This article explores changes and continuities in the culture of memory of the Second World War in the western Ukrainian city and regional centre of Lviv between the final years of Soviet rule in Ukraine and 2009. While the city’s post-Soviet culture of memory has often been read as an ideologically inverted copy of its Soviet predecessor, replacing Communist distortions and omissions with nationalist ones, this article argues that this is an ironically appealing as well as often plausible but nevertheless misleading interpretation. In reality, similarities should not eclipse the different ways in which the public aspects of memory are produced since it is these differences in how memory narratives are made that can change their stability and affect their potential outcomes.

For Delphine Bechtel, for instance, in post-Soviet Lviv «Soviet propaganda has merely been replaced by another, opposite, Ukraino-centric [propaganda].»¹ Likewise, for Bechtel, Lviv’s many renamings of public space stand for a deeper continuity. With these «[i]nscriptions onto the toponymy of the city, the municipality [Kommune] has [historically] always subordinated itself to [a] far-away centre. Nothing has changed in this respect after 1990, the municipal administration pays homage to the national Ukrainian pantheon.»²

Yet, as this article will show, substantially more of Lviv’s culture of memory is now in fact Lviv’s own and not the mere reflection of its larger contexts, and it is also produced with substantially more local input from the public sphere than under Soviet rule. This argument for differentiation implies neither pessimism nor optimism. Put simply and as this article will show, there is no comfortably inescapable or confidently predictable path leading from a more local and participatory memory production to a more pluralist and critical outcome. Indeed, the

² Bechtel, «Von Lemberg», 218 (my translation and emphasis).
more open production of memory could turn into an especially firm base for
closed, impoverished, and ultimately mendacious narratives.

This article first surveys post-Soviet changes in Lviv’s public culture of mem-
ory, then it sketches the effects of the Second World War on Lviv and the Soviet
official memory of the war, suppressing the public articulation of alternatives
until the late 1980s. Third, it discusses several examples of what has replaced
Soviet discourse, focusing in turn on a sample of cases: first on the most important
academic history of Lviv, the new Istoriia Lvova published in 2006–2007, and
on an ambitious multi-volume project to create a comprehensive Entsiklopediia
Lvova, released essentially at the same time, secondly on the monument to the
nationalist leader Stepan Bandera, officially opened in 2007, and thirdly on a
recent project to museify the memory of the Second World War at one of Lviv’s
major former prisons.

The end of Soviet rule in Lviv has already been described, especially the mass
demonstrations in the city from 1988 on, and, in the Ukrainian context, the city’s
particularly strong opposition movement, combining secular, religious, mostly
Greek-Catholic, dissident and nationalist actors as well as ideas of different
generations, while taking over local power structures from 1990 and exerting a sig-
nificant, if ultimately checked, influence on the politics and national-level dis-
courses of independent Ukraine in the early nineties. These circumstances
facilitated substantial — and, in the general Ukrainian context, exceptional —
changes in Lviv’s city-scape, street names, monuments, museums and public
spaces – changes predominantly promoting a national as well as nationalist idioms.
Clearly, post-Soviet Lviv underwent a genuine, deep, and obvious recoding of its
public space. In some respects, this operation was similar to the Soviet approach
to Lviv, especially between 1939 and 1941 and in the immediate post-war period. In
these years, conquest was imprinted rapidly on the city-scape through a wave of
street renaming and monument removal.

In the post-Soviet period too, between 1990 and 1993 alone, several hundred
names of streets and squares were changed. A large number of memorial plaques
were removed. Mostly, the representatives of Soviet power and culture had to

3 D. Zlepko, «Aufbruch unter Blau-Gelb. Der Wan-
ney, Rewolucyjny Karnawal. Europa ódodka 1989, Wroc-
ław 2005, 150–158, 272–276, 320–326; Isto-
riia Lvova, vol. 3: Lystopad 1918 – noch. XXlst., Lviv
2007, 400–413.
4 For an overview of this process and some com-
parative data showing how exceptional it has been
in Ukraine, see Y. Hrytsak/V. Susak, «Construct-
ing a National City: The Case of L’viv», in: J. J.
Czaplicka/B. A. Ruble/L. Crabtree (eds.), Com-
posing Urban History and the Constitution of Civic
Identities, Baltimore 2003, 140–164, 151–157. For
an up-to-date survey and further details on renam-
ings, removals and new structures, see O. Shy-
shka, «Pamiatnyky i memorialni znaky Lvova (do
1991 roku)», in: Halytska Brama 6–7 (June-July
2010), 4–18.
5 Shyshka, »Pamiatnyky«, 15.
6 Istoriia Lvova, vol. 3, 415, and Hrytsak/Susak,
»Constructing,« 152.
vacate Lviv’s space, whether they stood for global, all-Union, Ukrainian, or local Communist or Soviet traditions. Local writer Yaroslav Halan, assassinated in 1949 by Ukrainian nationalists and then used for the Soviet equivalent of a local martyr cult, was removed from public space as were Friedrich Engels and Feliks Dzerzhinskii. Dozens of busts and memorial plaques dedicated to Lenin disappeared.\textsuperscript{7}

Important monuments that were removed included the central Lenin statue (1990); a Soviet tank symbolising the Soviet «liberation» of Lviv in 1944; statues of Nikolai Kuznetsov, a Soviet agent who killed a German occupation official in 1944; and of Yaroslav Halan. While the tank was the first war memorial to be set up in re-conquered Lviv, two much bigger memorial complexes, the 1950s Kholm Slavy (Hill of Glory) and a 1970s victory memorial, have been preserved.\textsuperscript{8} The memory of Ivan Franko, a pre-Soviet local writer and Ukrainian national activist, co-opted into the Soviet canon and cast in one large monument and a plethora of smaller markers, has seen no diminution in post-Soviet Lviv.\textsuperscript{9} Monuments were erected to the Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko (1992–1996), the Ukrainian pre-1939 Prosvitna national education society (1993), the historian and, at one point, anti-Bolshevik politician and Ukrainian leader Mykhailo Hrushevskyi (1994), the dissident and Rukh opposition leader Volodymyr Chornovil (2002), the medieval king and founder of Lviv Danylo Halyskyi (2001), and the nationalist leader during the Second World War Stepan Bandera (2007). A monument has been announced for Roman Shukhevych, another nationalist leader and the most important military commander of nationalism’s armed forces. A monument to the Habsburg emperor Francis Joseph is also planned.\textsuperscript{10}

Important memorials were built for the victims of the Lviv ghetto (1992), for the victims of political repression and Communist crimes (1997), for a group of Polish academics killed in a German massacre in 1941, for the inmates of a major Soviet transit prison camp (2002), and for Ukrainians killed in the «liberation struggles of the Ukrainian people» (1998–2001). Clearly, one purpose of this last memorial is to «counterbalance» a neighbouring inter-war memorial dedicated (mostly) to Poles fighting for a Polish Lwów between 1918 and 1920, which has been restored. Since 2005 a memorial to Ukrainian deportation victims has been proposed, receiving public support from former President Viktor Yushchenko in 2007 during official commemorations of the 1947 Akcja Wisła deportations of Ukrainians in Poland.\textsuperscript{11} The Lviv City Council, together with partners in Poland,

\textsuperscript{7} Shyshka, «Pamiatnyky», 15 and 18.
\textsuperscript{8} Shyshka, «Pamiatnyky», 17.
\textsuperscript{9} Shyshka, «Pamiatnyky», 18.
has called for projects for a more ambitious memorial dedicated to the Polish academics massacred in 1941.12 In August 2010, the City Council officially decided to hold an international competition for the design of three sites to memorialise and inform about the history of Jews in Lviv, including its terrible end in the Shoah.13

These changes in Lviv’s city-scape have been interpreted mostly from a perspective that emphasises and criticises the power of contemporary Ukrainian nationalist discourse, with its glorification of Ukraine’s, especially Western Ukraine’s and Lviv’s, Second-World-War ethnic nationalists and its suppression of the experiences of Lviv’s two other major war-time ethnic groups of Poles and Jews, in particular where remembering them would disturb the glorification of Ukrainian nationalism or implicate ethnic Ukrainians in morally reprehensible behaviour, such as collaboration with the German occupiers, participation in the Shoah or the ethnic cleansing of Poles.14 The essence of this defensive striving for retrospective innocence has been summarised concisely by a former aide of Roman Shukhevych: «Our Ukrainian nationalism is pure (chystyi) and self-sacrificing (zhertovnyi).»15

Attempts to forge a heroic and pristine memory of Ukrainian nationalism in the Second World War have indeed been the predominant factor shaping Lviv’s post-Soviet culture of memory. Yet, at the same time, the latter is a complex social phenomenon. While its surface takes the shape of monuments and new street names, it cannot be reduced to them. Its fuller conceptualisation requires more attention to a less obvious but equally important change in Lviv’s relationship to its past. In essence, the post-Soviet period is the first time in Lviv’s post-war history when the city’s population has been able to form a public sphere (or spheres) and openly and officially relate to its memory as a subject whereas, during the Soviet period, it was an important symbolical object of larger Soviet and Soviet Ukrainian narratives.

1. Lviv and the Second World War: Local Experiences and Soviet Narratives

For Lviv, the Second World War produced radical change. It led to a nearly complete discontinuity in the city’s population. Before the war it was inhabited mainly by a slight Polish-cum-Roman-Catholic majority, a large Jewish minority and a smaller Ukrainian-cum-Greek-Catholic minority. Over the post-war period Lviv became an ethnically preponderantly Ukrainian city, after the war had brought German occupation and the Shoah as well as the de facto expulsion of most of its Polish population by the Soviet authorities. It also took Lviv from one type of state and political regime to another. Before the war, Lwów, as it was then generally known, was part of a Polish nation-state, increasingly marked by nationalism and authoritarianism. From 1939, it was renamed Lviv and included in the Soviet Ukrainian republic, part of the – then Stalinist and totalitar – Soviet Union, where the city remained after the end of the German occupation in 1944.

The war paved the way for Lviv’s Sovietisation as well as Ukrainisation. Apart from repression, the imposition of Communist party rule and the violent social and cultural policies of Stalinism, Sovietisation also included the rapid industrialisation of Lviv. While its leading cadres were mostly the so-called «Easterners», that is new arrivals from the eastern territories of Soviet Ukraine and the Soviet Union in general, the Soviet party state also consciously used Lviv’s industrialisation as a tool of «Leninist nationality policy», that is to create a new, mostly Ukrainian working class for the city, drawn to a large extent from the rural population of Western Ukraine.

Apart from a short German siege in September 1939, for Lviv the local beginning of the Second World War was virtually identical with the first Soviet conquest of the city in 1939. Starting cataclysmic change, during the Soviet period this conquest was encased in a spurious and mandatory narrative of a «Golden September». Referring to September 1939, it was based on three main conventions. The Soviet advance had been a campaign of national as well as social «liberation», freeing «Ukrainian brothers» – Bielorussians/Belarussians further north – from oppression and exploitation by the largely Polish ruling classes of a state and social order denounced as failed and combining the «feudal» with the «bourgeois». Moreover, the «Golden September» also brought the «unification» of Ukraine through Western Ukraine’s joining Soviet Ukraine. Finally, the «Golden September» stood for modernisation, facilitating the liquidation of «backwardness» through Soviet progress. The «Golden September» did not reflect the wide-spread experiences of mass repressions through arrests, deportations and killings.

With the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, the general Soviet narrative of the «Great Fatherland War» began to predominate. Regarding Lviv, there was a military story of initial heroic defence of the border close to the city and the fresh «liberation» of the city in July 1944. Concerning the three years of German occupation, the victimisation of Lviv’s civilian population and a strongly exagger-
ated Communist underground occupied the centre of the narrative, while both Ukrainian nationalists and the suppressed Greek-Catholic Church were subjected to charges of «treason» and collaboration with the Germans.

Soviet discourse was stable in its blind spots. Its defining omissions covered Lviv’s major pre-war non-Ukrainian populations. Regarding the Jews, their annihilation in the Shoah was not denied but subordinated to a general Soviet convention, which denied the specificity of the German assault on the Jews by depicting it as part of the general German abuse and murder of the civilian population. Moreover, while the Ukrainian nationalists, especially the Nachtigall auxiliary battalion of the German army, were accused of participating in the murder of Jews as well as Poles, the possible perpetrator roles of parts of the local civilian population were hardly considered.

Concerning the Poles, their presence in Lviv during the German occupation, when they were still a clear majority of the city’s population, was rarely mentioned. Neither the Polish underground government and military structures, larger and more important than those of the Ukrainian nationalists or the Communists, nor the Polish role in reconquering the city from the Germans were given any space. The only exception were occasional short references to the Polish unwillingness to give up Lviv. While the victimisation of Lviv’s Poles at the hands of the Germans cannot be equated with what was done to the city’s Jews, sometimes Soviet post-war discourse treated them similarly. An infamous massacre of mostly Polish academics in 1941 was included in Soviet narratives, but the Polish identity of the victims was left out. A memorial to them was planned and even partly built, yet ultimately abandoned.

Also absent from Soviet discourse was the history of the Ukrainian–Polish war within the war and the different ways in which it affected Lviv: The stream of Polish refugees from Volhynia from 1943, when Ukrainian nationalists massacred Poles there; more refugees from closer by, when nationalist ethnic cleansing expanded west and south in 1944; increasing tension and some killings in Lviv itself, and retaliation killings in and outside Lviv by Polish underground units from the city.

Taken together, the «Golden September» and the «Great Fatherland War» narratives covered the period from 1939 to 1945. Yet in several respects, Lviv’s experience of war lasted beyond May 1945, with the struggle between the Ukrainian nationalists and the reconquering Soviet forces escalating in its surroundings into a full-fledged counter-insurgency war, Lviv’s remaining Poles being expelled in 1945 and 1946, and the last major single deportation – this time mostly of Ukrainians – hitting the city in 1947. Again, apart from very general references to the Soviet success in defeating the Ukrainian nationalists and to the «evacuation» or simply «leaving» of the Poles, all these topics – crucial for Lviv’s real history – remained outside official Soviet and thus public discourse. If post-war Lviv was a
city unwilling to address key aspects of its recent past, it was also a city forbidden
to do so in the public sphere. With all its noisy propaganda about Lviv’s Socialist
present and Communist future, Soviet rule left the city’s society quite literally
speechless about much of its past within living memory.

2. Post-Soviet Changes and Continuities: Lviv and its Context
Challenged publicly and fundamentally for the first time in the late 1980s, the
«Golden September» and the «Great Fatherland War» finally lost their position as
officially mandatory paradigms with the collapse of Soviet rule in 1991, leaving
behind an unknown territory to be explored, re-described and reclaimed. While
Soviet discourse was partly defined by its omissions and partly by its distortions,
Soviet myths have not simply been replaced by post-Soviet truth. The processes of
recovering the past were not shaped merely by desire to retrieve the unknown or
suppressed and to rectify distortions, but by political projects and interests as well
as individual and collective needs for identity and psychological orientation.

While in general the new post-Soviet Ukrainian culture of memory is decisively
more pluralistic and open to inquiry and debate than under Soviet rule, there also
are continuities. With respect to Lviv, the most obvious of the latter is that the
city is still part of a larger culture of memory, including the recent, particularly
active Ukrainian state intervention under former President Yushchenko. While
the centre of the relevant politics of history and memory has shifted from Moscow
to Kyiv, Lviv’s culture of memory, as before, cannot be understood without its wider
context.

The Ukrainian context, speaking with a plausible degree of simplification, is
still structured fundamentally by the fact that post-Soviet/Soviet narratives cen-
tring on the «Great Fatherland War» largely dominate in the East of Ukraine, while
the culture of memory of the West is now shaped by a positive and uncritical read-
ing of the record of Ukrainian nationalism during the Second World War. While
the first presidents of independent Ukraine did not stress but rather fudged this
polarity, from 2005 Yushchenko started taking a strong personal interest in the
politics of history, promoting a nationally oriented and, in its effects, often nation-
alist perspective, which emphasised Soviet crimes against Ukrainians, in particu-
lar the Holodomor of 1932–33 as well as positive or heroic aspects of Ukrainian
nationalism while omitting or downplaying its failures and crimes.\footnote{For Ukraine’s (roughly speaking) East–West split in the memory of the Second World War, see W. Jilge, «Nationalukrainischer Befreiungskampf. Die Um-wertung des Zweiten Weltkrieges in der Ukraine», in: Osteuropa 6 (2008), 167; Shapoval, «Shukhvych»; S. Rohdewald, «Post-Soviet Remem-
brane of the Holocaust and National Memories of the Second World War in Russia, Ukraine and Lith-
ungskampf», 173–174.}
This glorification of Ukrainian nationalism, however, was not the sharp break with Soviet practices which its adherents like to see in it. In fact, it has been characterised by practices which share key features with Soviet ones, including, as the principal analogy, the strong, intentional and explicit exploitation of selective historical narratives to legitimate present politics. According to Andreas Kappeler, for «post-Soviet Ukrainian historians, who had been educated in the ideologies of Leninism and Soviet patriotism, the immediate adoption of an ethno-national approach after 1991 represented no great break, for ethnic nationalism and essentialism were already inherent in Soviet ideology.»\(^7\) Yet the absence of compulsion in favour of and the presence of at least potential alternatives to the nationalist narrative has constituted a clear difference from the Soviet period.

Andriy Portnov has pointed out that Ukraine’s historical memories do not fit into a rigid model of «two Ukraines», as originally sketched by Mykola Riabchuk. Criticising the normative subtext of the «two Ukraines» approach, Portnov has instead emphasised the country’s regional diversity and effective – if also contingent – pluralism in the area of historical memory.\(^8\) While this is a valid warning, regional diversity on one side and the existence of macro-regions on the other are not mutually exclusive. Generally, as Kappeler has summed up the evidence, «[divided] memory is a reality in today’s Ukraine.»\(^9\)

Lviv’s position as the symbolical leader and representative of Western Ukraine in turn is not a result of inexorable forces of Ukrainian national consciousness – or dukhovnist, roughly translatable as spirituality – at work in it, as nationalist discourse would have it. While Lviv has a real history as a focal point of Ukrainian national projects, its consolidation as the lider – in late-Soviet terminology – of a historically constructed region of Western Ukraine was an unvarying aim of Soviet policies, even if it came with unintended consequences.

One of these unintended consequences, and at the same time another Soviet/post-Soviet continuity, is crucial in the context of the memory of the Second World War. As before, only now openly, Lviv has remained the single most important urban symbol for the nationalist interpretation of Ukraine’s history in World War Two. The Soviet-era epithet of Bandershlat – «Bandera’s city», with the word for city taken from German as well as a ring of «bandy», as in insurgents’ group, to it – is still partly used as a term of abuse and partly adopted and re-appropriated as a proud self-designation.

In sum, Ukraine’s memory of the Second World War has been changing and so has Lviv’s. The relationship between these two processes is close. Lviv’s impor-

\(^7\) A. Kappeler, «From an Ethnonational to a Multi-ethnic to a Transnational Ukrainian History», in: G. Kasianov / P. Ther (eds.), *A Laboratory of Transnational History. Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*, Budapest 2009, 58.


\(^9\) Kappeler, «From an Ethnonational», 56.
tance in the Ukrainian context – and beyond – has increased since its role as a site of memory for the nationalist reading of the Second World War has been articulated and asserted openly. Moreover, during Yushchenko’s presidency, several key national actors in the area of historical memory, prominently including that of the Second World War, came from Lviv, for instance, the head of the security service (SBU) archives Volodymyr Viatrovych, who is also one of the, in Wilfried Jilge’s apt terminology, leading «national-historians», or the former head of Ukraine’s Institute of National Memory Ihor Yukhnovskiy. Put differently, under Yushchenko, Lviv was not only no longer a mere reflection or symbol of its larger Ukrainian context, but it also had a direct effect on the latter.

3. The Academic Dimension: The Post-Soviet *Istoriia Lvova*

Significantly, the most extensive, detailed and institutionally most authoritative Ukrainian post-Soviet scholarly treatment of Lviv’s history during the Second World War has been produced by a group of historians from Lviv working at the Ivan Krypiakevych Institute of the local branch of the Ukrainian Academy of Science and was released by the Tsentr Evropa publishing house in Lviv. About one hundred pages of the third volume of their three-volume *Istoriia Lvova*, published in 2007, are dedicated to the Second World War. 20

At the same time, in 2007 and 2008, the first two large volumes of a new multivolume *Entsyklopediia Lvova* were edited by Litopys publishing house, also located in Lviv. 21 Under the general guidance of the historian Andriy Kosytskyi from Lviv’s Ivan Franko University, the *Entsyklopediia*’s 25–member editorial board and its more than 150 authors are representative of a broad section of Lviv’s cultural-academic elite. Moreover the *Entsyklopediia*’s staff and authors include employees of more than fifteen of the city’s major academic or cultural institutions, including the Ivan Krypiakevych Institute of the Academy of Science, Lviv’s major museums and its major institutions of higher education. The *Entsyklopediia*’s symbolical weight is increased by its unprecedentedly high standard of printing and illustration. Both the *Istoriia* and the *Entsyklopediia* are certain to become reference works on Lviv.

Regarding the period of the first Soviet occupation from 1939 to 1941, the *Istoriia* differentiates carefully among ethnic and social groups, avoiding an exclusive focus on the local Ukrainians and recognising the importance of non-Ukrainian experiences. The Second World War is described as the time of Lviv’s «greatest ... demographic catastrophes» and its beginning as deciding the fate of «then Polish Lviv». The text repeatedly refers to facts which contravene nationalist stereotypes, such as the 150.000–200.000 ethnic Ukrainians fighting in the Polish forces. 22

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22 *Istoria Lvova*, vol. 3, 163 and 165.
Reactions among the city’s population to the war and to the Soviet occupation are also discussed in a differentiated manner, noting that, on the whole, Polish inhabitants showed «patriotic attitudes», supporting the local authorities and volunteering for the army, while Ukrainians, antagonised by prior national discrimination, were often glad to see Poland defeated.\textsuperscript{23} The \textit{Entsyklopediia Lvova}, in its thirteen-page entry on the «Second World War», draws a similar picture and also mentions that the then large, moderate Ukrainian party UNDO called on Ukrainians in Poland to help defend the country against a German attack.\textsuperscript{24}

In the context of prior interpretations, this approach is significant. Nationally different responses to the Soviet invasion have been a highly charged issue since the invasion itself, with Polish contemporaries accusing Jews above all, but also Ukrainians, of collectively welcoming the Soviet occupiers and thereby committing an act of treason, foreshadowing future accusations of collaboration. Ukrainian contemporaries levelled the same stereotypes at Jews. Subsequently, in the Shoah, the accusation of Jews, fused with the already traditional prejudice of «Judeo-Bolshevism», facilitated the participation of non-Germans in the Shoah. Moreover, the rhetoric of «Judeo-Communism» is still employed in some current Ukrainian discourses.\textsuperscript{25}

Against this background, the \textit{Istoriia}’s treatment of the response to the Soviet invasion is important: «The advance of the Red Army provoked an ambiguous reaction among different strata of the city population – from complete rejection by the Polish and part of the Ukrainian political class [politykumu] to enthusiastic support – above all from the unprosperous [nezamozhnim] population, mostly Ukrainians and Jews …». This privileges a social interpretation over an ethnic generalisation and points out identical reactions among some Ukrainians and some Jews. The passage also ascribes a «wait-and-see [vychikuvalnu] position» to the majority of Lviv’s inhabitants, describing the desperate reaction among the city’s Poles and explaining pro-Soviet sympathy among Jews in «pragmatic» terms because «where the forces of the USSR advanced, there would not be a German occupation.»\textsuperscript{26}

The \textit{Entsyklopediia}, however, gives a different and stereotyped impression of Jewish reactions, telling its readers that «Lviv’s Jews welcomed the Red Army men with special enthusiasm» and stressing Jews, while not mentioning Ukrainians or Poles, among the «poor population», which «supported the new regime». Moreover, the \textit{Entsyklopediia} does not point out that Jews had any special reason to fear a German occupation and thus to welcome a Soviet one.\textsuperscript{27}

The \textit{Istoriia}’s treatment of the expulsion of Lviv’s Poles between 1944 and 1946 shows more sympathy for its Polish victims than preceding publications in Ukraine.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 164–165.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Entsyklopediia Lvova}, vol. 2, 156.
\textsuperscript{25} Bartov, \textit{Erased}, 196–197.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Istoriia Lvova}, vol. 3, 170.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Entsyklopediia Lvova}, vol. 2, 158.
It still occasionally uses the official euphemism «evacuation», but also the terms vyselennia and deportatsia, explicitly acknowledging compulsion. While the Polish exile government’s aspirations for retaining Lviv are dismissed as unrealistic «dreams», the reluctance of local Poles to leave is explained by their distress over abandoning their «home city» and «a territory where they had long lived and which they considered home.» Yet the Istoriia says little about local Ukrainian reactions to the expulsion of the Poles, mentioning only that some were «categorical» while the Istoriia’s account of the expulsion closes with a paradoxical assertion of «continuity», stating that the remaining Ukrainian pre-war inhabitants of the city and the immigration from other western Ukrainian towns meant that «Lviv, despite the tragic events of the war years and the post-war period, remained Lviv»\(^{28}\), thus denying the catastrophic rupture of the war in an attempt to claim an implicitly Ukrainian tradition. On the whole, however, the Istoriia’s treatment of the first Soviet occupation and the expulsion of Lviv’s Polish population after the return of Soviet rule to Lviv is marked by differentiation and empathy for non-Ukrainians, while nationalist stereotypes are largely absent or implicitly contradicted.

Against this background, the chapter on the German occupation of Lviv deserves close attention, since it indicates where this openness reaches its limits and which issues of Lviv’s Second World War remain difficult, even for the authors of an unprecedentedly comprehensive and – by comparison – balanced work. As with the Soviet invasion of 1939, the city population’s response to the German invasion of 1941 is presented with some empathy for Poles and Jews.\(^ {29}\)

Yet the events of the last days of June and the first days of July 1941, when the Soviet regime retreated from Lviv and German troops and Ukrainian nationalist auxiliaries arrived to occupy the city, highlight the Istoriia’s failure to address several key issues. The Soviet prison massacres of thousands of inmates preceding the Soviet retreat are described, and the pogrom following several days later on the arrival of German and Ukrainian nationalist forces is not omitted.\(^ {30}\) The fact that the prison massacres and the pogrom were propagandistically linked by the charge

\(^{28}\) Istoriia Lvova, vol. 3, 255ff.

\(^{29}\) Istoriia Lvova, vol. 3, 201.

\(^{30}\) According to Grzegor Motyka, the NKVD murdered at least 5387 prisoners in the territory of the former eastern Galicia. The majority of the victims were ethnic Ukrainian. G. Motyka, Ukrainska partyzantka, 1942–1960, Warsaw 2006, 87. This did not mean that there were no Poles or Jews among them, however. Ibid., 87; and D. Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens, München 1996, 56. The number of prisoners massacred in Lviv was probably close to 2500. R. Brandon/W. Lower, The Shoah in Ukraine. History, Testimony, Memorialization, Bloomington 2008, 20, endnote 20. For more on the NKVD massacres in western Ukraine’s prisons and also further east in the summer of 1941, see G. Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie 1939–1944. Życie codzienne, Warsaw 2000, 186–191; in more detail and with slightly higher estimates of the number of victims than Motyka: Pohl, Judenverfolgung, 55–56. K. C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair. Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule, Cambridge/Mass. 2004, 14ff.; Motyka, Partyzantka, 97. Hryciuk, Przemiany, 201, and Pohl, Judenverfolgung, 58–67, especially for direct German involvement behind the scenes as well as on the ground.
of «Judeo-Bolshevism», with Jews held responsible for Soviet crimes, is also explained. Moreover, the participation of local non-Jews as pogrom perpetrators is acknowledged.

Yet the Istoriia’s depiction of the pogrom evades the most difficult facts as well as questions. Thus, the Ukrainian nationalist auxiliaries of the Nachtigall Battalion under Roman Shukhevych – one of the most important and now most glorified leaders of the so-called Bandera-wing of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B) and later of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army largely controlled by the OUN-B – appear only in the role of being the first to discover the corpses left after the Soviet massacres. The question of any participation on their part is not asked. It was one of the key conventions of Soviet propaganda to accuse Shukhevych’s men of taking part in the pogrom as well as in that massacre of Polish academics for which a new memorial is currently being developed. In both cases, the Nachtigall, however, in reality, did not participate at all (in the massacre of the academics) or at least not as an organised military unit (in the pogrom). Yet the question remains, if and how many of the Nachtigall soldiers took part individually in the pogrom.

Nachtigall soldiers were given leave and permission to look for the corpses of relatives among those killed in the prisons by their Soviet guards. Thus, men representing the most committed part of a violently nationalist force with a clear anti-Semitic edge to it were present at key sites of the pogrom, where Jews were systematically abused, tortured and killed. There is comparatively strong evidence for the participation of at least some Nachtigall members, perhaps on leave, in the killings at one or two of the prisons, while investigations into this issue have been insufficient. It seems unlikely that no Nachtigall members at all took part in the pogrom, notwithstanding unsubstantiated yet unintentionally telling post-war statements by at least one Nachtigall veteran alleging that Roman Shukhevych explicitly prohibited his soldiers to take «revenge on our enemies the Poles and Jews, because it is not our business to take care of this,» as now reproduced – uncritically – in Lviv.

Currently, apologists of the Ukrainian nationalists are turning the falsifications of Soviet propaganda into a rhetorical strategy. Finding it easy to refute generalising Soviet-type accusations of Nachtigall or of Shukhevych personally and having been in a position to document the process of falsification on the Soviet side, historian-activists such as Volodymyr Viatrovych stress Soviet lies to imply closure of the issue, while simply failing to ask more detailed questions or acknowledge

33 Pohl, Judenverfolgung, 80–84, 100ff.

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Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
international research, which shows that the refutation of specific Soviet claims does not mean that no crimes were committed at all.\footnote{Interview with Volodymyr Viatrovych on Zaxid. Net, «Vyznannia Holodomoru obiednane ukrain-tsov», http://www.zaxid.net/article/45246 (accessed 20 July 2009), and interview with Volodymyr Viatrovych in Lviv’s local paper Vysokiy Zamok 190 (11 October 2008).}

Disregarding the question of the involvement of individual Nachtigall soldiers in the pogrom, the role of the OUN-B as a whole and its cadres on the ground in Lviv is also not explored in the \textit{Istoriia}. The source of «Judeo-Bolshevism» propaganda is identified exclusively with the German occupiers while the OUN-B’s strong anti-Semitism and its use of the «Judeo-Bolshevik» stereotype, or its general belief in terrorism and «revolutionary» violence, are not mentioned.\footnote{For more on these features of the OUN-B, see T. Kurylo / I. Khymka [J.-P. Hymka], «Iak OUN stavylasia do ievreiv? Rozdumy nad knyzhkoiu Volodymyr Viatrovycha», in: \textit{Ukraina Moderna} 13 (2008), 264 and passim; A. Kentii, \textit{Zbroinyi chyn ukraínskykh natsionalistiv 1920–1956. Istoryko-arkhi-ivni narysy}, vol. 1, Kyiv 2005, 222; Pohl, \textit{Judenverfolgung}, 57; and G. Motyka, \textit{Ukrai´nska partyzantka, 1942–1960}, Warsaw 2006, 96.}

Likewise, the involvement of a Ukrainian \textit{milits} in the pogrom is also omitted while in reality its members took part and may have played an important role in organising and spearheading abuse.\footnote{Jeffrey Burds has identified several individual \textit{milits} members on pictures showing their participation in the pogrom.\footnote{The \textit{Istoriia}, however, even credits the \textit{milits} with stopping the pogrom.\footnote{Recognising that «a certain part» of local non-Jews did take part in the pogrom, the \textit{Istoriia} also continues an old tradition of dismissing the local pogrom perpetrators as socially marginal and criminal.\footnote{For more on the Ukrainian \textit{milits}' role in pogroms in settlements other than Lviv, see Pohl, \textit{Judenverfolgung}, 60. The OUN had also made systematic attempts to infiltrate the Soviet police. Pohl, \textit{Judenverfolgung}, 62, and Serhiichuk, \textit{Zdvih}, vol. 3, 22–23.}}}}\footnote{For Jeffrey Burds, see ibid., 203.}

Likewise, in its entry on the «Second World War», the \textit{Entsyklopediia}, addressing the Soviet prison massacres, describes the victims of the Soviets as «Ukrainians, Poles, [and] Jews.» Regarding the subsequent pogrom, the \textit{Entsyklopediia} evades the term itself, reduces the source of «Judeo-Bolshevism» propaganda to the Germans alone, and leaves the immediate perpetrators entirely unspecified: «The German commanders adroitly exploited the NKVD crimes for anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic propaganda. During the reburial of the victims of the Communist regime, \textit{assaults} took place on Jews, who were accused of supporting the Communist regime.»\footnote{I. Himka [J.-P. Himka], «Dostovirnist svidchennia: Relaiatsiia Ruzi Vagner pro Lvivskii pohrom vlitku 1941 r.», in: \textit{Holokost i Suchanist} 2 (2008) 4, 43–65, 63–64.}

\footnote{Given the \textit{Entsyklopediia}'s preceding statements on this alleged support, the uncritical reader could be left with the impression that there was some justification for such accusations.}

\footnote{Likewise, in its entry on the «Holocaust», the \textit{Entsyklopediia} also ascribes «assaults» on Jews to provocation by German propaganda alone. But, inconsis-
tently, it also states that they were «spontaneous», again mentioning allegations of Jewish support for the Soviet occupation in a way that makes this support appear real and pointing to the «wide-spread conviction about a strong pro-Communist attitude among Lviv Jewry, which between 1939 and 1941 demonstrated its support of the [Communist] regime and actively co-operated with the Soviet authorities.» Linking this assertion directly to «spontaneous assaults on Jews» beginning with the identification of the NKVD victims, in effect, the Entsyklopediia here comes close to the pogrom perpetrators’ narrative that Jews deserved retaliation for their alleged crimes. Yet the text also implies that killings, as opposed to beatings and denunciations, were a purely German matter.42

In the Istoriia, the OUN-B’s attempt to declare a Ukrainian state and government in Lviv, which also took place at the very beginning of the German occupation, is described in exclusively positive terms, and the question of what relationship the OUN-B foresaw for this state with Nazi Germany is not raised. In reality, the OUN-B was ready for close collaboration and subordination within an international order dominated by Germany. The German authorities, however, quickly suppressed this initiative.43 Yet the OUN-B had signalled clearly that it wanted German recognition for a formally independent Ukraine under authoritarian OUN-B leadership and in alliance with Nazi Germany.44 Notwithstanding public announcements, growing tensions and later clashes, initially the OUN-B stayed in contact with the Germans and continued looking for opportunities to co-operate, occasionally stressing common hostility to Bolsheviks as well as Jews.45

The Istoriia does not address these obviously relevant issues but uncritically quotes OUN-B leader Stepan Bandera’s later rationalisation, pretending that the confrontation with the German occupier was the beginning of an anti-totalitarian struggle of Ukrainian nationalism, uncompromisingly resisting Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union at the same time.46 Similarly, the raising of an SS-Division of Galician-Ukrainian volunteers in 1943 and (de facto) the co-operation of the «Ukrainian Central Committee» in Cracow and its branch in Lviv with the German authorities are depicted uncritically as mere measures to mitigate the severity of German occupation.47

A full analysis of both the Istoriia’s and the Entsyklopediia’s treatment of the Second World War period would be beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, on the basis of the material already discussed, it is clear that there are important similarities as well as differences between these two major recent publications – mostly by authors from Lviv – on this key period in the city’s history. Both publications accord more space and much more detail to it than preceding works, and both

42 Entsyklopediia Lvova, vol. 1, 538.
47 Ibid., 212–213.
make room for the experiences of non-Ukrainians. At the same time, neither addresses fully, by taking into account all information already available, those experiences which implicate ethnic Ukrainians in general or Ukrainian nationalists in particular in culpable decisions and actions, especially with regard to the Shoah. Here the Entsyklopediia even appears to reproduce parts of the «Judeo-Bolshevism» discourse, constructing a link between alleged Jewish co-operation with Soviet rule and the pogrom following the prison massacres.

4. The Bandera Monument

The two major, and local, recent publications on Lviv produce a contradictory and inconsistent picture of its Second World War past. Instability is not a feature, however, of Lviv’s monument to Stepan Bandera, prominently located not in the city centre but still close to it on Kropyvnytskyi Square and overlooking two of the city’s main thoroughfares – one of them Bandera Street – connecting the centre with the central train station as well as the airport. It was officially opened in October 2007, with the head of Lviv’s oblast administration and of its oblast council both giving speeches. Composed of a bronze statue on a pedestal nearly seven meters high and a triumphal arch behind it of a height of nearly thirty metres, it is not yet finished but was opened when the statue of Bandera was ready. The style of the whole complex is reminiscent of the monumental architecture of twentieth-century authoritarian regimes, a fact which its makers acknowledge but justify as recalling the «heroism» of Bandera’s time, as implicitly opposed to the less heroic present.48

The monument inscribes itself unmistakably in an uncompromisingly nationalist interpretation of Bandera and the OUN-B, whose leader he was during the Second World War and after. Its message leaves no room for the OUN-B’s anti-Semitism or its ethnic cleansing of Poles in 1943 and 1944, but presents Bandera as a heroic and pure fighter for centuries-old strivings for national liberation and independence. The monument also establishes an unconditional link between Bandera and a millennium of Ukrainian history. The four columns of the triumphal arch behind Bandera’s statue are meant to represent four periods of Ukrainian independence: Ancient Rus’, the times of the Cossacks, the period of state building after the First World War, and the present, that is the struggles and ultimate success of the twentieth century. The columns will display state symbols as well as the names or depictions of leaders, creating a long descent of heroic fore-runners for Bandera.49 According to the makers of the monument, its large size is

not only due to a need for monumentalism, but also for counterbalancing a large, formerly Roman-Catholic, thus «Polish», church in the monument’s vicinity.\textsuperscript{50}

The initiative for the monument goes back to the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{51} Some of the funds for it have come from a coalition of associations, including a «Committee for the Construction of a Monument to Stepan Bandera», the «Association of Political Prisoners», and the «Prosvita» organisation.\textsuperscript{52} A leading activist has been the local, now national politician Andriy Parubiy, who has strong nationalist views, while former dissident Ihor Kalynets has played a crucial symbolical role and headed the main fundraising organisation.\textsuperscript{53}

With the monument mostly realised, its initiators and activists can also see in it a sign of their personal triumph in marking Lviv’s public space with a resolutely nationalist site. Yet leading activist Andriy Parubiy’s claim that the «whole intelligentsia» of Lviv has supported this project is dubious.\textsuperscript{54} While public support has been dominant, there were also moments of conflict. Moreover, the monument makers’ claim that its funding came from grassroots sources is dubious. Yet, in fact, the \textit{oblast} administration covered much of the cost.

In spite of an earlier resolution from 2002, when it came to actually building the monument, the city administration refused to spend money, while it did fund the restoration of the pavement on the square around it. Lviv’s mayor is on record as pointing out that «even the Communists did not permit themselves to erect such high monuments.»\textsuperscript{55} He later explained his words as taken out of context.

Among those urgently wanting a Stepan Bandera monument, there were long arguments about its shape and location. The current one was not central enough for a group of activists and organisations, also claiming to speak for the «whole public of Lviv». In their letter to the \textit{oblast} council, these activists demanded that the monument be built opposite the Lviv Opera, in the very centre of the city.\textsuperscript{56} This would also have meant that it would have occupied the site of the former Lenin monument and an earlier stone block honouring Adolf Hitler. The same group of critics opposed the final concept of the monument, which was the result of no less than seven competitions over nearly ten years. They still found that the triumphal arch was reminiscent of a gallows or an «inverted trident», literally perverting Ukraine’s national symbol.\textsuperscript{57} Other critics, also generally supporting the monument, deplored its size and appearance, comparing it to Soviet statues.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{50} Y. Lishchenko, «A vam pamiatnyk Banderi nikoho ne nahaduie?», in: \textit{Vyzoky Zamok} 189 (16 October 2007).

\textsuperscript{51} Hordasevych, \textit{Nash Lviv}, 386.

\textsuperscript{52} Rossolinski, «Bandera», 115.


\textsuperscript{54} As quoted in Rossolinski, «Bandera», 115.

\textsuperscript{55} O. Keryk / L. Melnyk, «Kamin spotykannie pid triumfalnoiu arkoiu», in: \textit{Lviska Hazeta} (7 March 2007).

\textsuperscript{56} Hordasevych, \textit{Nash Lviv}, 385.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{58} B. Yurochko, «Monument lehendi», in: \textit{Lviska Hazeta} 183 (12 October 2007).
These arguments took place within the group of those for whom the need for a Bandera monument in Lviv was self-evident and who did not ask if a monument was to be built, but only how and where. A concise statement of this position came from Yuliia Lishchenko, a writer at the local Vysokyi Zamok newspaper, who reported critical reactions to the project, such as complaints about «that same already painfully well-known arm, ... that same coat catching the wind, that same wide «revolutionary» step ahead», referring to the resemblance between the monumental Bandera and Lenin. Lishchenko also insisted that a «modern European state, which Ukraine strives to be, must abandon the principles of socialist realism. ... The monument and its ... content and ... form must speak to the future and not to the past ... Nobody diminishes the importance of the appearance (finally!) of a monument of Stepan Bandera in Lviv.... But why, under the guise of patriotism, do they force artistic concepts on us, which we had already had enough of in the last century...?».  

The Bandera monument’s history shows that there was broad consensus on building it and virtually no principal criticism. Important questions as to what Bandera’s OUN-B represented besides the moral purity, heroism, and millennial liberation struggles ascribed to them by the activists of the monument were not raised.

Yet, this was not the nationalist equivalent of a Soviet culture of memory. Especially against the background of a comprehensive consensus around building a Bandera monument, three differences stood out. First, public debate was part of making the monument. The underlying consensus did not inhibit it, but instead promoted it. Second, the two main sides in the debate both found it necessary to build, or pretend to have behind them, as broad coalitions of individuals and associations as possible. Third, both sides also found it necessary to advertise their broad support and to claim – rightly or wrongly – that it amounted to either the «whole public» or the «whole intelligentsia» of Lviv.

5. The Lonski Prison Complex: Local or National?

While the monument for Stepan Bandera is dedicated to the single authoritarian nationalist leader or providnyk through whose imagined figure a specifically nationalist teleology of Ukrainian independence is projected onto Lviv’s city-scape, the new project of a memorial complex in the former Lonski Prison has posed a different set of questions. The imposing neo-Renaissance building still used as a prison in the first post-Soviet years is located close to the city centre at the beginning of Bandera Street, the end of which is now marked by Bandera’s monument.

59 Lishchenko, «A vam pamiatnyk Banderi nikohone nahadui?» (my emphasis).
60 The prison’s name derives from the former Polish name of a side street through which prisoners entered the building, Łackiego Street.
Moreover, in front of the Lonski Prison building stands Lviv’s major memorial to the victims of Communist crimes. Together with the Bandera monument, the Lonski Prison complex – under the official name «Memorial Museum of the Victims of Occupation Regimes «The Prison on Lonski [Street]»» – will establish an axis of national suffering and nationalist triumph along one of Lviv’s main streets.

During the Second World War, both Soviet and German police forces used the building as a prison to incarcerate as well as interrogate, torture and kill a wide range of victims. These included political prisoners during the first Soviet occupation drawn from all ethnic groups in Lviv, mostly Poles, Jews and Ukrainians. The prison was also one of the main killing sites of the Soviet prison massacres preceding the German taking of the city in 1941 as well as one of the main sites of the pogrom following it and a later pogrom known as the *Petliura Days* at the end of July.

Under German occupation, its victims included Jews who were caught trying to hide, Ukrainian and Polish underground members, but also some members of collaborating Polish and Ukrainian police units who had fallen foul of their German superiors. After the reconquest of Lviv by Soviet forces, among those imprisoned in the Lonski Prison there initially were members of the Polish underground and later Ukrainian nationalists, Greek-Catholics resisting the Soviet suppression of their Church, and secular dissidents. The history of repression at Lonski was genuinely, if sadly, multi-national, and the prison is important in several cultures of memory.

In July 2008, the Lviv City Council announced a competition for the architectural design of a «memorial complex in memory of the victims of occupation regimes in Lviv». At the same time, the Liberation Movement Research Centre (formerly, the Centre for Research on the Liberation Efforts), based in Lviv but under President Yushchenko closely connected to the SBU through its first director, Volodymyr Viatrovych, was involved in the museum’s development. Moreover, a number of former dissidents and nationalist activists also exerted influence.

As of 2009, the project of building what was meant to become one of Ukraine’s largest and most well-known memorial complexes was characterised by a strict focus on Ukrainian victimisation, excluding the victimisation of others and any references to Ukrainians as perpetrators. Moreover, even while 1960s dissidents and religious oppositionists were included, the victimisation of Ukrainians was mostly narrowed down to that of nationalist independence fighters.

A first, small exhibition was opened in June 2009 in an official act embedded in the celebrations of Ukraine’s Constitution Day and attended not only by local

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61 See the deposition of Shoah survivor Marceli Lubasz at the YIVO Archive, Record Group 720, Box 2, Folder 115, Marceli Lubasz, 4–5.
political and religious dignitaries, but also by the head of the SBU, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko. In his address he set the prison only in the context of «over seventy years of [the] Ukrainian fight for ... statehood» and explained that it «embodied the cruelty of occupation regimes in Western Ukraine as it housed prisons of Polish, German and Soviet regimes.» While he mentioned the «tragic days of ... late June 1941», he pointedly omitted those of early July and spoke only about the Soviet massacres. Then, «[d]uring the German occupation», Nalyvaichenko said, «the prison became the site where the enemies of [the] Reich were interrogated». Nalyvaichenko also explained that «[a]uthorities changed ... on Ukrainian soil, yet they were [all] united by the wish to get rid of [everything] Ukrainian, [and] dissolve the national identity of our people. Therefore, whether it was the Polish police, German Gestapo or the Soviet NKVD-KGB, their main prisoners remained fighters for independence, participants of the liberation movement.» These statements especially provoked a critical response from Poland across the political spectrum.

Nalyvaichenko’s odd implications, virtually equating Nazi and Soviet repression on one side and Polish inter-war repression on the other were not a slip of the tongue or spontaneous. His approach merely reflected the position of the Liberation Movement Research Centre in Lviv as expressed in background information for the first competition call for the architectural design of the new memorial complex. Apart from its exclusive focus on Ukrainians as victims and heroes, this text was defined by conceptualising the experiences of (all of) Soviet and Nazi rule in the same general category of «occupation regimes» as Polish inter-war rule, even privileging the interpretative key of «occupation» over the otherwise expectable category of totalitarianism.

The small preliminary exhibition, opened at the Lonski complex in 2009, was based on the same principles. Covering mostly the period of the first Soviet occupation between 1939 and 1941, it dwelled on Soviet crimes and the massacres of 1941 but omitted the following pogrom. This was a particularly striking blank spot because the exhibition included footage showing victims of the Soviet massacre being carried out of a basement, presumably at the Lonski Prison or another prison in Lviv. Part of the pogrom consisted of forcing Jews to retrieve such corpses, which is a well-known fact, at least among historians. Yet the footage in the exhibition is unexplained and, since the exhibition as a whole makes no mention of the pogrom, a visitor can easily fail to grasp that the men carrying a corpse are likely to be Jewish victims of a pogrom.

In a similar vein, the further history of the prison under German occupation was reduced to the persecution of Ukrainian nationalists, whose organisation was
described as the principal enemy of the Germans in Lviv. Thus, the greater importance of Polish underground structures in the city and the prison’s use as a holding and torture facility for Jews were both omitted. On 17 September, the anniversary of the «Golden September» Soviet attack on Poland, a second exhibition was added, dedicated to «Communist Terror in Ukraine» between the 1920s and 1950s.64

While Nalyvaichenko’s statements at the opening of the Lonski complex provoked protests in Poland, there was no significant public debate in Lviv either of this particular event or of the Lonski complex and its first exhibition. At the same time, in 2009, there were in fact severe and, in part, public conflicts within the group of individuals and organisations developing the Lonski complex over the last two to three years, that is public organisations in Lviv, the SBU, the Liberation Movement Research Centre, and the Lviv City and Regional Councils. The most obvious sign of conflict was the fact that the Lonski complex had two directors, one appointed by the mayor and representing the City Council and another one, who was also heading the Liberation Movement Research Centre as well as the Lviv branch of the SBU archives.

Meanwhile, a group of 27 scholars, publicists and activists mostly, though not exclusively, from Lviv published an open letter in which they objected to the Lonski complex being under SBU direction.65 The letter argued that «academic circles, Ukrainian as well as abroad, and the public of Lviv are worried about the situation which has arisen around» the Lonski complex. The complex was described as an «academic-research institution, which is called upon to research the history of repressions and crimes against humanity, directed against the Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish and other peoples ... in the time between the First and Second World Wars, in the time of Soviet and Nazi occupation as well as during the post-war period». Stressing the regional, all-Western-Ukrainian significance of the prison, the letter also underlined its «importance for the public of Lviv».

The letter warned that the Lonski complex should not depend «on political factors, ideological orientation and the personal views of people who hold high state offices» and argued that the only way to avoid such a risk was to «remove the museum from [its] subordination» to the SBU. The letter also employed the rhetoric of «Europe» and described the museum as «an important factor in confirming Lviv as a European city and Ukraine as a European state.» The signatories’ vision of the future function of the Lonski complex as a «site of meetings, mutual understanding and awareness of the past» was advanced to support their claim that «the city of Lviv ... should have the main initiative and be the main founder of such a

65 http://www.zaxid.net/newsua/2009/10/6/ 105407/ (accessed 7 October 2009). In the spirit of reasonable disclosure, the author should declare that he was among the signatories.
museum. Precisely the Lviv public reliably guarantees the creation and the stable functioning» of the museum, which requires «involving the public, including experts, academics and researchers, in the widest possible manner.»

The Lonski complex has thus also turned out to be a project in which a general consensus did not exclude debate. None of the involved actors doubted that Lonski should become a memorial complex. Yet the issue of who could really define its policies and content will probably not go away, but will continue to produce tension, only in a different institutional framework. At any rate, some representatives of Lviv’s public openly objected to the idea that a security service should manage a memorial complex, arguing that this would damage Lviv’s claim to European belonging and identity and insisting on a local right to define a site of memory and commemoration. Yet several other generally acknowledged representatives of Lviv’s public as well as the former President’s wife Kateryna Yushchenko threw their weight behind the position of the SBU and the Liberation Movement Research Centre.\footnote{http://www.zaxid.net/newsua/2009/9/26/ 173034 / (accessed 27 September 2009).} In the end, the Lonski issue caused public debate and many of its participants principally acknowledged the importance of the city’s public sphere while nobody argued directly against it. The question was who could claim the public and not whether it mattered.

As of 2009, the Lonski complex was still mostly incomplete, while the Bandera monument was nearly finished. Concerning the monument, there could already be no doubt that it would convey a strictly nationalist message. In the case of the Lonski complex, there were also few reasons to expect much. Lonski may easily turn into a site where only Ukrainian suffering will be remembered while other victims and Ukrainian perpetrators will be aggressively consigned to oblivion. This would be a particularly powerful signal, since Lonski has a comparatively well-known past as a place where victims came from different ethnic as well as political backgrounds. In particular, the Lonski prison played a special role in the Shoah in Lviv. This raises the issue of how to speak about Ukrainian and Jewish suffering in one place without either equating them and thus entering a dead end of «victimhood competition» or relativising one against the other. Moreover, it also points to some Ukrainians as Shoah (co-)perpetrators, which in turn once again would break the rigid and false mould of pure heroism and pure victimhood that nationalist apologists would like to cast for Ukraine’s future culture of memory.

The limited but real increases in empathy for non-Ukrainian others which are reflected in the Istoriia Lvova may not (yet) be relevant, for instance, for those who will decide about the future of the Lonski complex, while the limits of openness demonstrated by the Istoriia’s and the Entsyklopediia’s treatment of the record of 393

Ukrainian nationalism in general and of the pogroms of 1941 in particular may well turn out to be more important.

Yet it is also clear that Lviv’s culture of memory, though dominated by nationalism, is not restricted to it. In fact, there are some public signs of alternative discourses making themselves heard and challenging the nationalist consensus. In this respect, it is particularly important that the appeal to Lviv’s public is now a commonly acknowledged source of legitimacy. As the discussion around the Bandera monument has shown, this is true even within the circle of those who share nationalist views and, as it seems, can often hardly imagine any others.

The Soviet culture of memory worked without and against the possibility of an autonomous public sphere. In spite of the real as well as apparent continuities between the Soviet, post-Soviet and nationalism-dominated culture of memory in Lviv, the latter cannot be interpreted as a mere nationalist, ideologically inverted copy of the former. The underlying social processes are different, marked by – ordinarily imperfect – debate and appeals to the public, with the new nationalist culture of memory being produced by and embedded in a growing local public sphere.

This, however, is no guarantee of its real pluralism and does not necessarily protect it from aggressive simplification and stultifying distortions. On the contrary, in the worst case, Lviv may turn out to be an illustration of how post- and non-Soviet social processes can produce a culture of memory not far behind the Soviet in its production and preservation of omissions and distortions. This would be the ultimate as well as the most bitter irony.

At the same time, the most important implication of understanding the underlying difference between Lviv’s Soviet and post-Soviet cultures of memory is that this need not happen. While results look similar, the possibility of a growing diversity is inherent in how they are produced. Put differently, an irony of history, or perhaps memory, is bound to occur. The question that is still open is whether it will be tragic – with an open society intentionally producing a closed past for itself – or hopeful – with a crude nationalist culture of memory pursuing closure while unintentionally confirming modes of open discourse inviting alternatives.
This article addresses the changes of post-Soviet culture of memory of the Second World War in the western Ukrainian city and regional centre of Lviv. Attempts to forge a heroic and innocent memory of Ukrainian nationalism in the Second World War have constituted the single most influential factor shaping the post-Soviet culture of memory. Yet, at the same time, the latter is a complex social phenomenon. This article argues that, despite real continuities, the influence of nationalism in contemporary Lviv cannot be understood as a simple «mirror image» of Soviet myth-making. The article also stresses that outcomes are open and can be dire as well as hopeful. In a bitter paradox, post-Soviet Lviv can turn itself into a substantially open urban society, intentionally producing a closed, intolerant, misleading and narrow-minded past for itself, as it were «from below», in a way that Soviet myths could never have achieved. On the other side, the manner in which nationalism now has to pursue its aims of closure and discursive hegemony may unintentionally help confirm modes of public discourse, which then can also open up alternatives.

Anders, aber gleich oder gleich, aber anders?
Die öffentliche Erinnerung an den Zweiten Weltkrieg im postsowjetischen Lemberg

Différent, mais pareil ou pareil, mais différent?
La mémoire collective de la Seconde Guerre mondiale dans un Lviv post-soviétique
Cet article a pour objet l’évolution de la culture de la mémoire postsovietique de la Seconde Guerre mondiale dans ce centre de l’Ukraine occidentale: la ville de Lviv. Cette culture de la mémoire est avant tout façonnée par les tentatives visant à
forger une mémoire héroïque et innocente du nationalisme ukrainien pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Nonobstant, cette culture est un phénomène social complexe. Ainsi, l'article soutient l'idée que l'on ne peut pas comprendre l'influence du nationalisme lvivois contemporain comme un simple «reflet» de la création soviétique de mythes, même si des continuités réelles existent. En outre, l'auteur souligne que tout cheminement est ouvert et que les conséquences peuvent être non seulement négatives mais aussi porteuses d'espoir. Triste paradoxe que le Lviv postsoviétique réussisse son développement vers une société urbaine majoritairement ouverte, tout en s’inventant délibérément un passé fermé, intolérant, trompeur et étroit d’esprit – dans un processus allant de la base au sommet, d’une manière dont les mythes soviétiques n’auraient jamais réussi. D’autre part, la façon dont le nationalisme doit désormais poursuivre ses objectifs de fermeture et d’hégémonie discursive, pourrait aussi contribuer involontairement à faire naître des discours alternatifs.

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