whether they can claim more general validity. This also applies to other European and non-European countries, as well as to other ethnic trading diasporas. Local studies have to be firmly embedded into a transnational context. Researching ethically based trading communities worldwide is one step towards understanding the workings of 19th century globalisation.

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