In this year of anniversaries, the statesmen of 1814/1815 have frequently been compared to those of 1914. Of the latter, Christopher Clark ends his memorable study on the origins of the First World War with this famous sentence: «the protagonists of 1914 were sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world.»¹ In contrast to the protagonists of 1914, Tsar Alexander, Castlereagh, Metternich, Hardenberg, Talleyrand, Wellington and others of their generation were far from blind to the horrors of revolution and war.

Members of a privileged and landed aristocracy, they were nourished in their youths by the privileges of the ancien régime and the heady ideals of the Enlightenment. They had known Europe before the French Revolution and had also experienced the optimism and chaos of the Revolution in their youths. Although born into the nobility, the men of 1814/1815 were far from idle aristocrats: they had achieved their high positions in policy-making circles through their own talents and perseverance.

Each of the leading statesmen at Vienna had in fact encountered and overcome notable personal and political reverses. This was partly a by-product of the long struggle with Napoleon, in which everyone had been on the losing side at one time or another. Castlereagh, for example, had been held responsible for the fiasco at Walcheren and had been ousted from the British cabinet. Metternich’s advice had been rejected in 1809, his country had been defeated at Wagram, and he had witnessed the occupation of Vienna by French forces. Talleyrand had been disgraced and humiliated by Napoleon, while Tsar Alexander had experienced the defeat at Austerlitz and had been forced to submit to Napoleon’s conditions at Tilsit. Worse still, in the dark days of 1812, he had suffered the French invasion of Russia and the burning of Moscow.

What did these men learn from their struggles and privations? One might suppose they had become vengeful and unforgiving; instead, their wartime experiences fostered

a sense of realism and pragmatism. Above all else, they learned the necessity of frequent communication, developed a willingness to consider views from other vantage points and gained an appreciation for the benefits of cooperation and moderation. These qualities, which had held the alliance together in the final campaign, were now carried over into peacetime.

Old and New World Order
In the autumn of 1814 these statesmen gathered in Vienna. Were they architects? Did they create a new world order or simply restore the old? The answer lies somewhere in between. The French Revolution had constituted a profound break with the past. The men of 1814, having vanquished Napoleon and dissolved his empire, were faced with the task of redrawing the map of Europe – an opportunity and challenge unprecedented in modern history. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars had torn asunder the fabric of the ancien régime. Under Napoleon’s ruthless hand, new states had been formed and destroyed at dizzying speed. But now this game of musical chairs, in play for two decades, was about to cease. Where were the new frontiers of Europe to be drawn?

One could begin, as the allies themselves did, with the frontiers of France. While the statesmen of 1814 have often been complimented on their foresight in inviting France to the Congress, in reality the arrangements with France had already been concluded before, in the first Peace of Paris. Even this treaty, however, was a negotiated settlement and not a coerced Diktat in the sense of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. This had less to do with Talleyrand’s diplomatic skill than with the views of the allied statesmen on the nature of the enemy. That enemy, they believed, was the French Revolution, and they saw Napoleon as the military face of that primordial force. The Bourbon king of France was their natural ally and they therefore did not seek a punitive treaty that would undermine his authority.

After France, the men of 1814 turned to the Netherlands. As Niek van Sas has shown, the future of the Netherlands featured prominently in their thinking. After all, it was fear of French control of the Scheldt that had first brought the British into the war in 1793. As early as 1795, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Grenville, had proposed that the Netherlands be strengthened by the addition of Belgium. In 1805 Pitt had called for dividing Belgium between Holland and Prussia in order to create new barriers against French aggression. Instead, in 1806 Napoleon reduced the Netherlands to the puppet Kingdom of Holland ruled by his brother, Louis Bonaparte, and then directly annexed the Netherlands to France four years later. Only in 1813 was

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2 Edward Mortimer first applied this term to the men of 1814/1815 in his Palliser Lecture, asking: «Are our leaders today sleepwalkers or architects?» This sobriquet was subsequently used for the panel of the Salzburg Global Seminar on 1814 («The Architects»).


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Prince William of Orange able to return to the Netherlands, after French troops had finally withdrawn.

Meanwhile, Castlereagh carried Pitt’s master plan with him when he travelled to the Continent in December 1813. In the first Peace of Paris, it was agreed that Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands should be united. The decision to establish a monarchy, on the other hand, was taken solely on the initiative of William of Orange. Castlereagh did not wish to dictate the internal arrangements of the Netherlands, although he was overjoyed with the results. At the same time, the British refused to return all of the former Dutch colonies, some of which they kept as strategic posts for their growing empire.4

The reorganisation of Central Europe was far more problematic. The Tsar had set out to right the wrongs of his grandmother Catherine the Great by restoring Poland, which had been effaced from the map by the partitions of 1772–1795. However, to placate the Russian nobility the Tsar also had to guarantee that the new Poland would not be a threat to Russia, a trick he neatly pulled off by proposing a Kingdom of Poland with himself as king. In doing so, he restored Polish territorial integrity and institutions without granting the Poles their full independence.

At the same time, in order to secure Prussian adherence to the final coalition against Napoleon, Alexander had previously agreed in the Treaty of Kalisch (Kalisz) of February 1813 to restore Prussia to its pre-1806 proportions «statistiques, géographiques et financières». The Tsar proposed to compensate Prussia for its Polish losses with the acquisition of the Kingdom of Saxony. Further complicating matters, to entice the Austrians to join the allied coalition, the Tsar had promised at Reichenbach (Dzierżoniów) in June 1813 that Poland would be re-partitioned.

The subsequent controversy at the Congress of Vienna over the Tsar’s Polish-Saxon plan would doubtless have become far more acrimonious had it not been for the close cooperation that had developed between the allied leaders during the final months of the campaign against Napoleon. Metternich and Castlereagh were sceptical and viewed the Tsar’s Polish-Saxon scheme merely as a new form of Russian aggrandisement. Yet despite some loud sabre-rattling, the allies managed to avoid a renewal of armed conflict. In an elaborate minuet, Prussia first cooperated with Russia, then acted in concert with Austria and Britain, and finally gravitated back to Russia. These oscillations can be explained in part by Prussian interests but more so by the different perspectives of Hardenberg and his sovereign, Frederick William III. In the end, the Tsar succeeded in taking most of Poland; yet Castlereagh and Metternich were eventually proven right in thinking that the Poles would be unable to maintain their autonomy in such a setting.

While Poland remained divided, Germany was simplified and its 39 separate states associated together in a loose confederation (der Deutsche Bund). Prussia gained two-fifths of Saxony as well as new territories to the west. The Netherlands and Hanover contributed to the final settlement by making further territorial cessions to Prussia.\(^5\)

In Italy, too, the men of 1814 faced the task of reconstruction. Here again, Napoleon had replaced traditional boundaries with a bewildering succession of new states. The statesmen at Vienna could not turn back the clock, but they placed Habsburg princes in several of the Central Italian principalities, while strengthening the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia as another barrier state cradling France. At Vienna, one key issue was whether to topple Napoleon’s brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, from the throne of Naples. Austria had signed a treaty with Murat in the final stages of the 1814 campaign, yet Louis XVIII was determined to remove him and to return the Neapolitan Bourbons, his cousins, to the throne. Murat solved the problem by allying with Napoleon during the Hundred Days.

Not all the decisions at Vienna were confined to territorial arrangements. The plenipotentiaries guaranteed the neutrality of Switzerland and discussed protections for German Jews and the abolition of the slave trade. They also established new rules for diplomatic precedence and created the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine. A single treaty, the Vienna Final Act, created a new body of public law for Europe.

**Explaining the Success of the Settlement**

To what factors should the success of these arrangements be attributed? Why did the Vienna settlement result in a century of relative peace? Paul Schroeder and Matthias Schulz believe that the Congress statesmen embraced new norms – namely a renewed respect for treaties and the rule of law – in order to end the chaos of the preceding decades.\(^6\) Henry Kissinger has argued that the settlement was so successful because it established a stable balance of power. Each of the great powers might have been slightly dissatisfied, but none was so dissatisfied that it would overturn the system: «an international settlement which is accepted and not imposed will therefore always appear somewhat unjust to any one of its components. Paradoxically, the generality of this dissatisfaction is a condition of stability, because were any one power totally satisfied, all others would have to be totally dissatisfied and a revolutionary situation would ensue. The foundation of a stable order is the relative security – and therefore the relative insecurity – of its members. Its stability reflects, not the absence of unsatisfied claims, but the absence of a grievance of such magnitude that redress will be sought in over-


turning the settlement rather than through an adjustment within its framework.»

Once accepted, the settlement gained further force through its legitimacy.

I would argue that the powers were not quite so high-minded as Schroeder and Schulz suggest. Taking a realist position, I contend that most of the allied great powers simply became «satiated». At Vienna, they carved up the «middle zone» of Europe. Here, the great powers either resorted to outright annexation or established spheres of influence based on their interests and their capacity to act: Russia kept its hold over Finland and the new Polish Kingdom; Britain, which had forced Ireland into a union during the French wars, allied with an enlarged Netherlands and held onto its new strategic outposts overseas; Austria was made master of Northern and Central Italy and assumed the Presidency of the new Germanic Confederation. Prussia was the only allied great power to be disappointed, although its reconstruction westward later proved to be a blessing. France did not benefit at all and faced a new barrier of stronger states across its western frontier, but it was not dismantled either. Several of the smaller states were devoured in the process: Denmark and Saxony were reduced, the Norwegians were reassigned to Sweden against their will, Genoa was annexed by Piedmont-Sardinia, and Sicily was returned to Naples. The main «balance-of-power» concern was clearly to limit France.

It was because of the need for a «solid and lasting pacification» that Castlereagh defended the territorial settlement in the House of Commons when he returned to London in March 1815. The primary aim of the Vienna Congress, he told the House, was the creation of a «system [...] under which all countries might live in peace». To achieve this end, he admitted that the allied leaders had been forced to sacrifice popular aspirations or to alter ancient governments incapable of withstanding French aggression. Confronted with the charge that the allies had disregarded the wishes of the Genoese people, Castlereagh, conceded that «the prejudices of a people were entitled to attention when greater objects did not stand in the way», but went on to demonstrate that in the case of Genoa, its annexation to Piedmont-Sardinia had been required by the European need for a stronger state on the southern flank of France.  

The Vienna settlement clearly lasted as long as it did because it rested on a realistic assessment of great power capabilities and limits. Its purpose was to stabilise Europe and to solidify the middle zone that had proven so tempting to expanding powers. And in this it largely succeeded. The later independence of Greece and Belgium, and even the unification of Italy and Germany, can be seen as continuations of the processes of simplification and centralisation initiated by the French Revolution and Napoleon, and furthered by the Congress statesmen. Indeed, the men at Vienna were not even hostile

8 House of Commons, 20 March 1815. Extracts from this speech may be found in C. K. Webster, British Diplomacy, 1815–1815. London 1921, 395–403. A copy of this speech may also be found in the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (Belfast), Castlereagh Papers, D3030/4463.
Nationalism should not be considered as a monolithic concept in this period since it clearly had varied meanings in different regional settings. Nationalist aspirations in the German states or the Austrian Empire, for example, differed from those in Poland or were Latin America.


In revising older stereotypes, it is important not to exaggerate the impact that public opinion actually played. In Britain, with the most active press in Europe, newspaper editors could scarcely trust their own sources of information. Thus, on 5 September 1814, the three leading London papers all blamed the French for deliberately spreading false rumours of imaginary discord in Vienna. As the *Morning Chronicle* wrote: «the Parisian journalists are again at work in the vocation which seems allotted to them, of starting doubts and difficulties». Without accurate information, public opinion could not exercise as powerful an influence on decision-makers as later in the century.
80,000 or 100,000 men had been placed in the fortresses between Valenciennes and Givet, when Napoleon landed at Cannes, the King need never have quitted Paris.»

After the Hundred Days, the allied statesmen therefore introduced a series of remarkable, new security mechanisms: France was occupied by allied troops, suffered new territorial losses and was forced to pay reparations. A new treaty, the Quadruple Alliance of 20 November 1815, called upon allied leaders to resist the return of revolution and to hold periodic conferences. The statesmen further agreed to create an «ambassadorial conference» in Paris to supervise the French government, and to install similar ambassadorial conferences in several other capitals to handle issues such as the slave trade. Finally, the Tsar launched an assertion of moral principles in the form of the «Holy Alliance», a Christian brotherhood of monarchs proclaimed in September 1815. Metternich would have added a common European centre for reporting and sharing counter-revolutionary police intelligence, but he never succeeded in this. This ambitious programme was all part of what Beatrice de Graaf denotes as Europe’s new security culture; Alan Sked compares this structure to the counter-terrorist methods used today. Historians in general often refer to these new arrangements as the Congress System.

Clearly, the ideal was for the great powers to agree among themselves on major issues and then to impose their collective will on the rest of Europe. This approach was briefly tested in the autumn of 1818 at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. There, the allied leaders met, decided on the evacuation of France, and consulted on disputes between Bavaria and Baden, the enforcement of the Treaty of Kiel on Sweden, and possible intervention in the dispute between Spain and its colonies in the Americas. «It really appears to me to be a new discovery in the European Government», observed Castlereagh, «at once extinguishing the cobwebs into which diplomacy obscures the horizon, bringing the whole bearing of the system into its true light, and giving to the great powers the efficiency and almost the simplicity of a single state.»

At Vienna, the allied leaders had also discussed the issue of a general guarantee. This concept can be traced back to the philosophers of «perpetual peace» – the Duc de Sully, Abbé St. Pierre, Rousseau, and Kant – each of whom had envisaged a confederation protecting its member states against all changes by force. In 1804, Prince Adam Czartoryski had proposed just such a system to the Tsar, who was much taken by it. The British Prime Minister William Pitt also saw some value in it and in 1815 Castlereagh raised the possibility at the Congress of Vienna. While this proposal would have guaranteed all rulers their thrones, it foundered due to the uncertainty surround-

13 Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna, 179, citing the National Archives (Kew), F.O. 92/23, 161–168.
ing the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the signatories concluded the Vienna Final Act, which made every state a party to the territorial settlement.\textsuperscript{17}

The idea of a general guarantee – comparable to what we would today call a system of collective security – was again raised and rejected at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. Castlereagh now argued against such a guarantee, pointing out that it would commit the European powers to maintaining rulers who might not deserve to rule – the very antithesis of John Locke's social contract, the English Glorious Revolution, and the reasoning of the Declaration of Independence. <<\textit{N}othing \textit{c}ould be more immoral or more prejudicial to the character of government generally>>, he claimed, <<than the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power without any consideration of the extent to which it was abused.>>\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Moderate Constitutionalism and Counterrevolutionary Intervention}

Having been raised in the Age of Enlightenment and lived through the French Revolution, the men of 1814/1815, especially Tsar Alexander (in his liberal phase), were to some extent moderate constitutionalists. New constitutions were introduced in the Southern German states, France, Finland, Poland, Norway and the Netherlands. Frederick William III of Prussia announced that he would grant his subjects a constitution; Castlereagh recommended to Louis XVIII that he become a true constitutional monarch on the British model; and the Tsar secretly ordered Nicholas Novosiltsev to draw up a constitution for Russia. Yet these statesmen also remained firm advocates of monarchical authority and hereditary privilege. Their plans were not liberal enough to satisfy the yearnings of those seeking a true sharing of power. Faced with mounting signs of restiveness, the European rulers and their statesmen became increasingly conservative after 1819.

In Latin America, revolutions were already in progress. Spain's attempts to obtain the assistance of the great powers to suppress them were foiled by the British. In the German states, Metternich succeeded in imposing the Carlsbad decrees, restricting freedom of the press and student societies; at nearly the same time, Castlereagh introduced the «Six Acts» in the British House of Commons while the Tsar authorized his brother to take repressive measures in Poland.

In fact, the great European alliance was soon deployed to restore the plenitude of power to the crowned heads of Spain, Naples, and Piedmont – absolute rulers who, having opposed reform, became the victims of quasi-popular revolutions led by junior officers of their own military establishments. Russia, Austria and Prussia propagated general principles of counter-revolution at the Congress of Troppau (Opava) in December 1820. Castlereagh would not openly commit British policy to such objectives,

\textsuperscript{17} F. Gentz to Janko Fürst von Caradja, 22 April 1815, Dépêches inédites, 1, Nr. 8, 146–152.

although he secretly sympathised with the continental powers. This disagreement finally led to a visible rift in the alliance. The British and the Russians had never construed the alliance in quite the same light: the Russians had always seen it as an embryonic world government while the British had mainly viewed it as a convenient forum for exchanging information and watching over France.

If the Congress System in its original sense had survived, European history might have been far different. In its purest form, however, the system only lasted until 1823. After the suicide of Castlereagh, France's unilateral intervention in Spain and the death of Tsar Alexander, modern history's first conscious effort to create a method of global governance based on multilateral cooperation seemed to have failed. But rather than disappear altogether, the Congress System evolved into the Concert of Europe: ambassadorial conferences continued to handle crises like the Belgian Revolution in the 1830s and there existed continuing respect for the territorial settlement at Vienna, although with periodic readjustments. Most importantly, a total war involving all the great powers at once was avoided for an entire century. In this sense, the system maintained the peace, making possible, as Paul Schroeder has pointed out, a period of unprecedented intellectual and technological innovation as well as the global expansion of European culture and power, often with brutal consequences in non-European lands.

Should the Vienna settlement and Congress System therefore be held accountable for the acceleration of European imperial expansion later in the century – a question raised at several recent conferences marking the bicentennial? Twenty years ago Edward Ingram argued that stability within Europe caused the powers to project their bellicosity outwards. More recently Jürgen Osterhammel has pointed to a «global dualism» in which civilised norms were applied inside Europe but a bloody free-for-all reigned elsewhere. And it is true enough that Metternich exhibited just such callousness – or incomprehension – when he wrote in 1821 that whether «three or four hundred thousand are hanged, slaughtered or impaled», in the Ottoman Empire, «it scarcely matters». However, although European statesmen treated native peoples outside of Europe with a considerable degree of ruthlessness, this was not a new phenomenon in 1814/1815. If anything, the Congress statesmen showed greater sympathy than their predecessors for the rest of humanity, as demonstrated by their efforts against the slave trade. And developments later in the century – such as the corrosive effects of European contacts with indigenous societies in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, technological advances, and the rise of new ideologies like Social Darwinism – played a greater role in promoting imperialism than the Vienna settlement or the Congress System, even though the stability they created certainly helped.

The Congress System left another quite unexpected legacy. In 1918, Wilson’s Fourteen Points called for «a general association of nations [...] for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike» – ironically, almost the same formula that had been raised and rejected by the great powers in the heated debates of 1818. Although Wilson opposed what he called the «Old Diplomacy», British leaders in fact looked back to the operation of the Congress System for guidance in designing the new League of Nations, as seen in the Phillimore Committee and the Cecil Draft. In the end, the «Executive Council» of the League of Nations was composed of the allied great powers in almost exact imitation of the Congress System. In 1945 at Dumbarton Oaks this was turned into the United Nations Security Council, whose veto-yielding permanent members were the victors of World War II, thus excluding Germany, Japan, India, or Brazil. The Congress System also provided the precedent for all later international summit conferences – personal meetings of heads of state and foreign ministers – such as the G7 of today.

**Conclusion**

In sum, the generation of 1814/1815 can hardly be maligned as sleepwalkers. They were acutely aware of the high stakes being played. They stood astride two worlds – between the turbulence of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars and the stability of the long nineteenth century, which they helped create. As architects, they were highly conscious of laying a foundation for the future. «The great military Powers of the Continent who have triumphed in the War», wrote Castlereagh to the Tsar during the Congress of Vienna, «should recollect, that they avowedly fought for their own liberties, and for those of the rest of Europe, and not for an extension of their dominion[s]. [...] [I]f the Allied Powers act liberally towards each other, and indulgently to other states, they may look forward to crown a glorious war by a solid, and lasting peace; and posterity will revere their names, not only for having delivered by their arms, the world from a tyrant and conqueror, but for having restored, by their example and by their influence, the reign of moderation and justice.»

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Ibid, 68; see also Webster, *British Diplomacy*, 226–227.