The subject of this paper is the educational cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Arab countries during the Cold War, with emphasis on the period between the mid-1950s and the 1970s. The years of decolonization and national affirmation in the Southern Hemisphere witnessed an unprecedented emergence of new ties between the communist superpower and most Afro-Asian countries. Western observers, diplomats and journalists, as well as scholars of international relations and of the Soviet Union, devoted much energy to map out, interpret and forecast the East-South relations and their consequences. In the ensuing abundant literature – testimony to the pervasive fear of communist expansion – issues such as military cooperation, economic relations and anti-Western political coalitions occupy a prominent place. Only moderate attention is given to topics like technical assistance, technological transfers or the implementation of developmental programs, while any systematic interest in the scientific and educational cooperation between the «Second» and the «Third World» is practically non-existent.

This paper thus focuses on a so far neglected subject: the educational aid and the training programs that the Soviet Union offered to its Arab partners, as a means to induce «progressive changes» and modernization in the Arab world.\(^1\) The Soviet period, the term «modernization» (modernizatsiia) was either used with reference to equipment and machinery (modernizatsiia oborudovanii), or it had a very negative meaning: it signified some historians’ anachronistic and «anti-scientific» use of «terms and evaluations» of their time in order to designate «phenomena and events of the past of a different quality, which leads to a distortion and falsification of history». See Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia [Big Soviet Encyclopedia], 1954, vol. 28, 46. Taking seriously the warning of the Soviet encyclopedia, I would like to acknowledge both the historicity and the relativity of the terms.

\(^1\) I am particularly grateful to Corinna Unger, David Engerman, Stephan Malinowski, Antonis Liakos, Tassos Anastasiadis, Vaggelis Karamanolakis and Lina Ventoura for their critical remarks, aid and patience. I am also greatly indebted to my anonymous readers for their extremely accurate comments.

\(^2\) I use the term «modernization» and the expressions with the attributive adjective «progressive>>, i.e. «progressive changes» or «progressive transformation>>, interchangeably, but with a preference for the second, because the adjective «progressive» (progressiinnii) was, undoubtedly, more representative of the communist vocabulary. On the other hand, in the Russian language of the
Soviet-Arab educational cooperation provides an axis of analysis that helps juxtapose the convictions and aspirations of both parties within the historical context of decolonization and the Cold War. For Moscow, educational aid and cooperation was a channel for the transfer of Soviet knowledge and the implementation of ideas for modernization. Moscow was aiming for a partnership with its own dominating influence. For radical Arab leaders, the attraction of the Soviet model consisted in the opportunities it offered for state-building, social engineering, rapid economic growth and, last but not least, national sovereignty. The Algerian Ahmed Ben Bella, for instance, put it this way: «if the Russians did not exist, we should have to invent them.» The educational aid of the Soviet Union and of other European communist countries was extremely important to fulfil these expectations. Ideology was not the main motivation, pragmatic considerations were much more crucial.

A point to be made here is that education, nationalization and the development of the public sector are linked together as vehicles of further modernization and that educational aid can play a considerable role in this context. Both the Soviets and many Arabs recognised this and, as it is to be demonstrated below, built their co-operation accordingly. Moreover, the fact that the Soviet and Arab views on the issue converged suggests the following hypothesis: despite cultural differences, shared secular beliefs and compatible interests and views about modernization prevailed and became the main foundation for the Soviet-Arab partnership during the Cold War.

Towards the end of the 1950s, Iraq emerged as a close partner of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. The Soviet-Iraqi «breakthrough» offers a good point of entry to inquire into the motives and objectives of Soviet-Arab cooperation in general.

1. The Soviet-Iraqi «Breakthrough»

Until July 1958, Iraq was ruled by a pro-Western authoritarian government and belonged to the military committee of the anti-Soviet Baghdad pact. The country’s oil reserves were fully and exclusively controlled by the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). After Brigadier Abdel Karim Qasim seized power on July 14, 1958, Iraq’s foreign and domestic policies came under attack. The young nationalist ruler also targeted the IPC’s monopoly and, in December 1961, reduced the percentage of the country’s territory to be conceded for exploitation from 100 to 0.5. However, let us not forget that Quasim was not the only leader who attempted to uproot foreign interest in the region. Almost a decade earlier, Iranian nationalist

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3 Quoted by a senior Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) official, Hocine Zahoune, during a discussion with a Soviet delegation. Russian State Archive of Literature and Art [Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Literatury i Isskustva, hereafter RGALI], f. 631, op. 26, d. 4827, p. 8. The statement initially appeared in an interview with Ben Bella in the newspaper Alger Républicain, April 4, 1963.
leader Mohammed Mossadeq had been engaged in an uncompromising struggle for the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company – the predecessor of BP – but ill-prepared and without any support, he was not able to withstand the Western embargo, and the CIA-instigated coup finally overthrew his government and put his plans on hold.\textsuperscript{4} In 1956, on the other hand, Gamal Abdel Nasser gained a great victory when, backed by the Soviets, he resisted the tripartite aggression and nationalized the Suez Canal.\textsuperscript{5}

Qasim’s revolution also earned Moscow’s approval. «We are certainly glad that those events took place in Iraq», said Anastas Mikoyan, the vice-president of the Soviet Minister’s Council, to the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. «We are supporting Qasim’s government.» Then Mikoyan made it clear what was really at stake: «What will happen if the Arab governments follow an independent policy and manage their own resources by themselves? As far as the oil is concerned, it will not disappear. We don’t need this oil, and the Arabs will still sell it to the same Western European governments, but they will sell it at regular commercial prices, which is only right.»\textsuperscript{6}

At that point, however, nationalizing the country’s oil industry was not an easy affair at all. On the one hand, Western corporations were controlling the world’s «open» market and were consequently in the position to impose an embargo on Iraqi production just as they had previously done in Iran. On the other hand, Iraq depended on Western technology and expertise, with a significant portion of the technical and scientific staff of the IPC coming from the West. In fact, the Iraqi oil industry was foreign at its core.

Now Qasim’s government and Iraq’s newly founded oil ministry put pressure on the IPC to «Iraqize» the industry’s technical staff. Their efforts have apparently paid off: within five years the percentage of foreign specialists dropped from 70 to 22 per cent. British-educated Iraqis replaced the British engineers.\textsuperscript{7} At the same time, the government took steps to diversify the country’s foreign partnerships. A high-level Iraqi delegation visited Moscow and addressed the issue of the national oil industry’s future development. Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the CPSU, informed the delegation: «our specialists will readily help you to discover your resources. You have all the conditions for the development of your national industry.» He predicted that Iraq «could be transformed into a paradisiacal nook.»

\textsuperscript{7} O. Gerasimov, \textit{Irakskiaia neft’}, [The Iraqi Oil] (Moscow, 1969), 100–101.
On March 16, 1959, Iraq and the USSR signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement. Shortly after that, Soviet geologists arrived in Iraq to detect and evaluate oil fields, and a few others began to work in the oil industry.\(^8\)

The Iraqi government took one major step to ready itself for the day of nationalization: it decided to invest in education to train future engineers and experts, which was indispensable for the long-term development of the national oil sector. Aware of the significant need for such an investment, the Iraqi government turned to the USSR. The Soviet example of rapid development and modernization as well as the recent Sputnik success (1957) were among the reasons the Soviet option seemed particularly attractive. Moscow lent a willing ear to the Iraqi request and offered some 50 scholarships per academic year. Each year the Iraqi government also sponsored the studies of around 320 undergraduate and graduate students at Soviet universities, such as Moscow State University, the Moscow Energy Institute and others in many Soviet Republics. During the academic year 1959–1960, 784 Iraqis were studying in the USSR; two years later their number reached 1306.\(^9\) Iraq became the first non-communist country to engage in such an extensive educational cooperation programme with Moscow and by far the first non-communist «exporter» of students to the motherland of socialism. Ironically enough, some of the program’s graduates ended up working for the IPC or for other foreign companies in the Emirates, in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.\(^{10}\) Nevertheless, many of them also served in the Iraq National Oil Company. Though Qasim was overthrown and killed in February 1963, the company was turned into a state monopoly when, in June 1972, once again with Soviet support, the government of Ahmed Hassan Bakr and Saddam Hussein realized Qasim’s plans and nationalized the IPC’s assets and the country’s oil sector.\(^{11}\)

The case of Soviet-Iraqi cooperation highlights the importance of education for the implementation of plans for national development in former colonial countries. It also demonstrates that Arab aspirations not only fit to Moscow’s foreign policy objectives against the West, but were also reminiscent of the Soviet experience and were awarded legitimacy according to the Marxist-Leninist principles.


\(^{10}\) See a report on Iraqi and other alumni: GARF, f. R-9606, op. 1. d. 3092, p. 3.

2. Arab Aspirations and Soviet Perspectives

In the immediate aftermath of decolonization, it had become clear that national independence as such did not fulfil Arab expectations with regard to national development and sovereignty. The postcolonial states were obviously «not sovereign» considering that foreign powers were supposed to guarantee their defence and their financial stability. Entire sectors of their economy were under the control of Westerners, while the professors, doctors, engineers and the educated elite in general were very often Europeans. The Arab nationalists of the 1950s and 1960s, including the communists, found this situation hardly acceptable. The overwhelming majority of them believed that a strong state should control the country’s reserves, manage the economy, foster the social development and organize education and national culture. For these Arab «modernizers», the keyword was «development», which was usually associated with the expansion of the public sector, the «nationalization» of natural resources and the «Arabization» of human resources. Additionally, these instances of nationalizations aimed not only at political and geopolitical gains but also at financing the modernization of Egypt and Iraq, respectively. They were considered the first indispensable and obvious steps toward the implementation of plans for national development and modernization. In their effort to realize those goals, the Arab countries gained the favour of the communist countries, particularly of the Soviet Union.

In what amounted to a major shift in Soviet foreign policy from Stalin to Khrushchev, Moscow supported, overtly or discreetly, most of the Arab national claims vis-à-vis the Western world and endorsed Arab demands for cooperation. The new Soviet leadership regarded the anti-colonial struggles as a significant opportunity to weaken North-South ties and to replace them with East-South ones. They also recognized the opportunity to expand their influence in the Southern Hemisphere. The USSR’s involvement in the Suez crisis was a signal directed to the colonial and postcolonial countries that Moscow was eager to support their national struggles despite their anti-communist stance. But much more significant was the fact that the USSR was eager to engage in a global battle, in order to win a strategic alliance with non-Western countries, and that Moscow was ready to accept the cost of its political investment. After all, Nikita Khrushchev was confident in the capability of the Soviet system to «bury capitalism» and believed that the Soviet experience represented a perfect opportunity for the national aspirations of the non-Western countries. This self-consciousness was particularly noticeable with regard to the «backward» Third World, but was not always as obvious in relation to the developed West. It is thus worth mentioning that while the Soviets were discredited after the invasion of Budapest in 1956 and consequently lost their «tutorial» position vis-à-vis the European left, they still felt confident enough to give lessons to their potential and desirable allies, such as Arabs and other non-Europeans. There is no doubt that in the eyes of Soviet theorists and policy makers their own
country’s history provided the most adequate model to be carried over to the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa.

It was the building of the first socialist state and the establishment of Soviet power that officials were constantly reminding to their Arab guests and professors were teaching to Arab students. The formative years of war communism, during which the Bolsheviks had nationalized the heavy industries and the financial sector, were the first edifying example to be evoked. The experience of the NEP (New Economic Policy) also tacitly provided a source of inspiration, in so far as Soviet specialists of the developing countries recommended, if only for a limited time, «the existence for a certain time of a mixed economy parallel to the growing and determining role of the anti-capitalist state-controlled sector». Similarly to the USSR’s passage from the NEP to Stalin’s planned economy, the extension of the public sector in all spheres of economic life was the fundamental objective, while the «final goal» was «the creation of a planned economy».

These milestones of the Soviet experience provided the framework within which socialist-oriented developing countries were supposed to continue their anti-imperialist course through history. Yet, besides that general and universal framework, Soviet theorists focused on a specific part of the Soviet experience, which they considered valuable to the Afro-Asian countries. That specific part had to do with the transformation of the «backward» Central Asian Republics into modern socialist societies under Bolshevik rule. According to the Soviets, the historical example of Central Asia had the potential to serve as a model for post-colonial Arab countries and to inspire the Arab modernizers without offending their religious sensibilities. A «modernized» Soviet Central Asia was supposed to offer «empirical evidence» that proved the Soviet assumptions about socialist development and modernization right. Based on this reasoning and taking into account the priorities of Soviet foreign policy, Soviet theorists devised the theoretical scheme of the «non-capitalist path of development» (nekapitalistitsekskii pyt’ razvitiia), which could be implemented in those countries in which capitalism was still at a very early stage. The theory suggested that, with the economic, scientific and technological support of the Soviet bloc, the less developed countries could by-pass the painful capitalist stage of development and proceed immediately to the construction of socialism.

The shock therapy of socialist modernization could help those countries accelerate their history and achieve their ultimate goals of national development, sovereignty and social justice. Both the theory and the empirical evidence were supposed to

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12 V. G. Solodovnikov, *The Present Stage of Non-Capitalist Development in Asia and Africa* (Budapest, 1973), 26–29. It needs to be mentioned that, drawing from Lenin, the author also acknowledged the need for tactical «concessions to foreign capitalists».

offer a time-tested alternative path to realize the visions of Arab leaders, intellectuals and activists who wanted to modernize their countries, but rejected the Western capitalist model. Nikita Khrushchev was very clear on what he considered an alternative and progressive path to the desired final destination: «He who wants to know what kind of fruit this alternative path yields may take a look at the prospering republics of Soviet Central Asia and at the other regions of our country, which, after October, have by-passed the painful capitalist path.»

Yet, apart from the recurrent theme of Central Asia in Soviet propaganda aimed at the Arabs, the theory of the non-capitalist path of development implied an unavoidable postulate: that the passage to socialism could be achieved only with the economic, technological and scientific aid of the socialist countries. The Soviet Union thus had to assume a large share of the responsibility in transforming post-colonial countries into socialist and sovereign ones. Even though the risky Soviet involvement in the Suez crisis, which had a great impact on Arab opinion, had hardly cost anything, the forging of a solid Soviet-Arab partnership required large investments and carried significant costs. The new Soviet leadership, however, seemed to be ready to take these on. At the first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo, in December 1957, the Soviet representative was Anoushavan Arzumanian, the director of the prestigious Institute of World Economy and International Relations. In his speech, he stressed the generosity of Soviet intentions regarding the Afro-Asian countries: «We can set up for you an industrial or transporting enterprise, a scientific or a training institution, a hospital, a cultural institute. We can send you our specialists or you can send us your specialists to become familiar with our enterprises and scientific institutes. We can send our professors to your educational institutions and you can send your students to ours. Do that, as it is better for you. Tell us what you need and we are going to help you, as far as our economic potential reaches, by according you the means either in the form of credit, or in the form of subsidy. […] We are ready to help you not out of self-interest, but as a brother helps his brother, because we know from our own experience how to overcome privations.»

Egypt was the first Arab country to receive Soviet aid in support of her program of national development. The Aswan High Dam, constructed with Soviet loans and technical assistance, was not only a project of vital importance for the irrigation and electrification of the region, but also a display of Soviet technological skills, a veritable tour-de-force of Soviet engineering. Among the most important projects implemented by Soviet engineers in the Arab countries were dams and railroads in Iraq and Syria, the deep-water seaport of Hudayda in North Yemen and the steel plants of Annaba and Helwan in Algeria and Egypt, respectively. A significant part of those projects also consisted of the training of qualified Arab workers to be

15 Arzumanian’s speech was published in the review V zaschitu mira, 1958, v. 81.
employed in the industries and enterprises or to replace Soviet technicians once the projects were completed.\textsuperscript{16}

However, training workers «then and there» alone was not enough to meet the demand for specialists who, as it was hoped, would contribute to the development and «progressive transformation» of the Arab countries. If support for the creation of national industries and enterprises was one facet of Soviet development aid, the training of local specialists was the other. Without specialists educated by the Soviets, the non-capitalist path of development and Soviet-inspired modernization would definitely have been vain hopes. From the Arab point of view, without their own specialists, modernization, development and national sovereignty were empty dreams. Despite the often conflicting projects and aspirations of Soviets and Arabs, education was considered by both a cornerstone in the process of modernization.

\section*{3. Soviet Educational Aid and Cooperation with the Arab Countries}

From the very beginning of the Soviet-Arab partnership, the issue of educational cooperation figured prominently in the plans for modernization. In 1957, Egypt became the first Arab country to sign an agreement of cultural cooperation with the USSR, and it subsequently started sending students – mostly post-graduates – to Soviet universities for further studies and research. A year later, a group of Soviet specialists was invited to work at the Suez Oil Institute in what was the first academic exchange of its kind between Soviet and Arab institutes.\textsuperscript{17} As mentioned above, Iraq also embarked on a large-scale program of educational cooperation with the Soviet Union in accordance with Qasim’s plans for the modernization of the country and the nationalization of the IPC.

Soviet-Algerian cooperation took its course in a very similar way to Soviet-Iraqi educational cooperation. Before independence in 1962, only a few Algerian students – 9 in 1959, 22 in 1960 and 34 in 1961 – upon recommendation of the Front de Libération Nationale of Algeria (FLN), were admitted to Soviet universities and given Soviet scholarships.\textsuperscript{18} After liberation, the country was in urgent need of locally educated cadres – a need intensified through the exodus of the French colonos. Under these circumstances, during the period of Ahmed Ben Bella (1962–1965), Algeria became one of the major receivers of Soviet educational aid. The Soviet Union offered Algeria circa 100 scholarships to its universities each academic year.\textsuperscript{19} At the same time, in accordance with the decision of Nikita Khrush-
chev, the Soviets founded one of their most important educational institutions abroad in Algeria.

During a 1964 visit to Algeria, Khrushchev announced that Moscow was ready to finance the founding of an oil institute, so that the Algerian nation would be able to exploit its own resources and keep financing its other social and developmental programs. Towards the end of the same year, the Algerian Oil and Gas Institute was founded in Boumerdès, a suburb of Algiers. It became part of the African Centre for Oil and Textile, an educational complex sponsored by the USSR, which comprised a technical school for textile and another one for secondary, oil-related specializations. The Centre was equipped with Soviet material and employed about 200 professors from several Soviet universities and research institutes. Within five years, the Centre was admitting more than 1000 students in different fields. Many of its graduates continued their training at the Boubkine Institute for Oil and Gas in Moscow or other research institutes in the USSR.

The Centre became a paradigm of Soviet «disinterested aid» to young socialist countries, as well as an important basis for advertising the Soviet model to Algerian students. The films shown and the expositions organized at the institute propagated the achievements of Soviet science and highlighted the modernization of the Central Asian Republics. The Soviet teaching community founded an association for Soviet-Algerian friendship and organized open lectures about the Soviet Union, as well as commemorations of the October Revolution. The Algerians running the Centre tolerated the Soviet propaganda and even the teaching of Marxism-Leninism that was integrated into economics and other courses. After all, Soviet professors and Algerian students were working on projects of great interest to the state, such as the detection and exploitation of the national oil and gas resources or the liquidization of natural gas. Furthermore, many of the institute’s graduates, especially those who continued training in the USSR, made a career working for the national oil and gas enterprise, the well-known Sonatrach, which had direct access to and was training its cadres at, Soviet institutes. During the 1960s, with the support of the Soviet bloc, the company took over all oil fields and assets that had belonged to French and American oil companies. In 1971, the government of Houari Boumedienne nationalized all the natural gas fields in Algeria, and Sonatrach became the state energy monopoly.

condary education had to stay in Algeria and render their service to the country. The Soviets however blamed the Minister of National Orientation, Cherif Belcassem, for his European preferences: GARF, f. R-9518, op. 1, d. 489, p. 235–237.


Today Sonatrach is a kind of Algerian Gazprom. The company produces about 90 per cent of all Algerian export income. Algeria is the fourth largest exporter and producer of gas in the world.
As in the case of Iraq and the IPC, the nationalization of the Algerian energy sector was a cornerstone in the process of national development and modernization. In that process, diversification of foreign partnerships and educational cooperation with the Soviet Union played decisive roles. Both Algeria and Iraq managed to obtain the technology and develop the capacities to nationalize, exploit and commercialize their own natural resources. Their success was greeted as a triumph of Arab socialism and Soviet-Arab friendship, and was celebrated at the Baghdad International Seminars on «Oil and Raw Materials», organized by the Cairo-based Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization.23

That being said, Soviet-Arab cooperation in the domain of higher education was not limited to the so-called radical or socialist Arab states. Western-oriented Arab countries, such as Tunisia or Morocco, also needed native cadres for their modernization, and they welcomed the idea of cooperation with the Soviet Union. In 1961, Tunisia signed an agreement of economic and technical cooperation with the USSR, according to which the Soviets were to construct and equip the National Technical Institute of Tunis. Moroccan politicians, most of them members of the ruling conservative party (Istiqlal), requested Soviet scholarships for the party youth. Moscow granted the Istiqlal youth a small number of scholarships. Soviet scholarships were also offered to the ministries of education in Tunisia and Morocco; these could then choose their preferred candidates. Although most of these scholarships remained «unexploited» during the years 1960–1965, Morocco, Tunisia and the other Western-oriented Arab countries gradually put aside their reservations vis-à-vis the communist superpower and accepted Soviet educational aid.24 By the 1970s, even small Kuwait, a privileged Western ally, had instituted an educational cooperation with the USSR and sent around 40 students to the Soviet Union.25

In many cases, political changes in the Arab world were reflected in the evolution of Soviet-Arab educational cooperation. Thus, while the Iraqis were the most numerous group among Arab students in the USSR during the 1960s, in the 1970s their number significantly declined. Students from Syria, a country that became the most important ally of the USSR in the Middle East during the same decade, now occupied the first place on the list, followed by Jordanian and Lebanese students, among whom were many Palestinians. At the same time, despite a strong Soviet-Egyptian partnership, the Soviet Union was never the first destination for educational cooperation.”
Table 1: Arab students in the Soviet Union, 1960–1980. 26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Yemen Both</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>342**</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>784</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1331</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>354**</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>604*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1272*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961–1962</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>95 1306</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2273</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963–1964</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1163</td>
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<td>39</td>
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<td>73</td>
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<td>1562</td>
<td>1710</td>
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* Data underestimated, because many Iraqi students arrived later during the academic year
** It was the short period of the United Arab Republic

26 https://doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944_2010_1_85
Egyptian students going abroad. Most of the Egyptians who studied in the USSR were enrolled in a PhD program (*aspirantura*), which was rarely the case for the rest of the Arab students. It is also worth mentioning that among all the Arab countries and, eventually, among all the Afro-Asian and Latin American ones, Egypt, Syria and Iraq (in the years of Qasim) were the only ones to contribute financially to the scholarships of the majority of their students in the Soviet Union.

Despite some ups and downs due to political changes in the Arab world, educational cooperation between Arab countries, whether socialist or not, and the Soviet Union continued undisturbed, and the number of Arab students in the USSR increased steadily. The following tables represent that evolution.

**Table 2: Arab, African, Asian and Latin American students in the USSR, 1960–1980.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academic Year</th>
<th>Arab countries</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
<th>South-East Asia***</th>
<th>Latin America**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959–1960</td>
<td>1331</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>287***</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960–1961</td>
<td>1272</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>624***</td>
<td>319</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961–1962</td>
<td>2273</td>
<td>1027</td>
<td>6730</td>
<td>745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962–1963</td>
<td>2398</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>7093</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963–1964</td>
<td>2244</td>
<td>2327</td>
<td>1796***</td>
<td>1658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964–1965</td>
<td>2623</td>
<td>2794</td>
<td>7917</td>
<td>2111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965–1966</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966–1967</td>
<td>2998</td>
<td>4101</td>
<td>7698</td>
<td>2348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967–1968</td>
<td>3273</td>
<td>4309</td>
<td>7632</td>
<td>2086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968–1969</td>
<td>3884</td>
<td>4458</td>
<td>8671</td>
<td>2068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969–1970</td>
<td>3994</td>
<td>4459</td>
<td>7634</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970–1971</td>
<td>3424</td>
<td>3725</td>
<td>9215</td>
<td>1928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–1972</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972–1973</td>
<td>5128</td>
<td>4661</td>
<td>10235</td>
<td>2861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973–1974</td>
<td>5881</td>
<td>5027</td>
<td>10305</td>
<td>3248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974–1975</td>
<td>5844</td>
<td>5120</td>
<td>10169</td>
<td>3933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975–1976</td>
<td>7099</td>
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<td>1976–1977</td>
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<td>10121</td>
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<td>1977–1978</td>
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<td>9799</td>
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<td>1978–1979</td>
<td>9912</td>
<td>11110</td>
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<td>9781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–1980</td>
<td>12191</td>
<td>12627</td>
<td>16574</td>
<td>11390</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including Vietnam, but not Mongolia
** Including Cuba
*** Without China, North Korea and Vietnam


28 Ibid.
4. Education, Indoctrination and «Progressiveness» of the Students

Almost all of the Arab countries had a tremendous need for manpower, so the Soviet scholarships represented an important opportunity. Yet, it should be no surprise that for most of the Arabs the Soviet Union was not only the country of rapid industrialization and technological achievements but also the country of communism and atheism. Consequently, many feared that the Arab students sent to the Soviet Union would return with communist ideas and in a subversive mood.

Among others, a major concern of the Arabs was the fact that a number of Soviet «social» or «non-governmental» organizations – such as the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and the Committee of Youth Organizations – were distributing scholarships and recruiting candidates with the blessing of the Soviet government but without the permission of Arab authorities. This type of recruitment characterized the administration of the People’s Friendship University «Patrice Lumumba» (UDN). Founded in 1960 by Khrushchev, the university had as its mission to train students from less developed countries and to assist «the efforts of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples aiming at building a developed national economy».\(^\text{29}\) The institution was administered by social organizations and was theoretically independent from the Education Ministry, which made it even more suspect in the eyes of a foreigner. The British Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, had warned all the members of the Commonwealth that «the prorector of the Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow is a KGB general».\(^\text{30}\) In the European and conservative Arab press the UDN was depicted as a ghetto for colored students, as a centre of communist propaganda and, notably, as a low-level educational institution.

One after the other, Arab countries protested against the recruitment of Arab students to the university. Tunisian officials considered the enrolment of Tunisian students at the UDN as a «kind of discrimination» against them, because their educational level was equivalent to that of «European students», while «the University was catering to ill-prepared African students».\(^\text{31}\) Such arguments are particularly disputable seeing that the Ghanaians, Nigerians, Senegalese and other Africans were among the best students. These statements reflect stereotypical cultural hierarchies, which were quite often evoked by Arab officials. The Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs made it clear to the Soviets that Moroccan students «should not mix with Afro-Asian or Latin-American students, who make up the «People’s Friendship»

\(^{29}\) From the speech of Nikita Khrushchev at the inauguration of the university, on November 17, 1960, in SSSR i Strany Afriki, 1946–1962 gg. Dokumenty i materialy, t. 2, Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Polititseskoi Literatury, 1963, p. 83.

\(^{30}\) British National Archives, Prime Minister Cabinet Office, PREM, 11, 4609, p. 13. The Pro-Rector in question was P. D. Erzin.

\(^{31}\) GARF, f. R-9518, op. 1. d. 531, p. 80–81 and d. 532, p. 112.
University» and that the practice of distributing scholarships without the approval of Moroccan authorities was «inadmissible». Even socialist-oriented countries like Algeria required that almost all the Soviet scholarships should be accorded to state authorities or to state-controlled social organizations, not to individual candidates. They were categorically opposed to the idea of sending their students to the UDN. Most of the Arab countries never officially recognized the diploma of the UDN, which, as a result, became more and more marginalized. In 1967, 11.7 per cent of the Arab students studying in the USSR attended the university that bore the name of the Congolese nationalist hero. By 1981, that percentage dropped to 5.8. 

The problem of indoctrination persisted nonetheless, and it concerned not only the minority of Arab students of the UDN, who studied at more than 150 universities and technical schools all around the Soviet Union. In the early stages of educational cooperation between the Soviet Union and less developed countries, the Soviet government had agreed not to compel students to enrol in social and political science courses. And indeed, until October 1968, all courses of the social and political sciences were officially facultative. Yet, the USSR’s intention to influence the Weltanschauung (мировоззрение) of the students was not at all abandoned. Facultative courses, ostensibly imparting «the basics of a materialist vision of the world» to the students, were offered in many languages from the preparatory year on. Russian language teachers were also instructed to use texts with political and ideological contents. In an extreme case, «the professors of physics were advised, with the teaching of the quantum mechanics of the relativity theory and of the laws of contemporary physics, to pay more attention to the philosophical explanation of the natural phenomena on the basis of dialectical materialism». Circumventing the principle of voluntariness (договорённости) in a more overt way of, the Soviet Ministry of Education in March 1961 introduced an obligatory course entitled «USSR today», which contained sections on the CPSU and the establishment of communism in the USSR.

The Arab embassies in Moscow protested against such practices and prevented their students from attending those courses. In a characteristic reaction, the Egyptian government withdrew some 250 students from Soviet universities and, with a special airlift from Russia, sent them to the United States. Much more disap-
pointing to the Soviets was the fact that their efforts to attract students to the facultative courses did not elicit the desired results. While the percentage of foreign students who were taking the facultative courses in the social and political sciences fluctuated from 50 to 80 per cent at the UDN, the same percentage was significantly lower at other universities. The Komsomol attributed this failure not to a lack of interest but to the rigid schedule foreign students had to follow, as well as to the difficulties they faced given their insufficient academic preparation.  

In any case, this failure was indirectly recognized in a decree issued by the Ministry of Education in October 1968, according to which «all foreign students studying in the USSR [were] obliged to study social sciences, the history of the CPSU, political economy and the fundamental principles of scientific communism». If the facultative courses had been a success, there would have been no reason to make them obligatory.

At the same time, the efforts of Soviet authorities to conquer «the hearts and the minds» of the Arab and foreign students were not restricted to universities. A broad program of extracurricular activities was offered to the students, which included films on communism and the USSR, visits to pioneering industries and kolkhozes, meetings with senior Bolshevik revolutionaries, participation in Soviet and Arab commemorations, etc. In 1965, the Soviet society for friendship and cultural relations with the Arab peoples fostered the creation of a permanent extracurricular seminar entitled «USSR and the Arab countries», which was led by a group of Soviet and Arab students. All of those initiatives were in accordance with the directives of the CPSU «to take care of the students’ everyday life so that they [would] become not just highly qualified specialists but people with progressive opinions, as well as sincere friends of the Soviet Union.» They were also responses to the exhortation of the deputy minister of education, M. Prokopev, to fight «a battle» for the education of the students «from the moment when they begin their scholarships at the railway station until the end of their studies.»

Despite those high expectations on the Soviet side, the Arab students’ studies in the Soviet Union were not to be reduced to mere indoctrination. The overwhelming majority of these students studied at «first class» educational institutions together with their Soviet colleagues, took the same courses and passed the same exams. The academic bar was set very high, especially at the technological and medical faculties, which attracted 50 and 22 per cent of foreign students, respectively. Many students were confronted with severe academic difficulties. During the aca-

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41 I quote not from the decree, but from a discussion that took place among officials at the Ministry of education concerning the decree. GARF, f. R-9606, op. 1, d. 3538, p. 84–85.
42 GARF, f. R-9576, op. 13, d. 141, p. 95–96.
43 The «top secret» resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU in A. B. Davidson and S. V. Mazov, Rossia i Afrika. Dokumenty i materialy XVIII v. – 1960 g. (Moscow, IVI RAN, 1999), v. 2, 326.
44 The speech of M. Prokopev, VLKSM op. 46, d. 339, p. 8.
ademic year of 1962–1963, the failing rate of the Iraqi students that Qasim had sent to the Moscow Energy Institute reached 64 per cent. If they failed, students were obliged to repeat the exams and eventually the academic year or, in extreme cases, leave the Soviet Union. In order to prevent the expulsion of students, which could have damaged the Soviet-Arab educational partnership, the universities introduced auxiliary courses for small groups. Those courses existed at almost all of the universities that received foreign students from less developed countries, from Moscow State University to the UDN. At the latter, however, the course of studies was one academic year shorter than at other university. But even UDN courses were similar to those of the other Soviet universities, while the students there were also required to gain practical experience through working at a factory, a laboratory or an enterprise, as well as to write a graduation thesis (реальнii дипломнii проект), very often on a subject that was considered to be conducive to the development of their countries of origin.

In every respect, education was much more prominent than indoctrination. Soviet officials firmly believed that the Soviet-educated Arab graduates, as individuals, would in and by themselves demonstrate the superiority of Soviet science and the Soviet system. Consequently, they would bring the perspective of progress back home, which would in turn encourage their countries to opt for a non-capitalist path of development and modernization. Apart from embodying the superiority of socialism, the Arab graduates would also assume a significant role in its realization in their home countries: Educated as they were, they could quickly occupy leading administrative and political positions, which would allow them to influence the course of reforms by applying their expertise to the implementation of socialist policies. Thereby, Soviet officials believed, the graduates would dedicate their knowledge and political understanding to the political and economic liberation of their peoples. They would thus function as veritable agents of socialist development and modernization and help transform Arab countries into modern socialist states. Yet in fact, although most of the Soviet-educated Arab doctors and engineers had successful careers and enjoyed recognition in their countries, their access to key political and administrative positions was relatively limited. This can be attributed to the stiff competition with candidates educated in the Western or Arab world, who were often closer to the old elite. Another factor was the suspiciousness of most Arab states vis-à-vis Soviet-educated jurists, economists and political scientists. As a consequence, the Arab countries tried to intensify rather the educational cooperation with the USSR in the medical, engineering and agricultural fields.

While in the USSR, some of the Arab students adopted «progressive» positions and became outspoken in their sympathies for the Soviet Union. Communist or pro-Soviet students dominated most of the Arab national students’ associations.

46 Kononenko, Деятелность, 102–114.
47 This was an important conclusion of a report produced by researchers of the Soviet Institute of Africa. RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 39, d. 136, p. 82.
and had a strong influence on their non-communist colleagues. Many Arab student associations supported Soviet views on international affairs, wrote resolutions in favour of Soviet-Arab economic and cultural cooperation and protested against the persecution of communist activists by the regime of Nasser, the hero of Pan-Arabism. \footnote{GARF, f. R-9576, op. 13, d. 20, p. 171.}

The anti-imperialist and anti-Western mood of the Arab students and their adherence to socialist ideas generally dominated the scene, although there existed strong disagreements among Marxist-Leninists, Nasserists, Baathists, Algerian «Benbelists» and Palestinian Maoists.

At the same time, for most of the Arab students, «loyalty» towards the Soviet Union was clearly predicated on Moscow’s stance regarding the Middle East conflict and its support of the Palestinians. Consequently, when Soviet involvement and support for the Arab partners fell short of eliciting the desired results, as was the case during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, this led to strong anti-Soviet protests on the part of the students. The Arab students faulted «insufficient» Soviet military support and criticized aspects of Soviet-Arab relations, especially the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel, which they considered a betrayal of the Arab cause. \footnote{RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 8, d. 604, p. 89.}

In addition to the Palestinian question, Arab students in the Soviet Union endorsed progressive domestic policies of nationalist Arab regimes on many occasions. In that sense, they fulfilled the political expectations of their Soviet hosts and demonstrated their «progressiveness». The overwhelming majority of the Iraqi students supported Qasim’s reforms, not only when he was at the helm of the country but also after his fall. The pro-Qasim General Union of Iraqi Students in the USSR set up a «Committee of Solidarity with the fighters against the terrorist regime» of Aref (who succeeded Qasim) and organized the students in kolkhozes in order to finance a committee for the protection of the Iraqi people’s rights; the group ended up joining the underground resistance. \footnote{GARF, f. R-5451, op. 45, d. 1560, p. 65.}

Algerian students also approved the efforts of the FLN for a political and economic liberation of their country. Most of those who arrived in the USSR during the war were members of the pro-FLN youth and the General Union of Algerian Muslim Students. They saved money from their scholarships and helped purchase Soviet equipment for the Algerian trade unions in exile. \footnote{Algerian students also approved the efforts of the FLN for a political and economic liberation of their country. Most of those who arrived in the USSR during the war were members of the pro-FLN youth and the General Union of Algerian Muslim Students. They saved money from their scholarships and helped purchase Soviet equipment for the Algerian trade unions in exile.}

A few years later, the Union of Algerian Students in the USSR, which was by now controlled by the youth of the Party of Socialist Avant-garde, made a similar symbolic gesture. In support of the progressive socialist reforms of Houari Boumedienne – for instance the nationalization of the gas fields and the agrarian reform of 1971 – the union collected money and offered it to the Algerian embassy. \footnote{RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 8, d. 604, p. 89.}
Supporting nationalizations and socialist reforms provided a common «progressive» ground for most of the Arab students in the USSR, from communists to FLN supporters, from Baathists to Nasserites. In that sense, a consensus existed among the majority of youth political forces on what should constitute a progressive policy of economic and social modernization for Arab societies. However, a similar consensus did not exist in terms of ideology, political representation and foreign policy. A large gap separated (notably) the communists from the Egyptian Nasserites, with the latter striving to put an end to the «progressive» appetite of the former in order to attain ideological hegemony over the Arab students’ mind. But while the Nasserite students still felt somewhat attracted to the Soviet socialist system and its achievements, found common ground with the other socialists and communists and after 1966 joined the progressive front of the «Union of Organizations of Students from the Arab Countries» in the USSR, that was not the case with every Arab youth organization and group in the Soviet Union.53

First of all, the Muslim Brothers challenged the predominant nationalist, socialist and communist ideologies, which sometimes left Soviet authorities perplexed. The Umma party and the Muslim Brothers strongly opposed the domination of the communist union of Sudanese students, which was recruiting among the Arabs and the African Sudanese students.54 A group of Muslim Brothers also existed in the Syrian community, which was, however, dominated by the communists.55 But the strongest challenge to the diverse progressive forces came from the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, who seized control of the associations of Egyptian students in Moscow and Leningrad in the 1970s and contested Marxist ideology and secular socialist orientation, as well as the Soviet-Arab partnership as a whole.56 The Egyptian Muslim Brothers’ organization’s rise to power in the Soviet Union exposed the limits of Soviet influence on the political beliefs of the students through education or indoctrination. It also revealed the students’ disenchantment with the socialist path of development and with Soviet influence in Egypt and the Arab world in general.

Significant as it may be because of the anti-secular and anti-progressive direction it took, the Egyptian case was nevertheless not the rule. During the 1970s, the majority of Arab students’ associations remained committed to secular and socialist principles. Communist students continued to have the upper hand in the Lebanese, Syrian, Jordanian, Sudanese and Iraqi associations. «Progressive democrats» constituted the overwhelming majority in the Algerian, Moroccan and Palestinian

53 Concerning the «Union of Organizations of Students from the Arab Countries» in the USSR [Sojuz Organizatsii Studentov arabskikh stran v SSSR] see RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 8, d. 604, p. 82–83.
54 From reports of the Komsomol: RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 46, d. 354, p. 19–20 and p. 30. See also at the same collection the file d. 371, p. 9.
55 RGASPI, f. M-1, op. 46, d. 354, p. 36.
56 RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 8, d. 604, p. 83. Among others the Egyptian Muslim brothers’ youth was particularly active in «attributing to the Soviet Union the responsibility for the continuous occupation of the Palestinian land by Israel».
groups. At the same time, Arab graduates of Soviet universities set up alumni organizations in Lebanon (1970), Syria (1970), Jordan (1971), Iraq (1972) and South Yemen (1972), or else seized control of existing associations of friendship with the Soviet Union. Through meetings, conferences and cultural events, as well as through their auxiliary role in the educational cooperation, they became a bridge between the Soviet Union and their own countries. They constituted a tiny but active faction of the millions of «friends» the USSR had in the Arab world during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{57}

5. Conclusion

In 1989, some months before the ultimate economic and political collapse of the socialist bloc, leading political economist André Gunder Frank, wrote that «much Third Worldist socialist rhetoric is just that, and no more» and that «the East has supported superstructural change in the South with words and sometimes arms, but without being able to offer the really necessary infrastructural support of an economic alternative».\textsuperscript{58} These bitter conclusions of a radical thinker, whose disillusionment with the East-South relations and with the Soviet model of development surely did not arise from groundless assumptions. Seen in the context of the global Cold War, the history of Soviet efforts to transfer the socialist model of development to the Arab world and to support the transformation of postcolonial Arab countries into socialist and developed ones was evidently a failure. Soviet claims that the non-capitalist path of development would lead Arab countries to independence and prosperity turned out to be overly optimistic. The rapid deterioration of social and economic conditions in the Soviet Union during the 1980s, and the final collapse and abandonment of the socialist model in its own motherland put an abrupt end to every debate about transferability, influence and Soviet lessons for Arab modernization.

Yet, despite failure and disillusionment, the history of East-South cooperation can hardly be summarized as «only words and sometimes arms». The Soviet-Arab partnership has a wider significance in contemporary international history, due to both its cultural and its political and economic dimensions. In terms of cultural history, it marked a period of convergence and exchange between states and peoples with different historical backgrounds and cultural horizons. Cultural differences, which surely existed, were usually far from insurmountable. Neither Soviet orientalism nor Arab perceptions of the communist superpower prevented people from sharing their beliefs. Rational ideas about modernization found common ground, secular beliefs prevailed, while hopes for progressive social change tran-

\textsuperscript{57} RGASPI, f. M-3, op. 8, d. 604, p. 83–92. For the alumni organizations see GARF, f. 9606, d. 8665, p. 33–42.

scended cultures. At the same time, in terms of political and economic history, Soviet aid for the nationalization of Arab natural resources on the demand of Arab governments and peoples was a tangible contribution to the construction of their national economies, not a simple «superstructural change». The education given to thousands of Arab students in the Soviet Union and the training of workers and students in Algeria, Syria, Egypt and elsewhere had a great impact on Arab societies and economies during the difficult years of struggle for consolidating national liberation and constructing a sovereign state.

I argued above that Arab students in the Soviet Union received a high-quality education and that for this reason Arab governments were more and more willing to accept Soviet educational assistance and became interested in Soviet-Arab cooperation. That tendency was reflected not only in the exchange of students but also in the reception of Soviet professors in Arab countries. In 1975, their number reached 61 in Tunisia, 66 in Egypt and 829 in Algeria, where the Soviet Union had also founded and equipped the National Institute of Light Industry, as well as the Institute of Mining and Smelting at the University of Annaba. In 1980, together with the Algerian Oil and Gas Institute of Boumerdès, those three institutes were training a total of 8500 Algerian students, while the Algerian minister of higher education and scientific research, A. Brerkhi, was making plans for further cooperation, stating that «Algeria was ready to consign its future to the USSR». Yet, this did not come to pass.

The Soviet-Algerian cooperation in the field of education not only trained Algerian students but also provoked the West to a response. Following the Soviet «educational intrusion», many Western countries established or reinforced their educational ties with Algeria. Boumerdès welcomed the creation of the French-sponsored National Institute of Mechanics, of the American-sponsored National Institute of Electricity (a project of the Education Developing Council), of the West German-sponsored Algerian Oil Institute (a project of the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit) and of the Canadian-sponsored National Institute of Productivity and Industrial Development. The sun-clad Boumerdès became the battlefield of a bloodless strife between Cold Warriors over the implementation of their modernization projects and the attainment of the Algerian alliance. The Algerians had every reason to be satisfied not only with the battle’s outcome but also with the opportunities the East-West confrontation and the global Cold War had opened for them to diversify their foreign partnerships and pursue their own development projects.

A retrospective reading of the history of Soviet-Arab relations and East-South cooperation, which takes the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the abandonment of

59 GARF, f. R-9606, op. 1, d. 6829, p. 2.
60 GARF, f. R-9606, op. 1, d. 9120, p. 30.
the socialist model as a point of departure, is more likely to give vent to disillusionment and acknowledge total failure. Instances of failure undoubtedly occurred, and long before 1989 the Soviets and the Arabs themselves admitted to them – overtly or discretely – and revised their positions. Yet such a retrospective interpretation conceals some important «successful» aspects of the East-South cooperation and tends to give all credit to post-Cold War triumphalism.

In any case, the verdict of «success» or «failure», if reached by historians, must be historicized. What meant success from the socialist point of view – nationalizations and the creation of a state-led economy, for instance – would be a failure from the liberal one. The socialist model of modernization furthered the quest for sovereignty and advocated state control over production and foreign exchanges, while the liberal one promoted free enterprise, individual agency and the integration of the national economy into the world market.

Yet the use of the term «successful» with regard to some aspects of the Soviet-Arab cooperation is not a *post mortem* abuse. During the period analyzed here, Soviet-Arab cooperation in the field of education did not look like a failure. Neither its role in the national development of Arab countries, nor its agency in the consolidation of their independence vis-à-vis the West. Neither to the Soviets nor to the Arabs. The Soviet-Arab partnership branded the developments that unfolded during a crucial historical period in the Arab world and had a great impact on Arab youth. The contribution of the Soviet Union to the development of Arab countries was significant and needs to be thoroughly revisited and reconsidered.
Soviet Lessons for Arab Modernization:
Soviet Educational Aid to Arab Countries after 1956

This paper examines the Soviet-Arab cooperation in the domain of higher education and particularly the education of Arab students in the USSR. It argues that educational cooperation took shape on the ground of shared beliefs about the role of the state in the process of economic development and modernization. Soviet educational aid constituted a major vehicle for the transfer and implementation of Soviet ideas about modernization. It played a significant role in the development of Arab countries and marked the Soviet-Arab partnership.

Sowjetische Lehrstunden für die Modernisierung der arabischen Welt:
Die Ausbildungshilfe der UdSSR in den arabischen Ländern nach 1956


Leçons soviétiques pour la modernisation du monde arabe:
L’aide éducative de l’URSS à destination des pays arabes après 1956

Cet article examine la coopération arabo-soviétique dans le domaine de l’enseignement supérieur et plus particulièrement la formation des étudiants arabes en URSS. Il part de l’hypothèse que la coopération éducative prit forme sur la base des idées partagées quant au rôle de l’Etat dans le processus de développement économique et de modernisation. L’aide éducative de l’URSS constituait un tremplin pour le transfert et l’application des idées soviétiques sur la modernisation. Elle joua un rôle significatif pour le développement des pays arabes et marqua le partenariat arabo-soviétique.

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